... For a taxpayer to have standing to challenge a government expenditure as violating the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court has required that the challenged action be “congressional action under the taxing and spending clause” ... Recently, the Court limited the reach of this ... expressly excluding “discretionary Executive Branch expenditures” ... Sherman points to no specific and binding legislative action directing that $20,000 be disbursed to Friends. It is not enough to say that Friends was “specifically selected” by the legislative leadership for the grant ... The complaint concedes that the General Assembly appropriated $5 million “to be used for grants administered by the <Department>” and then goes on simply to assert that Friends was specifically designated to receive money by the General Assembly. This assertion, however, is not tethered to any legislative text ... A patronage-based process like the one apparently used in Illinois is a far cry from the type of “specific congressional appropriation” that is analogous to the challenged action in Flast ...
As I read this, the court says that even if legislative body procedures effectively earmarked the money for the Bald Knob Cross, the absence of "specific and binding" language in the legislation prevents Sherman from having standing
... Sherman also contends that Friends should be compelled to return the $20,000 it received for the restoration of the Bald Knob Cross. That too is out of the question. After Hein, we explicitly ruled that “<t>he only form of relief the taxpayers <have> standing to seek <is> an injunction against the . . . disbursement of the allegedly unconstitutional grant ... Even if he did have standing, Sherman may seek only an injunction against the state prohibiting the allegedly unconstitutional disbursement, but it is too late for this relief ...
As I read this, the court says that even if Sherman had standing, he could only hope for a prior injunction against the grant, but can no remedy after the grant has been made. But since the impending executive decision to grant the money might easily be well-hidden before the grant is actually made, this alleged possibility of a prior injunction might be in actual fact entirely meaningless
= new reply since forum marked as read
