Reply #1: ok I compiled this and off it went

[rumpel]

Please also voice your piece to them to augment what I have left out - I am so pissed at this non-chalant attitude of terming voting an "errand".
I did not think it proper to post the e-mail address or phone number, so PM me for that.

Dear Mr. Klaus,

I will herewith provide you with links to information about the electronic machines in use.
This is from Prof. Mercuri at a Congressional Hearing of Oct 5, 2006
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1851&Itemid=26

State Senator Bowen continues to address concerns regarding the certification of certain machines in our state. I have not heard that these issues were in fact addressed.
Should you have new information on these issues having been corrected I would appreciate input on this.

February 28, 2006 – Secretary McPherson releases the ITA report – dated February 23, 2006 – from CIBER on the Diebold memory cards.  The report notes the Diebold system uses interpreted code – something banned by the FEC standards the Secretary said on August 3, 2005, he would follow.  The report also identifies at least three security vulnerabilities and a number of requirement violations.  The report notes, “Certain vulnerabilities in this report may require a portion of the code to be modified in order to correct the vulnerabilities identified.  To ensure that the efforts to correct vulnerabilities do not introduce new vulnerabilities, CIBER strongly recommends retesting of the remediated code prior to its migration to a production environment.”  The report also states, “Error handling appears to be adequate for a system that executes in a perfect running environment.  However, the interpreters do not have the proper degree of effort checking to identify or recover from key failures in a damaged, altered or dysfunctional environment.  Our reasoning for increasing the security on the code is because the object code traverses potentially untrustworthy hands . . . Since the object code is on the memory cards being distributed, it is a prime target for potential tampering.”
http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=985&Itemid=113

Meanwhile, new and additional vulnerabilities have been found and are generally available in form of media reports. Here is just one from Prof. Avi Rubin
http://avi-rubin.blogspot.com/2006/10/following-is-excerpt-from-email-i.html
Do we know whether these machines are going to be shut down or re-booted each day - re-programmed each day during the early voting process?

My county, Los Angeles, will be using the Diebold AccuVote TSX system for early voting, however on election day, Inkavote Plus will be used.
The Los Angeles county registrar’s website provides a FAQ pdf file pertaining to early voting. Which content lacks detail but empty assurances.

I would be interested to learn that Ms. McCormack and staff are in fact in control of the source code of the Diebold AccuVote TSX, as stated in same document, which implies she has technical staff to program the memory cards, not outside vendors including Diebold technicians. A monumental task considering the many languages and districts she covers.

The county registrar Connie McCormack stated in a public hearing, that absentee, provisional and early votes will be excluded from the random mandatory recount.
Considering the fact that CA-50 Bilbray was sworn in prior to all votes having been counted in San Diego this is of grave concern.

This is a report from our recent primaries pertaining to Riverside, Napa and San Bernardino.
http://josephhall.org/nqb2/index.php/2006/05/31/casequoiavvpat

As for San Diego, the registrar allows the machines to be taken home by poll-workers prior to elections which detail you can find here:
http://nosleepovers.org/

I can not see where your confidence in these machines are rooted. I can not see, how an election pollworker can certify to anyone, should vote switching or errors occur, that the problem was in fact fixed, including that the overall vote tally was in no manner affected. It is a box containing algorithms, invisible and unverifiable, who can certify that no hidden executable algorithm was initiated.
Yes, it does not matter whether it is for early voting or on election day – these machines should not be used.

And last but not least, I do not consider voting another errand.

Sincerely,

xxxx

In California early voting providing counties are the following:
Alameda Sequoia Optech 400C Sequoia Optech Insight Sequoia AVC Edge II Yes Sequoia AVC Edge II 10/09 - 11/07

Fresno Diebold AccuVote-OS Diebold AccuVote-OS Diebold AccuVote-TSX Yes Diebold AccuVote-TSX 10/09 - 11/01

Los Angeles Ink-A-Vote OS Ink-A-Vote Plus OS Ink-A-Vote Plus OS Yes Diebold AccuVote-TSX 10/25 - 11/03

Mariposa Sequoia Optech Insight Sequoia AVC Edge II Sequoia AVC Edge II Yes Sequoia AVC Edge II 10/09 - 11/07

Monterey Sequoia Optech 400C Sequioa AVC Edge II Sequioa AVC Edge II Yes Sequoia AVC Edge II 10/09 - 11/07

Napa Sequoia Optech 400C Sequoia AVC Edge I Sequoia AVC Edge I Yes Sequoia AVC Edge I 10/30 - 11/06

Orange HART BallotNow HART eSlate HART eSlate Yes HART eSlate 10/20 - 10/29

Riverside DFM Mark-A-Vote Sequoia AVC Edge II Sequoia AVC Edge II Yes Sequoia AVC Edge II 10/10 - 11/06

San Bernardino Sequoia Optech 400C Sequioa AVC Edge II Sequioa AVC Edge II Yes Sequoia AVC Edge II 10/10 - 11/07

San Diego Diebold AccuVote-OS Diebold AccuVote-TSX Diebold AccuVote-TSX Yes Diebold AccuVote-TSX 10/09 - 11/07

San Mateo HART BallotNow HART eSlate HART eSlate Yes HART eSlate 10/09 - 11/07

Trinity Diebold AccuVote-OS Diebold AccuVote-OS Diebold AccuVote-TSX Yes Diebold AccuVote-TSX 11/01 & 11/02

Tulare Sequoia Optech 400C Sequoia Optech Insight Sequoia AVC Edge II Undecided Sequoia AVC Edge II Undecided

Yolo HART BallotNow HART eSlate HART eSlate Yes HART eSlate 10/30 - 11/03