Reply #109: I translated and read the LeMonde article. Comments below.

[leveymg]

Black is not mentioned. Two other ranking CIA Counterterrorism officers are: Mike Scheuer and Gary Berntsen.

Scheuer was ousted as head of the Bin Laden Virtual Station in Tysons Corners in 1998, and replaced by Tenet protege Rich Blee, under the command of Cofer Black, who was appointed overall Director of CIA/CTC at about the same time. So, its quite possible that Scheuer may not have been aware of the French Intel threat reports forwarded to CIA in 2000 and 2001.

Gary Berntsen was a 20-year veteran of the CIA Clandestine Service (formerly, DOO), but was not at HQ in the time that particular French reporting came in. He spent much of late 1999 and 2000 in Afghanistan, trying to track down and planning the capture of bin Laden, but claims he was frustrated in this by an overly risk-averse Clinton Administration. So, he also may not have been privy to the DGSE reporting on bin Laden's terrorist attack plans. He is the author of the first-hand expose, Jawbreaker, of how in December 2001, the Bush regime in Washington left the door open for Bin Laden's last line of retreat from Tora Bora. Along with Steve Coll's excellent Ghost Wars, this is a primary source for much of what is known about the failed CIA-led effort to capture bin Laden in Afghanistan during that period.

One thing of interest stood out is the French Intel report of the early-2000 meeting in Kabul at which the 9/11 attack was allegedly hashed out. I would think this may have occurred after the Kuala Lumpur meeting that straddled the New Year and into the second week of January. It is also possible that the reported date is off. It's an important detail, however, that needs to be resolved as it is believed that operational details were decided by those most directly involved in the attacks who met in Malaysia.