Intel Community and DOS IGs found that HRC "emails were not retroactively classified" [View all]

[leveymg]

Last edited Mon Jun 6, 2016, 05:50 PM - Edit history (1)

The Intelligence Community IG will be issuing a report on HRC's violations of classified information laws before the FBI issues its final report, and it appears that it too will recommend prosecution. Here is the Joint Statement of the Inspector Generals:

https://oig.state.gov/system/files/statement_of_the_icig_and_oig_regarding_review_of_clintons_emails_july_24_2015.pdf.

(If pdf does not come up, go to statement posted at office of the Director of National Intelligence: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/210-press-releases-2015/1232-statement-from-the-inspectors-general-of-the-intelligence-community-and-the-department-of-state-regarding-the-review-of-former-secretary-clinton-s-emails )

July 24, 2015
Statement from the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community and the Department of State Regarding the Review of Former Secretary Clinton's Emails

Yesterday the Office of the Inspector General ofthe Intelligence Community (IC IG) sent a congressional notification to intelligence oversight committees updating them of the IC IG support to the State Department IG (attached).

The IC IG found four emails containing classified IC-derived information in a limited sample of 40 emails of the 30,000 emails provided by former Secretary Clinton. The four emails, which have not been released through the State FOIA process, did not contain classification markings and/or dissemination controls. These emails were not retroactively classified by the State Department; rather these emails contained classified information when they were generated and, according to IC classification officials, that information remains classified today. This classified information should never have been transmitted via an unclassified personal system.

A lot of people seem to have missed that one, and it will be devastating to several key HRC Campaign lies.

There is abundant precedent for the prosecution of heads of federal agencies for classified information violations. Both CIA Director Petraeus and Deutch were cited for felony violations of Espionage Act Sec 793.

Petraeus plead down to Sec. 1924, a Misdemeanor, while Deutch was referred for prosecution by the CIA IG, but Attorney General Reno ran out the clock without convening a Grand Jury and Deutch was pardoned on Bill Clinton's last day. Both of them were found to have committed acts of mishandling classified materials. Deutch hooked up CIA laptops to his home internet, which was a chargeable offense under the law as it stood in 1996, and as it remains today.

Here's what the Deutch CIA IG Report found in 2000. (The forthcoming Clinton Intelligence Community IG Report will likely contain very similar findings): https://fas.org/irp/cia/product/ig_deutch.html

WHAT LAWS, REGULATIONS, AGREEMENTS, AND POLICIES HAVE POTENTIAL APPLICATION?

109. (U) Title 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 793, "Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information" specifies in paragraph (f):

Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing,... or information, relating to national defense ... through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

110. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. § 798, "Disclosure of classified information" specifies in part:

Whoever, knowingly and willfully ... uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States ... any classified information ... obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

111. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. § 1924, "Unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents or material" specifies:

Whoever, being an officer, employee, contractor or consultant of the United States, and, by virtue of his office, employment, position or contract, becomes possessed of documents or materials containing classified information of the United States, knowingly removes such documents or materials without authority and with the intent to retain such documents or materials at an unauthorized location shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.

112. (U) The National Security Act of 1947, CIA Act of 1949, and Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 establish the legal duty and responsibility of the DCI, as head of the United States intelligence community and primary advisor to the President and the National Security Council on national foreign intelligence, to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

113. (U) Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/ 16, effective July 19, 1988, "Security Policy for Uniform Protection of Intelligence Processed in Automated Information Systems and Networks," reiterates the statutory authority and responsibilities assigned to the DCI for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, E.O.s 12333 and 12356, and National Security Decision Directive 145 and cites these authorities as the basis for the security of classified intelligence, communicated or stored in automated information systems and networks.

114. (U) DCID 1/21, effective July 29, 1994, "Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) specifies in paragraph 2:

All [Sensitive Compartmented Information] must be stored within accredited SCIFs. Accreditaticn is the formal affirmation that the proposed facility meets physical security standards imposed by the DCI in the physical security standards manual that supplements this directive.

115. (U/ /FOUO) Headquarters Regulation (HR) 10-23, Storage of Classified Information or Materials. Section C (1)specifies:

Individual employees are responsible for securing classified information or material in their possession in designated equipment and areas when not being maintained under immediate personal control in approved work areas.

116. (U/ /FOUO) HR 10-24, "Accountability and Handling of Collateral Classified Material," prescribes the policies, procedures, and responsibilities associated with the accountability and handling of collateral classified material. The section concerning individual employee responsibilities states:

Agency personnel are responsible for ensuring that all classified material is handled in a secure manner and that unauthorized persons are not afforded access to such material.

117. (U/ /FOUO) HR 10-25, "Accountability and Handling of Classified Material Requiring Special Control," sets forth policy, responsibilities, and procedures that govern the transmission, control, and storage of Restricted Data, treaty organization information, cryptographic materials, and Sensitive Compartmented Information. The section states:

Individuals authorized access to special control materials are responsible for observing the security requirements that govern the transmission, control, and storage of said materials. Further, they are responsible for ensuring that only persons having appropriate clearances or access approvals are permitted access to such materials or to the equipment and facilities in which they are stored.