Reply #75: Ah, and the rebuttal in the Washington Post:

[BevHarris]

"...dismissed the report's findings as the concerns of those who spend too much time in the ivory tower.

"Electronic election auditing and security is a very complex and multilayered process, which is not always well understood by individuals with little to no real-world experience in developing and implementing such a process," said Michael Jacobsen, spokesman for the Ohio-based company.

Whew! Let's not worry our pretty little heads about it then, shall we?

And here's David Heller again (with a little practice, this guy could beat Brit Williams in the whopper-tellers category):

state law and election training procedures are designed to ensure the integrity of elections, regardless of the voting machine. "The chances of someone manipulating the system are slim to none," he said.

(Unless you're a 15-year-old with a hundred bucks and a smidgen of computer savvy.)

Heller points to a recount in Allegany County... "We printed out all ballot images to verify the unit did tally correctly. There were no variances," he said. "That gives the system more credibility. The results of the recount speak for themselves."

(Lemme see, I'm going into my address book and I'll record my name as "Bev" -- only my keyboard is messed up and it records "Gwc" instead. Now I'll print out a summary sheet with all the names in my address book. It says "Gwc." No matter, I'll just tell it to print only one entry at a time, that'll fix it.)

This again: "Diebold's Jacobsen said the software code that the Hopkins scientists evaluated was outdated and was never used in an election."