Reply #20: Another: ‘Embedding’ with Libya’s Freedom Fighters

[Iterate]

‘Embedding’ with Libya’s Freedom Fighters
Aug 22, 2011 1:21:00 AM EDT

...

Luckily for the mainly youthful volunteers, Qaddafi’s forces are nearly as fragmented. Qaddafi starved the regular Libyan army, fearing it might turn against him. The starving was almost literal; Mr. Senussi, as he is called by the troops, made only $400 a month. He says the weaponry and even the planes of the Libyan armed forces date from the Chad war of the 1980s. Instead of maintaining the Libyan Army, Qaddafi created independent brigades, commanded by his sons or regime insiders. These brigades were much better paid and equipped and answered only to him. The 219th Brigade in Sabratha, Mr. Senussi says, is a particulary good unit. The final piece in the puzzle is the “volunteers” (mutata’ween) who appeared after the revolution broke out. Unemployed layabouts or men from neighboring Chad or Mali are well paid to fight with special brutality, wearing civilian clothes and obeying no laws of war.

...

Having done seven embeds with US troops—mainly the elite 82nd Airborne—in Afghanistan, my own expectations of professional soldiers are very high. And while the men I’ve been with from the Sabratha and Zwara brigades are smart and brave, they readily admit that they are not professionals. This in itself is a shocker for a journalist. When I was caught on foot during an attack on Sunday in Sabratha, many men jumped into their cars and drove toward the fire, while others stayed on foot. But it took a few minutes for anyone to notice that I needed some guidance. A professional soldier makes a razor sharp distinction between soldiers and civilians (and between officers and enlisted fighters). But these fighters are civilians. Then too, they lack the division of labor that is taken for granted in our army, where each fighter knows exactly what is expected of him at nearly every moment. Everyone wants the glory of being in the thick of battle and no one wants a support role. Even the professionals ignore the basics of command and control. For hours in Sabratha, commanders made only occasional efforts to use the Thuraya phone to call in information about their location and progress to anyone outside the town. I am not sure they every informed Benghazi what we were doing. As Senussi Mohamad put it, “I talk mainly to my men.”

When the fog of war descends, these forces may make fatal errors.

One very tragic error took place last week not far from here. Ten fighters from Jadu were slain by a NATO airstrike—and two are still missing—due to the group having moved forward into a red zone. They had apparently communicated their intention to block the retreat of a large group of Qaddafi fighters at dawn on the 17th, but received no answer from the Benghazi command linked to NATO. A professional commander would have waited, but they went forward. Jadu is a tiny place, just 10,000 closely related people, and until the 17th they had only lost four men in the war. Shortly thereafter, the sky above this mesa town was illuminated by weapons fire late into the night as hundreds mourned their dead.

more... http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/marlowe/Embedding_with_Libyas_Freedom_Fighters

Some of this was in her tweets, but it was puzzling because I didn't find it in a published article. Now we know. Thanks.

ETA, here's another report from tweets that hasn't been published or expanded on yet:

Gaddafestrophe
#Gaddafi's regime ordered the execution of 100,000 people, a document found in a #Tripoli prison shows. #Libya #Feb17 via @AlArabiya_Eng 3 hours ago