The Other Nuclear Option

[Oilwellian]

This month, for the first time in five years, representatives from 189 countries will meet at the United Nations to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the world's bedrock arms control agreement. It is the first opportunity the world has had to formally discuss the NPT since the September 11 terrorist attacks, and since A.Q. Khan's frightening global black market in nuclear technology was exposed. It comes in the midst of severely heightened tensions over nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, and a "crisis of confidence" in global nonproliferation efforts. "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation," U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's high-level panel recently advised. Not gloomy enough for you? Short of a serious turnaround, the meetings will be a failure. "If we could get out of this conference without a major blow-up we would be doing well," says Matt Martin of the British American Security Information Council. How did we get to this point, and where are we headed? The blow-by-blow follows.

BOLTON'S LEGACY: A principle reason nuclear proliferation efforts have gone awry is the disturbing incompetence of John Bolton, who was in charge of nonproliferation efforts for the Bush administration. Instead of leading the charge, Bolton consistently undermined efforts in North Korea, Libya and Iran. (Instead of getting fired for his incompetence, Bolton has been nominated by Bush to be ambassador to the United Nations.) Even now, given the opportunity to strengthen U.S. efforts, President Bush is "sending only midlevel officials to the opening of the conference in New York." According to Ambassador Robert Grey, former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, his administration has put in little of the diplomatic legwork shown by previous administrations. "I don't know if I've seen things much worse in the field I'm working in," Grey said last month.

WHERE WE WERE: The Non-Proliferation Treaty was built on a simple bargain: the non-nuclear weapons states agreed to forego nuclear weapons in exchange for a commitment on the part of the nuclear weapons states to end their arms race and engage in "good faith" negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. With a few notable exceptions, the non-nuclear weapons states have kept their end of the bargain. On the other hand, the nuclear weapons states have shown scant inclination to fulfill their disarmament commitments. Yet both sides of the bargain are critical. "Preventing nuclear proliferation cannot be guaranteed without nuclear disarmament, and nuclear disarmament cannot succeed without preventing nuclear proliferation." And the treaty has worked. "In the 1960s, before the NPT, there were some 23 nations that either had nuclear weapons, had nuclear programs to develop such weapons, or were considering such programs.… Today, counting North Korea and possibly Iran, there are only 10 such countries. We have half the danger that we faced in the 1960s." There are fewer countries in the world with nuclear weapons, fewer countries in the world considering nuclear weapons, and half the number of nuclear weapons in the world as there was 20 years ago. (Center for American Progress Fellow Larry Korb charges in the Boston Globe that in today's climate, it's time to stop wasting money on nuclear bombs.)

WHERE WE ARE NOW: Though vital to global non-proliferation efforts, the NPT has some serious flaws. Currently, countries can acquire technologies that bring them to the very brink of nuclear weapons capability without explicitly violating the treaty, and can then leave the treaty without penalty. Far more stringent limits must be placed on the spread of nuclear technology, as A.Q. Khan's dealings showed. And these improvements must be made immediately. As Joseph Cirincione, director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment, has pointed out, "We are at a nuclear tipping point. The decisions we make over the next couple of years will decide whether that progress continues or whether a new dangerous way of proliferation is launched upon the world.… And if we mishandle this conference, if we don't seize this opportunity at this conference, you could puncture an unrepairable hole in the proliferation balloon." So why are this month's meetings expected to go so poorly?

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