Reply #24: Here are some more friends of AQ Khan...

[Octafish]

Alleged Perpetrators and Law Enforcement Results

Khan’s efforts to jump-start nuclear weapon programs in three new states involved numerous actors in a wide range of countries.

Pakistan
At the core of Khan’s dealings with Iran, North Korea, and Libya was the transfer of technology that comprised the essence of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent capability, presumably some of that country’s most prized and closely guarded state secrets. Several levels of officials in the Pakistani nuclear and military hierarchy have been investigated by Pakistani authorities. No prosecutions are known to have been brought, but a number of individuals, some of whom were held for “debriefings” for as long as six months, remain under house arrest and one appears to be in the indefinite custody of Pakistani authorities.

A.Q. Khan
Khan is believed to be under house arrest in Islamabad, following his detailed disclosures in early 2004 to Pakistani authorities regarding his activities, his public apology on February 4 of that year, and his pardon immediately afterwards by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.

Khan’s immediate subordinates at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL)
At least 15 officials linked to KRL were questioned by Pakistani authorities in early 2004. Most were released in several weeks or less, but three were held in custody for six months and then placed under house arrest, Maj. (ret.) Islam al-Haq (Khan’s personal staff officer), Nazeer Ahmed (Director-General of Science and Technology at KRL), and Brig. General (ret.) Sajawal Khan Malik (head of security at KRL). Only one KRL official, Mohammed Farooq, A.Q. Khan’s principal deputy, is thought to remain in detention at this time. <3>

Senior members of the Pakistan military
Three former Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS), Mirza Aslam Beg (COAS from August 1988 to August 1991), Abdul Wahid Kakar (COAS from January 1993-January 1996) and Jehangir Karamat (COAS from January 1996 to October 1998), have been accused in various reports of being involved in the affair, as either knowledgeable of and acquiescing in Khan’s activities, or actively facilitating them. <4> Beg and Karamat were reportedly questioned by Pakistani authorities but were not charged with any wrong-doing. Karamat is currently Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States. President Pervez Musharraf, who has served as COAS since October 1998, is also alleged to have been knowledgeable about the Khan network, but denies this was the case. <5>

Malaysia
This was the site of SCOPE, a subsidiary of the SCOMI Group BHD, one of the Khan network’s off-shore machining and manufacturing shops, which produced an array of aluminum components for the Libyan centrifuge enrichment program, including casings, end-caps, and baffles. The unit was set up by Tahir, but owned by a company controlled by Kamaluddin Abdullah, son of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. <6> Presumably a number of other business persons and technicians would have been involved in the effort.

Buhary Syed Abu Tahir
After being cleared of violating Malaysian criminal law, Tahir was arrested on May 28, 2004, under Malaysia’s internal security law, and remains in detention. <7>

Kamaluddin Abdullah, and other officers/employees of SCOPE
No charges are known to have been filed against these individuals.

Western Europe
At least nine individuals from Western European states have been identified in press accounts or official sources as assisting in illicit procurement activities in support of A.Q. Khan’s efforts to assist Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and/or nuclear programs elsewhere. Several of these individuals participated by assisting manufacturing and machining operations in Malaysia, South Africa, or Turkey relevant to the production of uranium enrichment equipment. The group includes three Swiss citizens, Friederich Tinner and his sons Urs and Marco; a Dutch citizen, Henk Slebos; a citizen of unidentified nationality, Zoran Filipovic; a British citizen, Abu Siddiqui; and German citizens Gotthard Lerch, Rainer Vollmerich, and Heinz Mebus (deceased). The Tinners, personnally and through companies they owned or operated in Europe (including CETEC and Traco), are alleged to have provided technical support in setting up and operating production lines for SCOPE in Malaysia. Marco Tinner is alleged to have used Turkish firms to manufacture centrifuge parts, which were then exported to SCOPE for further modification. Henk Slebos is reported to have sent dual-use equipment to Pakistan and to be part owner of ETI Elektroteknik, a Turkish firm that also allegedly supported the Khan network (see below). Zoran Filipovic is said to have worked with Slebos, helping to smuggle nuclear relevant dual-use goods out of the Netherlands. Abu Siddiqui did the same from England. Gotthard Lerch is reported to have assisted Libya in developing an advanced machine shop to support its planned uranium enrichment activities and to have arranged for the production of centrifuge parts in South Africa for the Libyan program. (Another individual, Peter Griffin, is said to have supported the outfitting of the Libyan machine shop; he successfully sued the Guardian (London) for libel for falsely alleging that Malaysian authorities found him guilty of providing assistance to Libya’s nuclear program. His son Paul Griffin is discussed below.) Rainer Vollmerich procured items related to uranium enrichment for nuclear facilities in Pakistan.

Friederich Tinner
In custody of Swiss authorities. <8>

Urs Tinner
In custody of Swiss authorities, since November 2005, awaiting trial. <9>

Marco Tinner
In custody of Swiss authorities; under investigation in Turkey. <10>

Henk Slebos
Convicted in the Netherlands on charges related to smuggling nuclear components to Pakistan. Received 12 month sentence, (8 months suspended, 4 months served); ordered to personally pay a fine of 100,000 euros (US$120,000). <11>

Zoran Filipovic
Convicted in the Netherlands of exporting controlled items to Pakistan. Sentenced to 180 days of community service and fine of 5,000 euro. <12>

Abu Siddiqui
Convicted in the UK of illegally evading British export laws by shipping nuclear dual-use items to Khan’s lab in Pakistan. Received a 12-month suspended sentence and a £6,000 fine. <13>

Gotthard Lerch
Charged with violating German export laws; arrested in November 2005, but not currently in custody. <14>

Rainer Vollmerich
Convicted of illegally procuring and exporting controlled nuclear materials to Pakistan. Sentenced to prison term of 7 years and three months. <15>

Investigations in France and Spain
According to two leading U.S. experts on the Khan affair, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, investigations are also being pursued in France and Spain. None has resulted in arrests or prosecutions as of this writing. It has not been possible to obtain additional details of these developments.

South Africa
Johan Meyer, founder of Trade Fin Engineering, and Gerhard Wisser, owner of Kirsch Engineering, are alleged to have supported the Khan enterprise along two tracks, reportedly working with Tahir. First, they received and transshipped sensitive goods needed for Libya’s uranium enrichment program and, second, engaged in the manufacture of components for that program, in particular, vacuum pumps and equipment for handling uranium in gaseous form.

Johan Meyer
South African authorities indicted Meyer, but dismissed the charges against him after he agreed to testify against Wisser. <16>

Gerhard Wisser (and his employee Daniel Geiges)
Awaiting trial in Pretoria. <17>

Turkey
Khan’s network operated in Turkey along the same tracks as in South Africa, with several key firms supporting Khan’s sale of a uranium enrichment plant to Libya by receiving and transshipping dual-use goods and by manufacturing components needed in the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment process, in particular electronic components. The key individuals and firms alleged to be involved are Gunes Cire (sometimes, spelled Gunas Jireh), director of ETI Elektroteknik, and Selim Alguadis, President of EKA, also a firm specializing in electronics, as well as several of Alguadis’s business partners.

Gunes Cire
Arrested and detained in Turkey. Died in 2004. <18>

Selim Alguadis
Under investigation by Turkish authorities; potential penalties of up to 20 years imprisonment.

Zubeyir Baybars Cayci, Ertugrul Sonmez
Turkish authorities said to be seeking indictments against these individuals who are partners of Alguadis; potential penalties of up to 20 years imprisonment. <19>

Dubai
Tahir worked out of Dubai, where he was Managing Director of SMB Group, and Freiderich Tinner, Peter Griffin, and others are alleged to have used this locale extensively as a transshipment point to disguise the ultimate destination of sensitive equipment. Griffin’s son, Paul, managed the Dubai-based company Gulf Technical Industries (GTI), reported to be a frequently used cut-out for the network. <20> The co-director of GTI, Ahmad Hassan Rashid Ahmad al Abbar, was the local sponsor of the company. <21> It does not appear that authorities in Dubai are pursuing charges against any individuals associated with the Khan network.

Paul Griffin
Not known to be currently the subject of investigation; has denied allegations of wrong-doing.

Ahmad Hassan Rashid Ahmad al Abbar
Not known to be the subject of investigation.

Singapore
Some of the materials used by SCOPE to manufacture 300 metric tons of aluminum tubing were purchased from Bikar Metalle Asia, a Singapore subsidiary of the German company Bikar Metalle. This tubing was sent through Dubai. There is no indication that Bikar Metalle Asia was aware of the purpose to which the material was to be used. <22>

Bikar Metalle Asia
Management was not prosecuted; found not to have committed a crime or to have hidden its involvement. <23>

South Korea
The Khan network acquired specialized balancing machines from South Korea. The manufacturer of the machines, Hanbando, Inc., has not been accused of wrong-doing, but the exporting company, known in court records only as “D” was the subject of law enforcement efforts.

“D” Corporation
Prosecuted in late 2004 and acquitted by a South Korean court because of lack of evidence of intent to break South Korean export control laws. Prosecuted for a second violation and acquitted on the same grounds. South Korean Ministry of Commerce and Industry, however, imposed a one-year ban on import and export activities by the organization. <24>

Japan
Specialized Japanese three-dimensional measuring machines, needed to build uranium enrichment centrifuges with the necessary precision, were found by the IAEA in Libya during inspections as that country dismantled its nuclear weapons program. On February 13, 2006, Japanese authorities raided the Mitutoyo Corp., outside Tokyo, manufacturer of the machines, which were shipped to Tripoli via Dubai by Scomi Precision Engineering. <25>

Mitutoyo Corp.
Under investigation.

CONTINUED...

http://www.wmdinsights.com/I3/G1_SR_AQK_Network.htm

Thank you for a great thread, Mark!
Infinite thanks for your tour d'force, an indictment of the traitorous gangsters who've hijacked America.
May they face Justice.