BBV: Problem with Rush Holt's legislation?

[WilliamPitt]

I just got off the phone with the daughter/niece of James and Kenneth Collier, authors of the book "Votescam." She was calling in response to my interview on truthout about the machines. Her point was that Holt's legislation is not sufficient to deal with the computer voting problem. Essentially, the bill is useless because it does not mandate the counting of the demanded paper ballots under any and all circumstances.

Follow me here. Recounts happen when the vote tallys fall within 1% of each other. The problem with the computer voting is that the recount depends on the questionable machines - push a button, get a number - which is why paper ballots for a recount are so vital. BUT if the vote does not fall within that 1% margin, there is no recount, and the paper ballots never come into play.

Ms. Collier was saying the Holt legislation needs to mandate the counting of the ballots regardless of the closeness of the election, a requirement not present in the Holt bill. She admitted that she is an advocate of paper-ballots only, and wants the computers "burned in the town square."

But does she have a point? Discuss.

[VelmaD]

1. I agree with her 100%

Burn 'em in the town square.

If the "bad guys" are gonna tamper with the code and sway the outcomes of elections but they know anything within 1% is gonna require a recount of the paper ballots then they'll just program the election not to be that close.

It ain't rocket science. :-)

[creativelcro]

31. see later posts please...

This 1% thing is incorrect. And, BTW, VoteScam is not exactly a book we can trust either (no references, nothing, we have to trust what's written in there; sound like Diebold to me :) .
-C

[Salviati]

2. Absolutely...

My feelings are there needs to be a provision for auditing the elections randomly, to see if the electronic count matches the paper count. Perhaps stipulate a certain percentage of elections will be randomly audited. As well as anyone can demand a specific audit of any election, as long as they're willing to pay for it. If it's easy enough to rig an election that we need to worry about it (which it is) then it's easy enough to rig it beyond the cutoff for automatic recounts...

[OneBlueSky]

3. sounds like she has an excellent point . . .

take, for example, the 2002 elections in Georgia . . . while the final counts weren't within 1% of each other in, say, Max Cleland's Senate race, the swing in the vote from the most recent polls to the actual vote count was pretty dramatic . . . but if these totals didn't hit the 1% margin to kick in the recount, we'd never know if the vote was rigged against Cleland or not . . .

one question that I don't know the answer to: can individual candidates demand a recount regardless of the vote margin? . . . anyone? . . .

[papau]

4. Must we assume massive fraud will be caught? - at the moment

the "unusual" results seem to come as the last machines are counted - with Dem areas voting 75% GOP due to some last minute conversion - which makes the GOP the winner.

But the amount of the spread tends to get beyond any 1% recount margin - Senator Hegal is claiming upset victories in the 70 to 80% range.

I tend to agree that a recount be mandatory and be via paper as long as corporate America has control of the count via BBV that can not be inspected, or for that matter, since counting votes is not tough, as long as Federal regulation and authorized computer programs and security are not mandated. SAIC certification is a bit worse than a Fox in the Chicken Coop, since the Fox has dinner served with a wait staff under current rules..

[Don_G]

5. She Has An Excellent Point

With the security of the BBV machines "sub-par" and the number of hackers out there, I believe it would be near mandantory to have an independant record of the tally from each BBV machine and votes not tallied for each precinct until independant conformation is recieved by another seperate means with another paper trail like verbal conformation over the telephone with forms being filled out at both locations with a verification code, name date/time, and persons involved for example.

[Green Mountain Dem]

6. Hi Will ... thanks for bringing this up..

I remain convinced that the only way around the BBV issue is to vote by absentee ballot, and even then I have my doubts. I have asked my Sens (Leahy/Jeffords) and Bernie to support the Holt bill, and I will pass on your info to their offices. I certainly was not aware of the situation you raise and I wonder if we will ever be able to vote again and KNOW that the process was not corrupted...Welcome to the new American Century!!

[Kelvin Mace]

7. We've said this all along...

It *must* mandate a paper ballot for voting PERIOD. This is one of the reasons we haven't endorsed the bill on the site.

Diebold AccuVote Ingredients

Taxpayer money.................$5000
Security Flaws....................328
Critical Security Flaws.........26
CEO commitments to
deliver election to GOP........1
Tamper-proof Paper ballots...0
Tamper-friendly digital
ballots................................At least 32MB
Your actual vote..................None of your business.

Edit: Added clarifying sentence.

[creativelcro]

11. if I remember correctly

it mandates random recounts on .5% of all votes (random precints etc), regardless of how close the results are.
We need to be practical, I think. That bill could be amended, but it is not a useless bill. Look, I can imagine why they did not go for 5% or so (.5% may have enough statistical power to detect many anomalies, I haven't done the calculations): because there could be opposition based on cost considerations.
I'd like some discussion on this issue. We can complain back and forth about the Holt bill not being perfect, but, concretely, what alternatives do you have in mind ? Without something concrete like the Holt bill, it seems to me that the accusation that all this screaming by BBVer will simply result in loss of voter confidence and nothing positive (something that is addressed in the WP interviewe) will turn out to be true.
-C

[SharonAnn]

8. Absolutely, there must be random recounts at a minimum

Randomly picked machines (must use true randomizing selection process) and a manual recount must be done to determine if the recount matches the machine count. Also, the consolidating systems have to be checked, etc. You would want auditors to set up the procedures (in conjunction with computer folks and election folks).

Without doing that, a paper ballot from these machines is meaningless. Think about it. If a 1% or less vote difference triggered the recount then all you have to do (if you're compromising the programming of the machine for counting) is make sure that the vote difference is more than 1%. That's not hard to do. Anyone who's capable of compromising the machine counting canmake the count come out however they want.

[Cocoa]

9. the Holt bill by definition is directly opposed to her goals

the Holt bill aims to increase confidence in voting machines.

VoteScam seems to be in the business of selling distrust of our elections. It seems to be their raison d'etre.

They appear from their website, and the number of times they are cited in NewsMax and at FreeRepublic, to be the flip side of our very own BBV.*


*this use of the trademark BBV does not represent the official definition of Bev Harris or Plan Nine Publishing, or affiliates.

[WilliamPitt]

10. I must confess that I have not read the book

[creativelcro]

29. read Black Box Voting (forget VoteScam)

It's an easy read, if you are already familiar with the issues. It's well written and I think it is balanced (at least up to Chapter 9, have not seen the rest). -C
PS. I am talking about black Box Voting (not VoteScam; VoteScam is hard to digest; no refs, nothing).

[GregD]

39. Votescam seems fishy -

I found it hard to believe as more than a silly conspiracy.

I watched the video one evening, showing the author being filmed as he walked around the upstairs of some "secret vote counting center".

All the people upstairs where the counting machines were located (this is back in the 60's or 70's if I recall correctly, so we're talking punch card readers) were hanging out drinking and having a party.

The people downstairs, sitting around tables and shown on film to be punching holes in ballots were purported to be the League of Woman Voters.

OTOH, one would think that the LWV would be "on our side" of the touchscreen voting issue, and they are not at all (at least in terms of their national position. Here is a group of LWV members who wish to change that position: http://www.leagueissues.org

Then again, I think that death threats and deaths actually surrounded their efforts. And some of the reference materials I recall looking at which are linked (to or from, I don't recall exactly) seemed rather compelling (although I may simply be far too gullible on this one.)

To be taken very seriously, I think some serious investigation of VoteScam's assertions would be needed. Where's Greg Palast? Maybe he can help!

[Kelvin Mace]

43. The major problem with Vote Scam

is it has ZERO sources. No footnotes or anything else to back it up.

David Allen
Publisher, CEO, Janitor
Plan Nine Publishing
http://www.plan9.org

[salin]

12. Can someone tell me the resistance to optical scan machines?

I voted on one for several years in California. Very easy to use (draw a line connecting the office to the candidate). The ballot was scanned and went into (stored) the machine. Thus the ballots were all in one place, easy to verify, with no hanging chads.

A while back I saw periodic resistance to optical scan machines - but can't remember why.

[shance]

14. Cant optical scans be manipulated and programmed various ways?

I remember watching a segment on local news describing the flaws in optical scanning and how supermarkets were overcharging (gasp!) customers because the optical scanners were, for some unknown reason**, increasing the prices on certain items.

Technology is great so long as it is not used in the elective process.

[creativelcro]

17. from what I remember...

there are legal obstacles to recounting the ballots that go through the optical scanners. it can only be done in limite circumstances. I don't remember the details though... Anybody up to speed on this ? Thanks. -C

[salin]

19. Wonder what that is about

Seriously. I watched my ballots read, and then taken (and held) within the machine. Why would there be challenges to reading these. They are much easier to read then punch cards, and I can't think of any legal difference between scanned ballots and punched ballots.

It could be that the insides of the machine (eg code) is protected from read. ?

[creativelcro]

23. problem with recounting optical scan "ballots"

here is where I read it (bbvreport.org). Any comments ? -C
_____________________________________________________________________
Accept nothing less than a paper ballot that you verify. It is not a "receipt" or a "trail" but a ballot -- which should be considered the legal representation of your vote, and should be placed in a secure ballot box and retained as evidence of the vote.

Also, beware -- most voters think that with the fill-in-the-bubble or connect-the-line kinds of ballots, which you run through an optical scan machine, your vote is safe. It is not, and here's why:

BOLD BY C It is against the law to do a robust audit with these paper ballots. Except in very unusual circumstances, and with a court order, no one is allowed to look at these paper ballots to compare them with the machine count. In California, there is a random spot check of 1 percent, but that is inadequate.

We need meaningful electoral reform. HR 2239 gets us partway there; we have a long ways to go.

Bev Harris
Black Box Voting

[AP]

28. There should be a random sample plus recount for ANY/NO reason if

a computer is used to tabulate a vote.

For hand counts, a MOE that triggers a recount, or further count, seems to make sense.

Right?

[salin]

22. but the scanned ballot is kept - and thus can be verified

and verified much more easily than many other voting methods.

[shance]

40. Remember how the Republicans blocked the recount in Florida?

Theres your answer.

49. Florida `2000: Not exactly all the Republicans fault, per se

In my legal research for my case, the Weber Case, and related to Bev's book, I have discovered the US Supreme Court overlooked two provisions of Florida State Law.

I wrote a legal brief for the Weber case detailing this.

[Kelvin Mace]

44. The trouble with optical scanners

1) Doesn't eliminate the "ambiguity" problem. If someone changes their mind it can result in an over-vote.

2) The scanners can fail to read ballots correctly.

3) You still have to trust a "black box" (the software is secret and can be tampered with).

4) Do not fold, bend, spindle or mutilate your ballot.

With that said, they are pretty much the most reliable method we have at the moment and they retain a paper ballot.


David Allen
Publisher, CEO, Janitor
Plan Nine Publishing
http://www.plan9.org

[salin]

46. thanks for the clarification

of all the methods I have used to vote- I prefered this - because the ballot was retained. But am glad to have the run down of the potential problems.

[Eloriel]

76. Yes. Optical scanners use some of the same software

as are used on Diebold's DREs. If a computer is involved, it's chancy.

I myself prefer optical scans and for one reason: there IS a voter-verified paper ballot. However, we have to make sure state laws allow for those ballots to legally be used in a recount.

Another problem is stray marks on the page or other marking errors which can cause ballots to be rejected by the scanner. It's been reported that in some precincts in FL when some precints' ballots were rejected, they were just ignored by the machine whereas in other precincts, the machines notified the voter so corrective action could be taken.

However, at GA Tech last week, Dan Wallach absolutely convinced me that using the machines to basically create marked ballot which are counted by hand IS the way to go. I don't know if this is legislatively doable, but that would be my preference as well unless maybe we could get open source software on optical scanners.

Dan's point is that the more complexity, the more things we have to just trust. We shouldn't have to "trust" (faith-based voting) -- we need to be able to KNOW.

Eloriel

[ewagner]

79. Agreed

and add that a manual count of the paper ballots which would be compared to the machine totals should be part of the post election audit and certification.

[AP]

16. If you have optical scan and no-cause recounts, you've covered your bases,

right?

[salin]

21. I would think it would be an obvious solution.

Hard ballots - verifiable - easy to read - and hard to design a confusing "butterfly ballot" (by nature of the scan ballots one has to draw a line across from candidate to office; or ballot proposition to yes (or no).)

[creativelcro]

24. see post #23

[GregD]

34. The optical scan precincts are counted by GEMS

Given what has been observed by those that have looked at GEMS, that's sufficient reason for me to be sceptical about Diebold's AccuVote Optical Scan, which is used here in Marin County, California.

[creativelcro]

38. GEMS, you are right,

are used to count not only TS votes, but also optical scan etc... so, there you go... -C

[salin]

47. Not sure what kind

but voted with an optical scanner in the mid-late nineties in Santa Clara County.

[Junkdrawer]

13. The Bill does have Surprise Mandatory Recounts...

SEC. 7. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY RECOUNTS.

The Election Assistance Commission shall conduct manual mandatory surprise recounts of the voter-verified records of each election for Federal office (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office) in .5 percent of the jurisdictions in each State and .5 percent of the overseas jurisdictions in which voter-verified records are preserved in accordance with this section immediately following each general election for Federal office, and shall promptly publish the results of those recounts. The treatment of the results of the recount shall be governed by applicable Federal, State, or local law, except that any individual who is a citizen of the jurisdiction involved may file an appeal with the Commission if the individual believes that such law does not provide a fair remedy.

[creativelcro]

15. Thanks for citing section 7

I was remembering correctly, after all... So, what's the deal then ? What do the critics want ?? a 100% manual recount ?? Please, articulate your position, backing it up with facts... It will be good to clarify the issues! Thanks! -C

[Junkdrawer]

26. Without Section 7 the Bill would indeed be a joke...

I believe that if this issue ever gets traction, this will be the Repuke amendment target #1.

[creativelcro]

27. possible...

They would say it costs too much (??), or something idiotic like that... -C

"I believe that if this issue ever gets traction, this will be the Repuke amendment target #1."

[Junkdrawer]

30. I believe they will go after the States Rights issue...

Fed. government mandating changes to a State controlled function.

51. Problem is...

"States rights" turns into Executive power in the state, in the personage of the Secretary of State, also known as Kathy Harris and now Cathy Cox.

[GregD]

35. Here's a perfect example:

Texas 26th Burgess, Michael C.

Updated 9/10/2003:
I believe that H.R. 2239 would impose a significant and undue financial burden on the states because it would require states to purchase yet another set of expensive equipment. In these economic hard times, I believe the funding required to purchase more new voting system equipment could be better spent on other state and local programs.

[creativelcro]

36. Did this idiot

vote in favor of the 87 Billion to Iraq (especially the 20 billion for reconstruction ?). Seriously, we should keep track of this! Thanks. -C

[goobergunch]

52. Oh yes he did....

http://clerkweb.house.gov/cgi-bin/vote.exe?year=2003&rollnumber=562

[althecat]

66. The Election Assistance Commission shall... yeah right

Is this the commission that hasn't yet been appointed...

And to put this in perspective this is one in 200 counties... So if someone knows which counties will be checked then this procedure will be a waste of time. Knowing election officials track record it seems likely that they would pick the 10th 20th and 30th counties alphabetically in order to keep it simple....

Basically this is insufficient to give you any confidence that the elections are not being rigged.

There needs to be procedural checks on the results of every machine and/or every precinct....

I am not sure what the details are but I think someone did the math and suggested that uf you take a random sample of say 500 votes from a precinct and the result is more than say 5% away (I don't know what the no. is) from the reported result of the precinct as a whole then you can be reasonably confident you have a problem with your machines. Increase the sample size to increase your accuracy... and if the result stays out of sqew you eventually count all the paper ballots and then use that as your count.

It would be relatively easy to write a set of precinct level audit procedures like this that removed most of risk of DRE rigging.

[HFishbine]

18. Well then

who counts the paper? Republicans or Democrats?

[creativelcro]

20. most likely...

there will be watchers from both parties, as it is usual for recounts... -C

[shance]

25. Independents.

Im playing.

Both parties participate in the re-counts.

Although it seems customary for Republicans to bring in their team of briefcases and paid door bangers/intimidators.

:)

[creativelcro]

32. KICK

[AndyTiedye]

41. Allow a Recount if a losing candidate demands it.

[creativelcro]

42. ok, again...

Holt has a surprise recount of 0.5% of the votes. Are you talking about a 100% hand recount ? -C

[WhereIsMyFreedom]

100. A 0.5% surprise recount seems somewhat low.

I think there should be at a minimum 10% surprise recount. Or what about having a random 5% and then allow both the Dems and Repubs to choose an additional 5%. That way, if they think that there is something fishy they can have it recounted. And, allow a complete recount to happen if someone else is willing to pay for it, but have the state pick up the tab if the recount changes things by some percentage (5% maybe?).

[Ugnmoose]

33. Sample audit required

Any system should have a paper trail that would allow for an independent random sampling of results to verify the overall accuracy of the system (in effect a partial audit). If there are no discrepancies noted there would be no need to count every ballot.

[creativelcro]

37. partial audit

I agree with you. Only point: the independent "medium" has to have been verified by the voter, not the result of a post-election printout of what's stored in the machines. I assume that's what you mean as well. Thanks. -C

[Ugnmoose]

77. Absolutely

eom

[creativelcro]

45. KICK

50. Pummel (many kicks at once)

48. Items missing from the Bill

I noticed the same problem, plus more. I've supported the bill up to this point, but the bill isn't finished!

It needs:

1) Addition of whistleblower provisions, with incentives for employees to blow and be represented.

2) Addition of disbarment provisons in cases where a) Companies don't meet prerequisite standards and mis-represent--company is disbarred. b) Secretaries of State misrepresent or fail to do their job, like in Florida 2000 and apparently, Georgia 2002--a recount or emergency paper re-vote must be mandated and administered by DOJ or EAC.

3) Addition of mandatory process standards, as recommended in GAO 02-52.

3) In the text, references to "electronic record" and "paper record" must be changed to make the "paper ballot" the legal verified copy, and what is preserved and retained. References to "preserving record within" must be changed to "preserving and retaining paper ballot within"

4) As a prerequisite to be completed, President Bush must appoint the oversight committee which he was supposed to do a year ago.

5) Complete prior investigation of recent allegations about companies and Secretaries of State, to make sure one thru four above are enough!

To pass the bill without the above changes, will not address the problem which has evolved since the bill was drafted!

Dan Spillane
aka "Deep Vote"
(in the BBV Book, and the first to blow the whistle, and taught Bev all about the certification process)
Seattle, WA

See also
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,57831,00.html

[JohnGideon]

60. Our Wa. SoS Has Some Problems

With his predecessor, Ralph Munro, now on the BoD of VoteHere and their partnering with Sequoia, Sam Reed may have some conflict of interest and ethics problems. He is using a Sequoia voting machine in his tour of High Schools and he is touting IT as the machines that will be used in the future. If he, or anyone in the SoS Office, is involved in the contract for purchase of machines there will also be a conflict. We'll see what happens but I am watching closely.

[GregD]

64. WA State

One of our team (Ellen) is in WA, as are several active volunteers, and a few of them have each spent much time pressing for someone that would take the allegations (Diebold emails, King County, etc.) and run with it. The story of bouncing between the AG, SoS, and others - all passing the buck - seems to be a consistent theme. It's a continuous loop...

Greg

[JohnGideon]

73. I Have Been Working With RedEagle

and the Citizens for Voting Integrity here in Wa. state.

[GregD]

74. If you contact me

I'd like to connect you with other WA state folks who are active on this. [email protected]

[althecat]

53. Yes Will she is completely right... this is a problem with HAVA...

The problem with the HAVA bill is real.... but it is still a step in the right direction. And small steps joined together the road will travel...

A new story about the 2000 election emerging soon will illustrate in concrete and real terms why the problem identified is very real.

Basically recounts are very rare... therefore there is an incentive to rig an election thoroughly not just tip it over the edge. Once a concession is made a recount is practically unheard of...

As has been suggested hereabouts and on Slashdot if you insist on having a machine count for speed then you need to do one of the following.

1. A complete count of the paper ballots which follows the machine count and which is the official count.

or at the very least

2. A system of auditing that counts the ballots produced by a substantial sample of machines. These samples ought to show if there has been any monkeying with the electronic results vis-a-vis the paper ones.

There is a problem with this second system though. Unless the audit procedure is completely separate from the main election apparatus, i.e. unless it is impossible for the riggers to know which machines and/or precincts will be random tested it won't work as there is no reason why the riggers can't be highly selective about which machines/precincts they target.

In addition - and this may be one of the hardest bits - candidates will have to be trained not to trust the results they see on the boards on the night and to wait for the official count + the audit before they concede.

In the past it was easier to jerrymander close elections as the closer the poll the less voters you had to resurrect, the fewer machines you had to shave the cogs on etc... with the GEMS vulnerabilities and other problems this is not the case anymore... and if the objective is to deliver a state in the Presidential race then there is no reason why you cannot stack the ballot in a county that is fully under your control.

al

56. Is this related to my legal brief?

You said:
A new story about the 2000 election emerging soon will illustrate in concrete and real terms why the problem identified is very real.

If other people have caught on, I might as well post the legal brief...?

[althecat]

58. No... Dan... But I am very curious now....

63. Read below, Bush vs. Gore error

:-)

[nbsmom]

103. Can anyone tell me what happened in CA?

There was clearly an effort to blow past the recount stage, but I'm not clear if it's being thoroughly investigated (e.g., the whole creepy thing about the lesser-known candidates getting the same #s of votes in the smaller counties.)

Once you're out of the margin of error and you have a concession, nobody goes back and looks?

[althecat]

105. We don't know... there are some folks working on crunching the nunbers...

over in the forums at...

http://www.BBVreport.org

Personally I reckon it was stolen - I can't see even CA voting for a Nazi rapist, and the networks declaring the result on the basis of the exit polls alone is suspicious as hell to me - but the problem with BBV is that with no paper to recount it is impossible to prove any fraud.

[GregD]

106. Tulare...

Al, among other activities, David is working on the next newsletter and has previewed some research from Tulare County that seems plausible.


A few points I am aware of:

- The recall made for some unique ballot layout challenges because there were 135 candidates for one race.

- The ballot was 8 1/2 X 18 inches, and there are three columns.

(I can attest to that as I am in CA, and voted on a scanned ballot. Took about a minute to find my candidate, then I forgot to turn the damn thing over and vote for the initiatives - felt like an idiot being so close to this stuff and making that sort of foolish error.)

- Apparently the ballot can be viewed at www.tularecoauditor.org
(somewhere within elections info, special election -- I looked and cannot find it, but I am told it is there.)

- The minor candidates who received unexpectedly large vote totals were supposedly those who were next to a major candidate.

It seems plausible that the a small percentage of voters marked the place in the ballot to the right of some candidates instead of to the left, so a small percentage of errors were diverted from the major candidate to the minor candidate through voter error.

- California has a legal requirement that 1% of the precincts be manually tallied (in this case, that's two precincts, one of which was quite large). The manual tally showed that the machines had counted the ballots accurately (as it always does, apparently). It seems that the ballots were counted as marked.

/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/

So, that's what I have heard. Then we look at the fact that Tulare and Alameda were the last to report. Apparently, due to all the noise everyone has been raising, I guess they decided to hand-carry the memory cards from Alameda to a small group of collection centers, then took them all to a central location or something... Still took an awful lot of time.

Anyone heard any excuses/explanations about Tulare, and why they were so late?

/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/


As for CA electing him, I gotta say I keep running into people, even folks that I know as friends and thought they had better judgment - and they voted for Arnold. One of these guys who I was with this weekend (we all work as members of www.northbay-tu.org, so everyone are staunch enviros) insisted that Arnold had the best environmental platform. I stared at him in disbelief, knowing full-well that there was NO platform - it was all BS soundbites. The same guy proceeded to tell me what a great governor Reagan was. I wanted to scream!

Then there is the realtor I know up in Mt. Shasta who not only voted for him, it sounded like she worked to influence others in a similar manner. In her words, after we discussed it a while, it was an anti-establishment revolt - a mini-revolution. And they saw Arnold as a non-politician and believed the bullcrap that "I'm too rich, I cannot be bought"... Right...

So, I don't know. I'm as anxious to see the numbers, and hope we have some serious geniouses looking at the spreadsheet over at BBVReports. But with the folks I have spoken to, and the amazing rationale I have heard in justifying their vote, the guy may simply have won it... Time will tell...


Greg

edited a typo

[goobergunch]

54. IMHO the Holt bill isn't perfect

However, it's a big step in the right direction. Would you rather have H.R. 2239, or the current system? That's the question that we face.

55. People will think things are fixed

If 2239 were passed, people would get the impression that the problem is fixed, when still, no Secretary of State has been held accountable, which was the problem in Election 2000 and Georgia 2002, and in my state (Washington).

What in the bill fixes this common problem which caused Election 2000?

[GregD]

57. Holt is being stopped by colleagues

FWIW, Rush Holt is being stopped all the time by colleagues wondering about HR 2239.

Our team is receiving a lot of feedback from volunteers making phone calls to Congress, and it would appear to be having an impact.

So we have their ear - I'd suggest that those involved in this work try to summarize the changes that are needed, such as Dan has put forth, so that such changes can be put forth to Holt's office.

=============================================

Another point about the telephone campaign:
One of our team spoke with the Staff at a congressman's office (I think it was http://www.house.gov/larson/). He said that the way to get it out of committee was to get Hastert and DeLay on board, as well as Ney. Then he said simply, "So, it won't move." But then agreed that what we are doing is the best way to proceed. So if you want to see HR2239 move forward, you should add Hastert and DeLay to your list.

Hastert, J. Dennis R IL 14th [phone]

DeLay, Tom R TX 22nd [phone]

[GregD]

59. Millender (D-CA) now a co-sponsor!!

I just got word that Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-CA) on the House Admin Committe is now a co-sponsor.

[goobergunch]

61. Mega w00t if true!

We have to get people on that committee to co-sponsor HR 2239. Unfortunately, THOMAS doesn't update co-sponsors until the next day.

62. Major error in Bush vs. Gore discovered

(DOES THE HOLT BILL FIX THIS PROBLEM?)

Case # 02-56726 Weber v. Jones Rights C. Cal

Amicus Curiae

Daniel B. Spillane
(Contact info redacted)

Introduction

I believe that I am bringing “to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court.” Rule 37(1), Rules of the Supreme Court of the U.S.

I am a Senior Engineer who has worked with computers for over twenty years. Most recently, I worked for a company which makes touch-screen electronic voting machines. Moreover, I have done several years of work examining the technical and legal aspects of voting machines, at both the national and state level. In this respect, and by offering this brief, I present a perspective which has not yet been heard, and is therefore profoundly relevant to Weber v. Jones.

My experience sheds light on a process that has been, up to this point, a hidden process—that of the testing and certification of voting systems prior to being used in an election, a step which is the precursor and foundation on which elections depend on in the United States. Such a step is required to realize California Elections Code 19205(c), which requires the Secretary of State to assure that any voting machine system "shall be safe from fraud or manipulation."

This brief illustrates the importance of election observation by laypersons throughout the entire voting process, in light of Bush vs. Gore, and amid recent media revelations concerning touch-screen voting systems. Moreover, this brief sheds light on widely-held misconceptions that followed Bush vs. Gore, as they apply to both electronic touch screen, and punch card voting systems.

This brief is an adjunct to another brief presented by (redacted), which quotes a Justice Department Official who could not provide adequate details on how the Department observes electronic machines.

Expert Opinion

Daniel B. Spillane
October 07, 2003

In the Bush vs. Gore opinion, the Justices devote a significant amount of discussion to "hanging chads.” Because of chads, they reasoned, the difficulty in determining proper intent on punch card ballots in the absence of consistent standards for counting made a recount unjustified. The courts conclusion is logical, and yet stops short, since it omits key practical and legal aspects related to the nature of voting equipment, and Florida law at the time.

The US Supreme Court concluded, "The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right", and goes on to suggest "The problem inheres in the absence of specific standards" . However, the court failed to note that specific standards for counting ballots after an election are only practicable in--and depend fully on--a uniform starting context established for each punch machine. My belief is that the confidence in the certification of an election result by a Secretary of State is directly dependent on the confidence in certification of election equipment prior to conducting an election. In other words, while I agree with the US Supreme Court, I believe accurate standards for counting punch cards are only possible if standards exist and are met for recording intent on the punch cards as well--not simply for counting. Remarkably, such standards did indeed exist for a full decade before Florida 2000, and were mandated by Florida statute.

Specifically, the Florida Legislature passed a law in 1989<1>, requiring "all voting systems used on or after July 1, 1993 to comply" with standards, based on the Federal Election Commission 1990 Voting System Standards, which state, in Section 3.2.4.1.2:

Punching devices "shall be suitable for the type of ballot card used" and "SHALL INCORPORATE FEATURES TO ENSURE THAT THE CHAD IS COMPLETELY REMOVED."

Unfortunately, the above statutory requirement was not cited in Bush vs. Gore. This led to a widespread misconception that punch card machines are inherently inaccurate, rather than the truth, which is that punch card machines which do not meet the standards of punching are inherently inaccurate. This blame on punch card equipment, then, took focus away from the root of the problem—namely, the dire consequence of Katherine Harris and the Florida Elections Department not meeting the standards for voting equipment, even when directed by law. But the confusion doesn’t end there.

Looking more closely at Bush vs. Gore, a simple, yet profoundly important point is also missed. That is, the public only became aware of the Florida problem because they and the recount judges could observe (as laypersons) the failed punch ballots, and the court could only render an opinion because likewise, they could observe the ballots. The converse of this is also true: If ballots are not observable, we might not know of election problems in Florida or anywhere!

Therefore, we can conclude, in the resolution of Bush vs. Gore and in all elections, the process of direct observation of ballots is of utmost importance to both the public and the courts. Moreover, due to the inherent nature of electronic voting machines--which do not produce a voter-verified paper ballot--direct verification and observation of ballots is impossible, and thus, such electronic machines represent a significant risk to the public.

Because of Florida 2000, it is reasonable to conclude that any voting machines (punch or electronic) which do not meet prerequisite equipment certification standards present a risk to final election certification, equivalent in magnitude to Florida 2000. Such risk is magnified with the use of more complex equipment, such as electronic machines, since the number of certification requirements increases dramatically. The stakes are high, since voting is a constitutional right.

Given all of the above, and recent revelations about electronic voting systems which do not meet certification requirements as claimed, it does not seem reasonable to conclude electronic voting systems meet rigorous and lengthy standards, purported to equate them in nature and reliability with Automated Teller Machines. Moreover, it is reckless to trust an industry and regulatory system with the higher level of responsibility required with electronic systems, when it hasn’t even now met or enforced a handful of simple standards for punch card systems.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<1> Florida Voting Systems Standards, History of … Florida Department of State, 04/2002

[Spazito]

67. Very interesting reading!

Thank you for posting this.

[althecat]

68. Yes Dan... Thanks for that....

Dan,

But that is not what I had in mind in my post above.. though your logic is superb.

Is this summary fair?

The Florida fiasco was not caused by machines per se, but by substandard machines.

The substandard machines were there because the duly authorised Morans Katherine Harris et al failed to do their duty.

New machines that are even more complicated to supervise will not solve the problem so long as the duly authorised Morans remain incompetent.

Further, while at least with hanging chads there was something to look at, with electronic machines nobody will ever know.

72. BEAUTIFUL

I see I DID communicate my message!

Your summary is RIGHT ON!

But I would add, we have to have something which is DIRECTLY observable in court, and for the Justice Department! You know, like a BALLOT!

Also, note that the law requiring machines which worked was there for about TEN YEARS and it still wasn't met! Maybe Kathy Harris broke some of the machines in the democratic precincts--but I guess we will never know now, since the Supreme Court NEGLECTED to cite the certification requirements for Harris et.al!!!

78. Kicky-wicky

[AntiCoup2K4]

82. Katherine Harris did her duty very well

Her duty as the Florida State chair of the Bush Cheney campaign, that is :grr:

83. THE SUPREME COURT CLEARLY HELPED

By NOT mentioning K. Harris was required to have punch machines that didn't have hanging chads!

They let us all down!

71. Florida law ALSO said in 2000

As far as I can tell, by other provisions of Florida law in 2000, a recount was MANDATED in a case where the Secretary failed. But since she failed in such a bad way, they would have had to do the vote over(?)

BUT THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT DO THIS, and made no mention of Harris not meeting the standards and the law!

INSTEAD, Katherine Harris was promoted higher into politics--for not doing her job! We were all told the problem was the punch card machines!

HOWEVER, the FAILED punch card standards are in the SAME BOOK as the electronic touchscreen standards they said would help us!

Kind of profound if you think about it--the standards were not met for punch cards, causing hanging chads...leading to a widespread migration to electronic systems, which are from the SAME STANDARDS as for punch cards, but are more complicated!

Electronic machines are based on the same standards which aren't being met--the difference being, you can't SEE the chads in electronic machines like you can with punch cards!

So, HIDE THE CHADS!

Can you say.....OOOOPPS!

81. Comment: Do we need a better (explicit) constitutional voting right?

That (calling voting a "constitutional right") is a technicality.

The right is by mention in amendments, but not by explicit provision.

Though that would be nice. Do you think we need another more directly worded amendment?

Maybe that is the answer, and then they couldn't screw with our votes?

Dan S.
In a message dated 10/20/03 5:20:19 PM Pacific Daylight Time, (redacted) writes:

(Dan)
In a recent post of yours, you said:
The stakes are high, since voting is a constitutional right.

*** ANYONE ELSE??? ***

[Nlighten1]

93. Link?

[gristy]

65. Where are HR2239 co-sponsors listed?

Can't find the info on Rush's site.

[GregD]

69. here ya go gristy

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.02239:

The new one is not in there yet, goobergunch says they are not updated until the next day, but we received confirmation that she has signed on.

Let's hope it's so. Getting members of the committee has always been a significant goal.

[goobergunch]

70. For a direct link to co-sponsors...

Alphabetical list

List sorted by date

[gristy]

75. OK, folks. Thanks!

A friend of mine in NY knows Rep McNulty (D, NY) pretty well. I've talked to him once about getting McNulty on board, and I just sent him another email.

[creativelcro]

80. WHOO HO!

THIS THREAD ROCKS!!! -C

84. Kick

[GregD]

85. WilliamPitt Rocks!

[Eloriel]

86. Holt's bill does one extremely important thing

Well, two.

Not only does it mandate a voter-verified paper (or audit trail?), it ALSO makes the use of those pieces of paper legal for recounts.

Holt's bill is far from perfect, IMO. But these two things make it something like 6,342% better than what we've got right now.

The other thing it does is make something happen in time for the 2004 elections. It's currently just about our only tool for ThAT.

I think we need to support it, and that means we should be working like crazy to get Republicans on board for sponsorship. (Hastert, Ney and DeLay are especially in need of cajoling, or so I understand since they're the ones blocking it.)

This is tough, because it is flawed. But I guess it's a case of not letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. The things it does provide for are IMO essential.

Eloriel

89. Feel free

Feel free to support the bill--if nothing else, it brings attention to the issue, just like my lawsuit and the Weber lawsuit, and the Diebold leak.

[althecat]

91. Eloriel... don't know if you noticed this thread yet...

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=104&topic_id=562713

It's about NY. I for one would be interested in your view...

[WhereIsMyFreedom]

102. There is another very important thing it does

Sec 4.a.2.C SOFTWARE AND MODEMS

(i) No voting system shall at any time contain or use undisclosed software. Any voting system containing or using software shall disclose the source code of that software to the Commission, and the Commission shall make that source code available for inspection upon request to any citizen.

107. "Commission"?

WHICH commission?

Unfortunately there is no "commission"...it was never set up!

I also wonder how source code will help a citizen who knows nothing about computers. It won't.

On the other hand, all citizens of layperson capacity can act as election judges for BALLOTS which contain the intent of the voter.

Open source code is fine, so long as such code produces BALLOTS which are kept in boxes. Not RECORDS, RECEIPTS, CODES, pictures of your nose...

BALLOTS

[Zorra]

87. Isn't Dennis Kucinich supposedly working

on a much more comprehensive evoting bill? I don't think the Holt bill is near comprehensive enough to solve the problems of the blackboxes.

I'll help burn the computers in the town square. Blackboxes are rapidly becoming mature white elephants.

88. Give Kucinich my e-mail

I would like to list my recommendations!

DanSLegal at aol.com

[Zorra]

96. Try this.

I actually may have gotten something through to his campaign manager through this link. This was a response I got after sending evote info a few months ago:

Thank you for sending this to us. I have forwarded your information to his campaign advisors. Feedback, information, and ideas are at the
foundation of taking back our government, and is deeply appreciated.


http://www.kucinich.us/contact.htm

[GregD]

90. Kucinich's plan will take too long to implement - we can't wait

My understanding is that he wants open-source software, developed by the government. He would start by conducting a contest of sorts, where open-source developers would present demonstrations of what their approach would be, or something to that effect. Then the code would be built and deployed. Basically he takes it away from industry altogether.

Great concept, but in the best of all cases, that is not going to happen in sufficient time to overcome anyone's concerns regarding 2004. And after a lot of states spend big bucks on stuff, it's yet another financial hurdle to prod the states to climb, so the whole concept is probably a tough sale - should have happened long ago...

If Dem candidates want to help, they have to make this an issue. It needs to be discussed regularly, as often as WMDs and tax cuts. They need to link to the sites that are working on the issue, or they need to build pages in their own web sites to discuss the issue. It needs to become part of the public discourse, and covered by the media with the same intensity as Bill's blow job.

2 cents...

[creativelcro]

92. I agree with that assessment...

"Kucinich's plan will take too long to implement - we can't wait"

94. That WOULD take a long time

That Kucinich approach would take some time.

And then you would still have Secretaries with their hands in the vote, and they are used to getting away with murder.

The short-term answer is the paper ballot which is the legal ballot and which is counted.

But that is not what the Holt bill says--it says "record" and "ballot" in different places, which isn't the same as "ballot" everywhere.

Very different.

You say this issue needs to be discussed, but it apparently has not been since the problems with Secretaries of State have been revealed.

Secretaries of State are sneakier and more curved than Clinton's weanie!

[althecat]

95. I vote for Ms Collier's plan...

I.E (from Will's post...)

She admitted that she is an advocate of paper-ballots only, and wants the computers "burned in the town square."

This is the easiest and most straightforward plan. And all this BS about fixing the machines does nothing to fix the fact that in (Diebold's case at least) the solutions are offered by a company that...

1. lies all the time.
2. is run by a bunch of crooks out of Canada.
3. has repeatedly broken the law in past elections.
4. has a security system that.. (on edit does not have a security system).

In short a company that cannot be trusted to be anywhere near any votes.. VVPB or not.

97. Exactly

If the machines can be retrofitted with ballot printers now, let's do it.

Forget about "Records" being printed, just "ballots" -- UNTIL it is proven all issues are investigated, and solutions reached, such as certification problems, dishonest corporation problems, etc.

I learned they spent FIFTEEN YEARS developing the 1990 standards, and apparently QUIT MEETING THEM in the early 1990s, despite the fact that the SECRETARIES OF STATE keep claiming they do meet them.

Until THAT is fixed, we have nothing, and have to fall back on the paper ballot.

Enter, Diebold.
Enter, Katherine Harris, Florida 2000
Enter, Cathy Cox, Georgia 2002
Enter, Alabama, 2002, where the governor "changed" overnight to a Republican
Enter, Ralph Munro aka. Sam Reed, and the still-unexplained Diebold memo referencing King County, Washington--and the UNMET 1990 standards with THEIR NAME IN THE BOOK

Enter--everyone else who we DON'T YET know about who has been dishonest in this racket!

[madfloridian]

99. AND , don't forget Glenda Hood, Jeb's right hand woman.

She and Jeb are in charge of elections here now if I read it right. No one paid attention when Dear Kate did her dirty work, and now comes Miss Glenda. As far as I can tell, she has no legislative oversight.....Secretary of State is now a position appointed by Jeb.

Even trying to find out what is going on here is hard. I would like to think we can trust her, but the track record of Jeb's cronies here is not exactly stellar.

:eyes:

[GregD]

98. Undisputed Al, and well said...

Hey - what you just mentioned (Canada) made me think of something. I want to add a bit of levity to this, without changing the subject - it's all so freaking frustrating. I hope I can share a smile with everyone for a moment.

San Francisco Mime Troupe http://www.sfmt.org/, is a group of folks that perform here in the Bay Area. These are not white-faced actors that move silently as if locked in a transparent boxes, but talented actors with great sets and an amazing stage band that sets the pace nicely. They have been around here for decades.

The show this season "Veronique of the Mounties" pits the US versus Canada, the latest evildoers... Veronique is the twin sister of none other than Condi Rice, who is partnered (politically and otherwise) as Cheney/Rice as they run for the WH in 2008. Absolutely hillarious...

Dang Canadians... We gotta gettem...


Their schedule is on the site - if anyone can get to this show, it's the best laugh I have had all year.


From their site:

Set in the near future, Veronique of the Mounties, finds the US government deeply engaged in its imperialistic quest to save the people of the world from themselves. After bringing "democracy" to Iraq, Syria, and France, the US turns its gaze to the terrorist threat on its northern border, CANADA. Fiction follows fiction until only one thing can protect America (and launch the Cheney/Rice run for the White House in 2008), Operation Frozen Freedom.

Meanwhile, as the Canadians mobilize to fight off invasion, Royal Canadian Mounted Policewoman Veronique Du Bois is given a dangerous mission: to journey into the heart of American darkness and recover the object that may stop the US military's insane rush to the Great White North.

Amid laughter and music, the play will answer these burning questions: Why would America turn away from its own economic and social problems and attack the peace-loving hockey fans in the north? Who benefits from a constant war on terror? Can a country with a maple leaf as a flag truly be a terrorist threat? And what has Canada got that's more valuable than oil?


Ok, back to BBV - I just needed to share that...

[RedEagle]

101. Canada has something resembling a free press...

...that's what Canada has got.

The Canadian equivalent of the kind of bite they take out of people and countries kind of like Laugh In used to once in a while in a one-line zinger.

Tis the season for new shows and Friday is comedy night. Must see:
Canadian Air Farce (that is not a typo) and This Hour Has 22 Minutes. Oh, and any time Rick Mercer does a send up of the U.S.

Taking a good look at our government through others eyes, since we can't look at ourselves any more. Satirical comedy completely replaced by the lap dog press and blatant PR for the administration.

AND- paper ballots.

[althecat]

104. "Something resembling" being the operative words

Remember the late Izzy Asper's diktat on the war.... though shalt not criticise. Not to mention Israel....

AN ASIDE: Greg, the show sounds fantastic. I wonder if they might consider coming to the Fringe Wellington Arts Festival here in Wellington next March. If they did I would promo their show as much as I can. Kiwis could do with a bit of real North American culture. Usually we have to make do with CSI, SVU and ER...

al

108. Something resembling...Democracy

Does this describe the US, or not?