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Otherwise, it would have an audit trail, like any decent accounting software.
It is transparently obvious that these systems are deliberately flawed. The software for these machines and the procedures used to transmit and tabulate the data make a real recount impossible.
I've been in data processing 20 years. The only reason there is no audit trail is so that you cannot do an audit. Otherwise, it would be there.
In many cases, the machines don't even print the totals for the precinct, they just send them to a country vote tabulator. Bev Harris (like her or not) demonstrated how easy it is to hack the country tabulators. If there is no precinct total printed or recorded at the precinct itself, changing the precinct totals on the tabulator is the easiest way to manipulate election results. You can't check against precinct totals, because they aren't kept anywhere else.
Every precinct needs to have a machine total printed at the precinct before the data is transmitted to the county tabulator. The voting machine needs to generate a paper ballot receipt, checked by the voter before they leave the booth. These paper receipts need to be hand counted and cross checked against the machine totals for the precict before any election is certified.
Who cares if it takes two or three days? I'd much rather be right than fast.
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