As it dawned upon America that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, the White House and their media surrogates successfully framed the debate in terms of the unaccounted for weaponry Iraq had declared,
"He said he had the stuff." This was not the main reason we were given during the "march to war", rather we were told that Hussein was
currently manufacturing bio- and chemical weapons and
currently building nuclear weapons and he must be stopped.
President Bush outlined the case against Iraq
in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, citing
photographic evidence that Iraq was operating proscribed industrial complexes so large, their nefarious activities could be seen from space.
The following day, Defense Intelligence Agency analyst John Yurechko gave a
presentation where he actually showed the photographs of which Bush had spoken. As an example, among the
dozens of slides he showed was one titled "Nuclear Program DECEPTION". The photograph is of the "al Qaim Phosphate Plant & Uranium Extraction Line" and is dated April 1, 2002. Below the photo are the words "Currently active". Yurechko noted to the Pentagon reporters, "If you look at the picture, you'll see it's an active facility." So there you go. Photographic evidence that Iraq was refining uranium.
In the following months, the Bush administration successfully harnessed our position of global leadership and power to reach a world consensus on UNSCR 1441 and secured Saddam Hussein's cooperation with it. These accomplishments
on their own are two of the very few Bush administration achievements for which we should unhesitatingly applaud them. Nobody sensible should deny that ensuring Hussein did not have access to nuclear warheads and other offensive weapons was a very good thing.
By the time we launced into Iraq, the inspection process had progressed sufficiently enough to show the alleged Iraqi threat was obviously a bunch of garbage smoked through an opium pipe. We were actually under the rooftops the facilities we were shown as proof that
"no terrorist state poses a greater or more immediate threat to the security of our people than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq," as Donald Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee on
September 19, 2002. (Side-note: an "immediate threat" is more alarming than an "imminent threat" as an imminent treat only threatens to become immediate).
Here are a few examples of things the inspections revealed - or rather didn't reveal. Americans selected by the administration were among the inspectors, of course:
"The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt." - January 27, 2003
"There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites." - March 7, 2003
"Falluja I is storage of farm products and largely deserted." - January 17, 2003
"The plant produces tomato products, date syrup, cheese, vinegar, and watermelon jam ... A Mosul-based multidisciplinary team inspected the Arabic Gulf Company in Mosul on 9 March. This company produces letter envelopes." - March 11, 2003
Did the inspectors conclusively, finally, and officially verify that Iraq had disarmed and was producing no weapons of mass destruction? No. Why not? Because President Bush had no resolve to follow through with the inspections his administration so fabulously made possible. Instead he "reluctantly"
launched "military operations to disarm Iraq".
President Bush's explanation
On July 14, 2003 President Bush
explained the errors in judgement claiming,
"It's the same intelligence, by the way, that my predecessor used to make the decision he made in 1998 ... And we gave a chance to allow the inspectors in, and he wouldn't let them in." That he seemed to have forgotten he succeeded in getting the inspectors in deserves no comment. On his claim that the intelligence, although flawed, had everybody fooled for a long time - that everybody "knew" Hussein was hording terrible weapons, perhaps someone other than this author is
more qualified to respond:
"I expect Saddam Hussein to let inspectors back into the country. We want to know whether he's developing weapons of mass destruction."
- President George W. Bush
January 16, 2002