Bush's
Imperfect Storm
March 1, 2003
By Michael Shannon
Meteorologists will tell you that in order to have a truly
noteworthy weather event you need a complex combination of
factors. It is not enough just to have large amounts of moisture,
severe swings in temperature or the proper atmospheric conditions;
you need to have all of these elements converge in a single
place and time. When they do, the result can be staggeringly
impressive in scope and effect. Evidence of this phenomenon
can currently be seen in mounds of snow and ice from Washington
to Maine.
The same is true in the political arena, in order to have
an event of widespread impact and effect it is necessary to
also have a convergence of a number of seemingly separate
factors. Individually these elements can pose a challenge
of limited degree, but put them together and they can effect
a change that once the process is underway becomes exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to control.
Mr. Bush is now faced with just such a convergence.
Over the course of the past few weeks a series of developments
have taken place that have altered the political climate to
the point where what seemed to have been a preordained decision
to wage war on Iraq, now must be seen in an entirely different
light.
The first sign of storm clouds gathering was the less than
hoped for response to Colin Powell's presentation to the United
Nations Security Council. It was an appearance that was widely
believed, in advance, to be the defining moment of the Administration's
effort to present its case for war. Relying on Mr. Powell
tremendous personal popularity and stature, it was thought
that he would layout, once and for, irrefutable proof of the
malfeasance of Saddam Hussein's regime to a receptive and
welcoming world audience. Unfortunately, that was not to be
the case.
Mr. Powell's declaration that Hussein is an evil man, who
is a lethal menace to his own people and no friend to lovers
of liberty and goodwill was hardly breaking news and made
very few points amongst the nonbeliever. Likewise was his
use of a British government intelligence dossier. This well
hyped document was purportedly to be the latest in hard evidence
of Iraqi duplicity, instead became a major source of embarrassment
when it was revealed that its authorship and content were
far less than advertised.
When Mr. Powell appeared before a Senate committee a few
days later he tried to make up for where he had fallen short
by playing his ace in the hole. By scooping the world's news
agencies with the announcement the United States was privy
to the contents of communication from Public Enemy Number
One, Osama Bin Laden, Powell tried valiantly to make the connection
between this vile and despicable man with his alleged soul-mate
in Baghdad.
Unfortunately, once the rest of the world was able to read
the statement for themselves, this connection was, once again,
less than advertised. Although Bin Laden did call upon the
Iraqi people to resist the American led assault with their
lives, he did not include Hussein as an ally in the cause.
On the contrary, he dismissed Hussein as an infidel: a traitor
to Islam.
While the reverberations of this bombshell were still echoing
through the halls of power, as well as the nation's living
rooms, the scene shifted back to the august chambers of the
U N. The heads of the two UN agencies which have been seeking
to verify Iraqi compliance to UN Resolution 1441 gave a detailed
report of their findings to date. As expected, they did not
report full and unconditional Iraqi compliance. While this
was greeted as good news in Washington, their report also
went on to state that Iraq was being somewhat cooperative
and even more harmful, that they had discovered no evidence
of any nuclear development or any stores of biological or
chemical weaponry. While it has long been the contention of
the Administration that, as Donald Rumsfeld so eloquently
put it, "the absence of evidence should not be considered
evidence of absence," the UN inspectors refuse to toe that
line of reasoning.
(As a backdrop to all of this, a rift erupted in NATO over
wether or not the alliance should make prewar preparations
to defend Turkey from possible Iraqi reprisals in the event
of Turkish participation in any military action against Iraq.
And to make matters even worse, the Turks themselves developed
a case of cold feet as to whether or not American forces could
use Turkish bases as the launching point to attack Iraq from
the north. It seems that it will take tens of billions of
dollars in American largesse to warm them back up.)
To top off the week's fireworks came the now infamous comments
by the French Ambassador. In a stinging response -- his reference
to Rumsfeld's dismissive labeling of France for being part
and parcel of "old Europe" was particularly biting -- to Powell's
earlier presentation, the ambassador made clear that France
did not support any use of military means to force Iraqi compliance
until such a time that the efforts of the inspectors had been
thoroughly exhausted. Much to the consternation of Team Bush,
his comments evoked a spontaneous outburst of applause amongst
the other diplomats in attendance.
Although recalcitrant behavior on the past of the French
is seen by many as de rigueur, additional trouble was afoot
even in what was deemed the safest of harbors.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair has long been rightfully
considered a key to the success of any American led initiative
toward Iraq. While it is universally accepted as a statement
of fact that the United States has more than sufficient means
to handle any military contingencies without the assistance
of allied support, the same cannot be said from a public relations
perspective. Even within the inner circles of the most hard
line of war advocates, it is understood that if the United
States were to act unilaterally in this matter that it would
open itself to untold resistance from both friend and foe
alike. That Mr. Blair has given repeated assurances that he
is a stalwart and reliable ally has been invaluable to the
Bush Administrations plans. Unfortunately for those plans,
Mr. Blair has also made it very plain that he regards the
need of an additional UN resolution declaring the Iraqis in
material breach of the previous resolutions, and thereby subject
to any mean necessary to force their compliance, before he
will sign off on the order to attack.
His insistence on this seal of approval from the UN was very
easy to understand when, in the midst of the largest antiwar
protests in the history of Europe, close to a million British
citizens marched through London demanding that he do so.
Although none of the hundred-plus demonstrations that simultaneously
took place in the United States, ranging from the largest
of American cities to much smaller ones in the heartland,
approached the size of the European ones, the overall effect
of the outpouring of sentiment expressed by hundreds of thousands
of everyday Americans, was the most telling development of
all. While the Administration would never say so on record,
clearly the images of such a mass showing of peaceful civic
resistance were impossible to ignore. With these demonstrations
the fallacy that Mr. Bush had the unconditional support of
his own citizenry was laid wide open.
In spite of all his troubles, Mr. Bush retains control of
the ship of state. He is still in the position to steer that
ship as he so chooses. However, when he first set sail on
this present course he did so believing that he would have
smooth seas in front of him and gentle breezes at his back.
But that's the funny thing about the weather, one minute the
sun's shining and the next, the winds are howling and the
waves are crashing.
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