Reply #59: I agree, it was a bit of both.

[BushSpeak]

I would think that there is a bit of legal difference between poorly calibrated machines with a default for Bush and software that actually flips votes from one candidate to the other.

This seems much more subtle, but just as efficient. If caught, they can blame it on the machines and not intentional software fraud.

This seems to follow the same pattern throughout the election. A technical obstacle course to record a vote for Kerry, but avoiding flagrant fraud.

I actually asked the question of a default for Bush, a couple of weeks ago on another thread.

My original question stands:
Is zone and pressure calibration a hardware or software problem?

Do the zones change from page to page?
Does the ballot order on touch screens change from precinct to precinct as on the Ohio punch cards?

I live in France and voted absentee, so I have to rely on DUers to get first hand information.

(By the way, Andy Stephenson said on Break for News a interview that a certain Jeff Dean who is now on Diebold's Board of Directors and their senior programmer for GEMS software, was convicted of embezzlement for computer hacking in the early 90's . He did this by installing a back door on the accounting software of his Seattle law firm.

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