http://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc080922.htmAn Open Letter to the U.S. Congress Regarding the Current Financial Crisis
John P. Hussman, Ph.D.
Summary Of Principles
1)
Public funds must function to increase the capital of distressed financial companies, not simply to take bad assets off of the balance sheet at market value (which may improve the "quality" of the balance sheet, but does nothing to improve the capital cushion and therefore little to avoid future runs on the institution).2)
In return for these funds, the government should NOT take equity (which is a subordinate claim and also creates potential conflicts of interest), but instead should take a SENIOR claim that precedes not only the stockholders but also the senior bondholders in the event the company defaults anyway. Congress may need to make some modification to existing bankruptcy law or provide for expedited bondholder approval to do this, but essentially, the government's claim should be subordinate only to customers in the event of default, and senior to both stockholders and bondholders. However,
it should also be countable as capital for the purposes of satisfying bank capital requirements.3) Ideally, the rate of interest on such funds should be relatively high (which will encourage these firms to substitute private financing as soon as possible), but actual payment should be made once the firms are again profitable so that the payment burden does not weaken them during the present recession.
4) The bill should allow for
expedited bankruptcy resolution for these institutions, so that in the event of failure, the "good" bank (all assets and customer liabilities, but excluding debt to bondholders) can be cut away and liquidated to an acquirer as a "whole bank" sale.
For nearly all of these institutions, the debt to bondholders is far more than sufficient to absorb any losses even in the event of bankruptcy. The current difficulty is that the bankruptcy process itself draws out the process of taking receivership, cutting away the good bank so that it can be sold to an acquirer, and delivering the proceeds as a residual to bondholders. Streamlining that process is one of the best ways to ensure that the failure of one institution does not have "systemic" effects.
5) To assist homeowners, the bill should
allow for a reduction of mortgage principal during foreclosure, but the mortgage lender should also receive a Property Appreciation Right (PAR) that gives the original lender a claim on future property appreciation up to that original mortgage amount. In other words, the homeowner receives a substantially lower mortgage balance and payment burden now, but the lender stands to be made whole over time through property appreciation rather than immediate burdens on the homeowner to make payments.
To the Congress of the United States
In 2006, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis noted “Everyone knows that a policy of bailouts will increase their number.” This week, Congress is being asked to hastily consider a monstrous bailout plan on a scale nearly equivalent to the existing balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.
As an economist and investment manager, I am concerned that the plan advocated by Treasury is essentially a plan to bail out the bondholders of financial institutions that made bad lending decisions, with little help to homeowners that are actually in financial distress. It is difficult to believe that the U.S. government is contemplating taking on the bad assets of these institutions at probable taxpayer loss and effectively immunizing the bondholders (and shareholders) of these companies.
While it is certainly in the public interest to avoid the dislocations that would result from a disorderly failure of highly interconnected financial institutions, there are better ways for public funds to accomplish this, other than by protecting corporate bondholders while homeowners remain in distress.
Consider a simplified balance sheet of a typical investment bank:
Good assets: $95
Assets gone bad: $5
TOTAL ASSETS: $100
Liabilities to customers/counterparties: $80
Debt to bondholders of company: $17
Shareholder equity: $3
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY: $100
Now, as these bad assets get written off, shareholder equity is also reduced. What has happened in recent months is that this equity has become insufficient, so that the company technically becomes insolvent provided that the bondholders have to be paid off:
Good assets: $95
Assets gone bad (written off): $0
TOTAL ASSETS: $95
Liabilities to customers/counterparties: $80
Debt to bondholders of company: $17
Shareholder equity: (-$2)
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY: $95
These institutions are not failing because 95% of the assets have gone bad. They are failing because 5% of the assets have gone bad and they over-stretched their capital. At the heart of the problem is “gross leverage” – the ratio of total assets taken on by the company to its shareholder equity. The sequence of failures we've observed in recent months, starting with Bear Stearns, has followed almost exactly in order of their gross leverage multiples. After Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac went into crisis, Lehman and Merrill Lynch followed. Morgan Stanley, and Hank Paulson's former employer, Goldman Sachs, remain the most leveraged companies on Wall Street, with gross leverage multiples above 20.
Look at the insolvent balance sheet again. The appropriate solution is not for the government to purchase bad assets with public money. The only way such a transaction would add to the institution's capital would be for the government to overpay for those assets. Rather, the government should either a) provide new capital, taking a claim in front of the company's bondholders and stockholders, or b) execute a receivership of the failed institution and immediately conduct a “whole bank” sale – selling the bank's assets and liabilities as a package, but ex the debt to bondholders, which preserves the ongoing business without loss to customers and counterparties, wipes out shareholder equity, and gives bondholders partial (perhaps even nearly complete) recovery with the proceeds.
The key is to recognize that for nearly all of the institutions currently at risk of failure, there exists a cushion of bondholder capital sufficient to absorb all probable losses, without any need for the public to bear the cost.
For example, consider Morgan Stanley's balance sheet as of 8/31/08. Total assets were $988.8 billion, with shareholder equity (including junior subordinated debt) of $42.1 billion, for a gross leverage ratio of 23.5. However, the company also has approximately $200 billion in long-term debt to its bondholders, primarily consisting of senior debt with an average maturity of about 6 years. Why on earth would Congress put the U.S. public behind these bondholders?
The stockholders and bondholders of the company itself should be the first to bear losses, not the public. That is the essence of what a free and fair market, and a responsible government would enforce. The investors in the companies that produced the losses should be accountable for them, and the customers and counterparties should be protected.
The case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was special in that government had already provided an implicit guarantee to their bondholders, so that bailout couldn't have been done otherwise without harming the good faith and credit of the government, but it's absurd to tell Wall Street “send us your poor and your tired assets, and we will tend to them.” The gains in financial stocks we have observed in recent days reflects money that those firms expect to be taken out of the public pocket.
A further difficulty with the Treasury plan is that it does little to actually reliquify banks that are at risk. To the contrary, the process of reverse-auctioning bad mortgage debt will provide for "price discovery" about what these assets are actually worth, most likely forcing other institutions to write down assets that are still held on the books at unrealistically high values. As a result, we may observe an increase, rather than a decrease, in the number of financial institutions having insufficient capital.
Replacing the bad assets on the balance sheet with cash, at the market value of those bad assets, may improve the quality of the balance sheet, but does nothing to increase the capital on that balance sheet or the ability of financial institutions to lend. If the objective is to prevent these institutions from bankruptcy or liquidation, or to increase their ongoing lending capacity, then the government requires a method to provide more capital. It is essential that in return for providing more capital, the government should receive a special, possibly novel, security interest that places the government in front of even senior bondholders in the event that the institution fails anyway.
Rather than making small changes around the edges of Treasury's vague and costly proposal, Congress should focus its attention on approaches that will provide capital to viable institutions and expedite the assumption and "whole bank" sale of failing ones.
On the regulatory front, Congress should restrict the speculative use of credit default swap (CDS) transactions. These swaps are essentially insurance policies that pay the holder in the event that an institution's bonds fail. Both credit default swaps and short sales should be allowed for bona-fide hedging purposes when an investor has a related asset that is at risk. However, it is appropriate for regulators to curtail the speculative use of credit default swaps and short sales relating to financial institutions.
With regard to assisting homeowners, purchasing the bad mortgage securities from financial institutions will do nothing to help those homeowners because it does nothing to alter the cash flows expected of them. Congress will be a far better steward of public funds by offering distressed homeowners what amounts to a refinancing, coupled with a partial surrender of future appreciation.
In practice, when a homeowner defaults on an existing mortgage, the bankruptcy court would be allowed to "push down" the principal value. Alternatively, government could purchase the foreclosed property at an amount near existing foreclosure recovery rates (presently about 50% of mortgage face value), and the government would then sell that home back to the owner with a zero-equity mortgage, allowing individuals to keep their homes. In either case, there would be an additional obligation placed on the property owner in the form of what might be called a “Property Appreciation Right” (PAR), which would be provided to the original mortgage lender. Though it would accrue no interest, it would provide a claim to the original lender on any appreciation in the value of the original home (or other property subsequently purchased by the homeowner) up to the difference between the foreclosure proceeds and the original mortgage amount. Note that the PAR would only become relevant at the point that the government was fully repaid.
For example, consider a homeowner with a $300,000 mortgage balance on a home now worth less than the mortgage balance itself. The government would buy the foreclosed property at say, $200,000 and mortgage it to the existing homeowner. The original lender would receive $200,000, plus a Property Appreciation Right (PAR), giving it a claim on $100,000 of any future appreciation of property. If the homeowner was to sell the property later for, say, $250,000, the owner of the PAR would receive $50,000, and there would be a remaining lien on future appreciation of property purchased by the homeowner. At any point the recovery from price appreciation satisfied the $100,000 claim, the PAR would be fully repaid.
Some provision would have to be made for the appreciation of an unsold home, but that detail could be accomplished through some form of equity extraction refinancing. To account for time value, the claim on future appreciation could be increased at a small rate of interest. Though the credit impact of a mortgage default would likely be sufficient to dissuade solvent homeowners from making inappropriate use of the program, the government could impose additional costs or eligibility requirements to avoid such risks.
In summary, the Treasury proposal to address current financial difficulties places corporate bondholders ahead of the public, rewards irresponsible risk-taking, and sets a precedent for future bailouts. Moreover, we know from a long history of economic experience across countries that a major expansion of government liabilities is invariably followed by multi-year periods of extremely high inflation, particularly when it is not matched by a similar expansion of economic production. Such inflation would initially be modest because of the current weakness in the economy, but could pose unusual challenges to the United States in the coming years.
Congress can benefit the American public by maintaining a focus on responsibly assisting homeowners in distress rather than defending the stockholders and bondholders of overleveraged financial companies. It is essential to recognize that the failure of these companies need not result in “financial meltdown” provided that the “good bank” representing the vast majority of assets and liabilities is cut away, protecting customers and counterparties, so that the losses are properly borne out of the capital base of the companies that incurred them.
Again, everyone knows that a policy of bailouts will increase their number. By choosing who bears the losses for irresponsible decisions at these companies, Congress will also choose the scope of the bailouts that follow.
Sincerely,
John P. Hussman, Ph.D.
President, Hussman Investment Trust
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
