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transcript ((check out what i bolded))
EVENTDATE: 07-23
XXX after a year.
WOLFOWITZ: The entire south and north are impressively stable and the center is getting better day by day. The public food distribution is up and running. There is no food crisis.
I might point out, we planned for a food crisis. Fortunately, there isn't one.
Hospitals nationwide are open. Doctors and nurses are at work. Medical supply convoys are escorted to and from the warehouses. We planned for a health crisis; there isn't one.
Oil production has passed the 1-million-barrels-per-day mark. We planned for the possibility of massive destruction of this resource of the Iraqi people; we didn't have to do it.
The school year has been salvaged. Schools nationwide have reopened and final exams are complete.
There are local town councils in most major cities and major districts of Baghdad, and they are functioning free from Baathist influence.
There's been a lot of talk that there was no plan. There was a plan. But as any military officer can tell you, no plan survives first contact with reality. Inevitably, some of our assumptions turned out to be wrong.
Fortunately, many things turned out to be much better than our assumptions, in no small measure, I think, because of a brilliant military plan that achieved extraordinary surprise.
There is no humanitarian crisis. There is no refugee crisis. There is no health crisis. There has been minimal damage to infrastructure -- minimal war damage, lots of regime damage over decades, but minimal war damage to infrastructure except for telecommunications, which we had to target.
There's been no environmental catastrophe either from oil well fires or from dam breaks, and there has been no need for massive oil field repair.
So, fortunately, much of what we planned for, much of what's captured in the title of the initial office -- Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance -- what we planned for and budgeted for has not proved necessary. But some important assumptions turned out to underestimate the problem. Some conditions were worse than we anticipated, particularly in the security area, and there are three.
No army units, at least none of any significant size, came over to our side so that we could use them as Iraqi forces with us today.
MORE .ETX
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