Reply #10: Excuse me!

[Bill Bored]

Thanks for the heads up, but Dodd isn't the only one you need write to! CT residents need to write to their state reps and Governor to fix this. I trust that verifiedvoting.org has the correct contact information, but just in case they don't, check it in google or at www.congress.org which has links to state and local representatives.

I'm telling my friends in CT to do this as well. They have mostly lever machines now, which are pretty much unhackable.

Here's a sample letter you can use if you want, or edit it. And please post it on the CT forum:

Dear Governor, State Sen., State Assembly, etc:

It is a little-known fact that in many states in our nation, the vote
has become unverifiable. It has been privatized and computerized without
the necessary paper records and random auditing procedures by which it
can be verified. Computer source code cannot be inspected at the time of
the election and computer security can be lax or nonexistent, allowing
manipulation of the vote data and the counting process itself.
Connections to central tabulators are made via potentially insecure
modem lines or the Internet, adding another point at which tampering can
occur to affect election outcomes in real-time. Altering only a handful
of votes per precinct can change the outcome of a close election. How
could this possibly be detected without the proper safeguards?

Boards of election, however well intentioned, do not have the requisite
knowledge, staff and experience to manage large scale distributed
computer networks.

In addition to being prone to outright fraud and manipulation
(deliberately not counting votes in accordance with the intent of the
voters), touch screen voting machines (also known as DREs) can be
programmed to "default" to certain candidates, to prohibit voting for
straight-party tickets, or to vote for a certain candidate or issue in
lieu of an undervote or overvote. And any or all of these can be
programmed to occur ONLY on the day of an election, making them
undetectable during the pre-certification process.

Most of these problems have actually been documented in the 2004
election, prompting widespread allegations of negligence, fraud and
malfeasance, the first congressional challenge to a state's electoral
vote for president since 1877, and the undermining of the electorate's
confidence in our voting system which is the very core of our
democracy. You can view the incident reports (which are probably only
a subset of the actual incidents that occurred) from the Research Maps at:

https://www.voteprotect.org/

Do you really want to go down this road in CT?

To avoid these problems in our state, if we replace our mechanical lever
voting machines, I want CT law to require paper ballots
marked by hand, and random audits of these ballots to verify the vote count.

Paper ballots can be counted by hand or optical scanners and provide a
permanent, auditable record of the vote. It is easy for voters to use
paper ballots, and our Boards of Election know how to safeguard and
handle them.

To fulfill HAVA accessibility requirements, voters with all disabilities
can use a ballot-marking device, such as the Automark, and still vote on
the same paper ballots as everyone else. Another alternative is the use
of ballot templates, which are inexpensive and work well in Rhode Island
and in other countries.

I don't want to cast my vote on a computer. And elections are not just
about my vote, they are about the will of the people - all voters.
Computers do not allow the public oversight that throughout history has
been the only way to ensure election integrity. I don't care whether the
computer makes mistakes due to innocent or malicious errors. The problem
is that no one can observe what is going on inside the computer, and
that opens the door to undetectable errors and the potential for fraud.

Optical scanners are useful for the counting of paper ballots, but they
are still computers, and their use opens the possibility for software
defects, malicious code, or back door data manipulation, all of which
could affect the results of our elections. While I support the use of
optical scanners to count paper ballots, before they are used we need
the following protections put into law:

(1) All software used in electronic voting and ballot tabulation
equipment must be freely available for public examination.

(2) Wireless communication devices in voting and tabulating equipment
must be banned. Such devices allow malicious individuals or
organizations to access and modify the software and tallies in the
tabulating equipment.

(3) Specify standards, procedures, and time-frames to guarantee voters
and candidates the right to petition for and obtain manual recounts
before certification of the winner of an election.

(4) Conduct mandatory random recounts of at least 5% of precincts.

(5) A citizen's advisory committee, which shall include election
officials, representatives of the disabled community, and independent
computer professionals without ties to voting machine vendors, shall
make recommendations for the choice of voting system for CT.

Sincerely yours,

Edited for spelling a few times!