effort.
And regardless of the endless demonization of Likud, I sincerely doubt people really have a clue as to what they really stand for or how they've evolved.
Likud politicians are NOT monolithic in their outlook and the party's platform has changed over the years. Moreover, they've been some of the most effective in reaching out to Arab states. Menachim Begin, for example, signed the peace agreement with Anwar Sadat.
Here's a link to an interesting article from Yale University:
http://www.yaleisraeljournal.com/fall2003/likud.phpCan Likud Make Peace?
By Sharon Goott
While conventional wisdom attests that left-leaning governments are more open to negotiations than are right-leaning governments, the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, presents a dramatic exception to this common-sense rule. Taking Israel’s historic peace with Egypt signed by Likud’s Menachem Begin as a successful model, and the subsequent failures at peace during the 1980s as unsuccessful models, this article examines the complex interplay of international and domestic factors necessary for peace.
Peace with Egypt involved a combination of factors that may never again be repeated. However, the prolonged success of the peace created by the Camp David Accords makes that process an obvious episode to examine in any attempt to identify preconditions for peace. A Likud government in Israel may be uniquely situated to make peace; constituents know Likud will not overstep certain boundaries because it has earned a reputation for being tough on security. In turn, a left-wing opposition would support any efforts towards peace. However, the experience of Camp David suggests that several different elements must be working in favor of peace for a Likud government to reach an agreement: committed and creative political leaders must emerge on both sides; parties that are willing to negotiate must have a sufficient domestic mandate to make concessions; a third party must provide outside pressure; and there must be an international balance of power that motivates the states to seek peace. A combination of these crucial factors allowed Israel and Egypt to reach their landmark agreement; the absence of one or more of these factors has perhaps doomed subsequent negotiations.
Egypt: Israel’s Partner
Anwar Sadat was a complicated leader who represented a distinct departure from the way that Gamal Abdel Nasser had ruled Egypt. Sadat assumed the presidency in 1970 with specific domestic and international goals that indicated a broader vision of Egypt’s place in the world. His plan included improving the decimated Egyptian economy, liberalizing social policies in Egypt, shifting Egyptian ties away from the Soviet Union and towards the United States, reaching a peace settlement with Israel that would result in the return of the Sinai to Egyptian control, and moving away from a pan-Arab orientation. By stabilizing the Middle East and aligning with the United States, Sadat hoped to secure funding from the U.S. and to increase the flow of foreign capital to Egypt.1 He championed the cause of “Egypt first,” hoping to re-establish Egypt’s dignity and centrality in the Arab world, which had been shaken by the Egyptian defeat in 1967. In addition, attaining peace with Israel would free up money that would otherwise have been spent on the military. More money would then be available for housing the urban poor, whose unrest threatened to destabilize Sadat’s regime.2
A relationship with the United States was of vital importance to Sadat, and if peace with Israel was the price, then Sadat was willing to pay. Sadat desperately wanted to be accepted by the powerful leaders in the world, especially those of the United States. Sadat hoped to turn the U.S. into an ally through his search for peace with Israel, using America as a mediator and honest broker in an unprecedented way. Sadat’s vision paved the way for a fundamental shift in American foreign policy, allowing an American administration to deal directly with an Arab leader for the first time. The increased U.S. involvement would prove crucial when Israelis and Egyptians arrived at impasses in negotiations. Without heavy U.S. involvement, and especially the dedication and perseverance of Ford administration Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and then President Jimmy Carter, the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks might have stalled permanently at numerous points.3
snip