CBO estimate on nuclear loan guarantees
For this estimate, CBO assumes that the first nuclear plant built using a federal loan guarantee would have a capacity of 1,100 megawatts and have associated project costs of $2.5 billion. We expect that such a plant would be located at the site of an existing nuclear plant and would employ a reactor design certified by the NRC prior to construction. This plant would be the first to be licensed under the NRC’s new licensing procedures, which have been extensively revised over the past decade.
Based on current industry practices, CBO expects that any new nuclear construction project would be financed with 50 percent equity and 50 percent debt. The high equity participation reflects the current practice of purchasing energy assets using high equity stakes, 100 percent in some cases, used by companies likely to undertake a new nuclear construction project. Thus, we assume that the government loan guarantee would cover half the construction cost of a new plant, or $1.25 billion in 2011.
CBO considers the risk of default on such a loan guarantee to be very high—well above 50 percent. The key factor accounting for this risk is that we expect that the plant would be uneconomic to operate because of its high construction costs, relative to other electricity generation sources. In addition, this project would have significant technical risk because it would be the first of a new generation of nuclear plants, as well as project delay and interruption risk due to licensing and regulatory proceedings.
Note the price - $2.5 billion was to be only for the first plant. Future plants were, according to the assumptions provided by the nuclear industry, expected to have
lower costs as economy of scale resulted in savings.
In fact, since the report was written (2003), the estimated cost has risen to an average of about $8 billion.
Wonder what that does to the “risk is that … the plant would be uneconomic to operate because of its high construction costs, relative to other electricity generation sources”?
Does that risk diminish or increase when the price rises from $2.5 billion to $8 billion?
With wind and solar, not such a problem at all.
Here is a Citigroup investment report where they say that over 70% of merchant reactors in UK would not have a market if they were built as planned by vendors - which means long term negative cash flow and eventual bankruptcy, and that is AFTER the nuclear industry has over the past 50 years received about 95% of all non-fossil energy subsidies. This is exactly what happened during the last bandwagon market also.
http://www.olino.org/us/articles/2009/11/26/the-economics-of-nuclear-reactors-renaissance-or-relapseThe price of nuclear subsidies is definitely worth looking at. Nuclear proponents will tell you the subsidies per unit of electricity for nuclear are no worse than for renewables. That statement omits the fact than nuclear power has received the lions share of non fossil energy subsidies for more than 50 years with no apparent payoff; for all the money we've spent we see a steadily escalating cost curve for nuclear. When we compare that to renewables we find that a small fraction of the total amount spent on nuclear has resulted in rapidly declining costs that for wind are already competitive with coal and rapidly declining costs for solar that are competitive with natural gas and will soon be less expensive than coal.
http://www.1366tech.com/cost-curve/In other words: subsidies work to help the renewable technologies stand on their own but with nuclear they do nothing but prop up an industry that cannot be economically viable.
Another factor that truly limits the utility of the nuclear indsutry’s preferred way of framing the impact of subsidies to our understanding of the true situation is found in the report
Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy Markets 2007 Published in April 2008 published by the Energy Information Administration Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric, and Alternate Fuels.
These /kwh numbers present the standard argument offered by the Nuclear Fission Industry and are
current year production divided by
this years subsidies for each power source (at least a very incomplete version of what is counted as a subsidy DOE).
The information they are trying to obscure is in the chart below where you can see that the subsidies over all this time have shown no results in the realm of mainstreaming the economics of fission reactors.
Full report:
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear_subsidies_report.pdfThis shows that when we look at
lifetime subsidies against lifetime production of nuclear fission power the subsidies fission has received are worth more than the average value of the electricity produced.
That's right. We paid for every kilowatt of nuclear fission derived electricity twice, once through the utility and once through the tax man.
You won't hear that from the nuclear industry.