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soryang

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Member since: Sat Mar 14, 2009, 09:45 PM
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Korea: The "Antiquated" Trip Wire Strategy of the CFC: End in Sight?


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 6.4) Title- Agreement overturned, the CFC will move to Pyeongtaek. "The last bastion of the trip wire broken?" Chart shows relative postions of the US Army's 210th Fire Brigade in Tongduchan and the blue and red emblem of the Combined Forces Command represents the Camp Humphreys, Pyeongtaek location. Banners say, "US Forces Korea trip wire moves south," and, "the security of US automatic entry (is a) Maginot line.

It appears from the discussion on Channel A News Top Ten today concerning the movement of the Combined Forces Command to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, announced by Secretary of Defense, Patrick Shanahan, and South Korean Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong DU, that the 210th Artillery Brigade will ultimately be removed from Dongduchan South Korea at some point in the future. Movement of this remaining element of the 2nd Infantry Division from it's forward position north of the Han River and proximate to the demilitarized zone, would eliminate in view of some critics the benefit of the so called "trip wire" strategy which automatically triggers US military involvement in the defense of South Korea should a North Korean invasion or other attack occur across the DMZ. Other elements of the division had already been moved southward to Camp Humphreys along with US Forces Korea, and the United Nations Command.

The so-called iron trip wire strategy was long a visible source of stability and security to South Korean citizens knowing it's powerful US ally would automatically be directly involved in the defense of South Korea in the event of a North Korean attack. On the other hand the US military presence sometimes was a source of friction with the local community. According to a July 16, 2017 report of the English language Hankyoreh:


The division was originally slated to be relocated in its entirely to Pyeongtaek by 2016 in accordance with the Pyeongtaek relocation plan. But a decision was made at a South Korea-US Security Consultative Meeting in Washington on Oct. 23, 2014, to leave the 210th Artillery Brigade there through 2020 while the South Korean military beefed up its firepower warfare capabilities.


At that point, three of six military installations in the Dongduchan area operated by the US Army had already been returned to the city.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/802974.html


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 6.4) Official ROK Ministry of Defense spokesperson, "The trip wire concept is is quite dated, we consider this to be an outdated idea."

An official statement from the ROK Ministry of Defense, today, disputed that the strength or readiness of the US- South Korean alliance would be adversely affected in any way by the change in the geographical dispositions of US forces, and said the concept of the trip wire engagement of US forces was out of date and not in keeping with modern warfare concepts. The issues have reemerged with the news that a South Korean general not from the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff would be established in Camp Humphreys as the US- ROK Combined Forces Commander in time of war in the future when preparations are completed and operational capabilities are considered to have been demonstrated. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, would remain in Seoul in their MND headquarters near the old Yongsan garrison location.

More:

https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-antiquated-iron-trip-wire-strategy.html

US-DPRK: Mine's Bigger than Yours


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 5.9)

North Korea has fired two more guided missiles from a launch site inland near Sino Ri, North Pyongyan Province. The flight paths carried the missiles eastward toward the Sea of Japan/East Sea. The first launch at 4:30 pm Seoul time was estimated as a 420 to 430 km flight. The second launch at 4:50 pm was estimated at 270 km. The prior guided missile flight from the Hodo peninsula on April 4, was 240 km.

The US announced on April 9 that it had seized a North Korean coal freighter Wise Honest on or about April 2. The US also fired another Minuteman III ICBM in a second exercise on April 9, the missile was targeted at the Kwajalein range in the Marshal Islands. This was the second Minuteman III test launch in just over a week. It is believed that the US Minuteman ICBM launch on the 9th was almost contemporaneous with the two North Korean Sino Ri launches. Reportedly the Vandenburg launch took place ten minutes after the first North Korean launch. The claim that this second Minuteman launch was a routine exercise launch seems disingenuous. The USS Rhode Island test fired a Trident SLBM off the Florida east coast April 9, a few hours later. Some headlines appear to be trying to relate this Navy launch to the North Korean situation to get the most mileage out of it.


(Source- KBS 24 youtube podcast April 26) Panmunjeom Declaration, one year special edition discussion. Pak Ji Won, Democratic Peace Party representive; Jeong Se Hyun, former Unification Minister; Moon Jang In, President's special adviser for unification policy, foreign relations, and national security.

Stephen Biegun is in Seoul purportedly to discuss negotiating approaches to North Korea. South Korea intends to carry out humanitarian food aid to North Korea. The White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said the US would not oppose it. I have the distinct impression from listening to an open discussion among the three "wise men" of South Korea concerning unification policies, April 26, calling for more courage from the Moon Administration in a difficult situation, that the humanitarian aid would go ahead whether the US consented or not. The wise men also called for South Korea to draw up a road map for denuclearization with each step delineated on a schedule with tangible actions for North Korea and tangible reciprocal measures by the US including easing of sanctions incrementally as progress is made along the way. Why the US hasn't done this yet reflects on the character of its "negotiating" effort.

Hyunmoo 3 picture side by side

(Source Channel A Top Ten News 5.7)

North Korea tactical guided missile left. South Korean Hyunmoo tactical guided missile right. Both solid fueled.

"This is just kind of what this class of short-range missiles looks like," Lewis says.


Town says, "It actually makes it more difficult for the U.S. and South Korea to postpone military exercises." The problem here is that they had already resumed exercises in late April before this launch in North Korea. Several experts have linked the two events.

In any case, what happened in Hanoi was a rejection of negotiations and a return to regime change politics by the US despite Trump and Pompeo's statements to the contrary. This was signaled implicitly by the breakin to the Madrid embassy by the group "Free Joseon" (just before Hanoi); the adoption of an all or nothing approach to negotiations with no reciprocity at Hanoi; the rejection of the South Korean joint economic overtures to North Korea at Hanoi; the abandonment of the Singapore joint statement; the public complaints about human rights abuses in North Korea by US representatives to UN committees; and the human rights content of daily VOA broadcasts in Korean, including public statements from top republicans in Congress and the Senate on a daily basis concerning human rights, weapons of mass destruction and other items not outlined at Singapore. The import of these events is unmistakable. Even the conservative expert in South Korea, Thae Yong Ho (the former DPRK diplomat) has commented that a return to human rights issues is the code for regime change in North Korea and signals an end to negotiation.


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 4,23) "US Forces Korea, last week conducted a THAAD deployment to Pyeongtaek...Photo made public on SNS."

In the last few weeks, the US has test fired a double ABM intercept on a single test target in the Pacific, conducted an exercise Minuteman III ICBM launch in the Pacific, deployed THAAD missiles to Camp Humphreys in a mobility exercise, and conducted a renamed version of the Max Thunder joint Air Force exercise with South Korea.





Kim in Vladivostok, Who's the Boss?


(Source- Channel A News 4.26) Choe Son Hui (left circle) arrives in the same limo with Kim Jong Un at the Vladivostok venue for the summit. Her nominal boss, Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho, (right circle) apparently rode in the front, while Choe sat in the rear with Kim Jong Un. The streamer says Choi Son Hui reforms Kim Jong Un's dictator image, paraphrasing Thae Yong Ho, expert guest. Thae is a former diplomat who defected from the DPRK embassy in London to South Korea. He had a one on one interview with the host of the Channel A News Top Ten program on April 26 to evaluate developments connected with the Kim-Putin summit.


(Source- Channel A News 4.26) (title- the real reason for Kim Yong Chol's absence?) Why did Chairman Kim bring along Choi Son Hui, First Vice Foreign Minister? To dispel his image as dictator? Choe sits to the right of Sergei Lavrov. Ri Yong Ho, DPRK Foreign Minister sits to Putin's left.

The most interesting contribution of Thae Yong Ho's analysis was his commentary on the elevation of Choe Son Hui to the inner circle of elite power holders in North Korea. Thae cited by way of historical precedent, three women as significant aides to Kim Il Sung during the early days of communist rule in North Korea. Most significant of these was Shin Jin Soon, a graduate of the elite Kyongseong International University, who was said to speak seven languages, and played a major role in North Korean international relations, particularly with Russia, as early as 1945. Her relationship with Kim Il Sung went back to the struggle against the Japanese Empire. Russia was referred to as brother in the struggle against Imperial Japan in Kim Jong Un's Vladivostok speech, as a historical bond that tied the two countries together.


(Source- Channel A News 4.26) Kim Il Sung, Shin Jin Soon, advocated in those days as Soviet foreign relations voice ( literally "wind pipe." )

The elevation of Choe Son Hui to the elite power level in North Korea is a product of her outstanding academic achievement at elite academic institutions, the failure of the Hanoi summit to which Kim Yong Chol's decline is attributed, and the model provided by Kim Il Sung's promotion of elite women to facilitate foreign policy goals. Shin Jin Soon, historically was described as the "wind pipe" to Russia. Kim Jong Un was said to be going to Vladivostok for an "oxygen supply." Ostensibly, the presence of an influential and worldly woman with the Kim delegation, presents a softer image of the dictatorship, in a world where many countries are devoid of women in positions of power.


(Source- Channel A News 4.26) Kim Jong Un: An intelligent woman is good. Thae Yong Ho: "It looks like Kim will be using Choe Son Hui often for nuclear negotiations."

It might be worthwhile to consider the important role played by Choe in comparison to the other women around Kim as his personal support group. Kim is in an isolated position and younger and less experienced than most of the international figures he meets, for example, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin. Thae notes the same has held true inside Kim's own ruling party, where older generation officials have dominated and the much younger heir to power has been engaged in a protracted effort to remove or replace them. Thae characterized the current North Korean leadership circles in term of an older generation typically in their sixties, that is, around thirty years older than Kim. Choe is a little younger than this at age 54, it is believed, and serves as an experienced bridge domestically and internationally as an adviser. The other women in Kim's life: wife, Ri Sol Ju; sister, Kim Yo Jong; and confidante, Hyon Song Wol, are like Kim himself substantially younger. Kim Yo Jang seems to be a highly visible pragmatic assistant when it comes to logistics, protocol, and propaganda. She was noticeably absent in Vladivostok. Choe, more so than the younger women, now has not only the role of a maternal mentor for a relatively young Kim, but the experience to provide the intellectual support and advice in a most challenging if not desperate international situation.








He should turn himself in then


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 4.17) Three identities of Adrian Hong, used in Europe by the Free Joseon leader, as portrayed by Channel A graphic.

It doesn't actually seem all that mysterious or confusing to those familiar with cold war era spy plots depicted in novels or movies. If one considers the moniker "Oswaldo Trump," the implicit message there seems to be to keep on the right cold war path. Ironically, Victor Cha's latest opinion, in The National Interest Magazine, on relations with North Korea exemplifies the greatest fear inside the national security establishment, that somehow after the debacle arranged by Bolton and Pompeo at Hanoi, a nuclear agreement might still emerge and result in downsizing of US military presence in the far east. The other symbolic aspect of the term "Oswaldo" is the notion of the sacrificial lamb, or scapegoat in these skull and dagger capers. One of the Channel A analysts belabored the obvious when he said the stolen digital data from the embassy was already in US possession and described the return thereof, by the FBI, as a symbolic gesture in terms of compliance with international law. Further, the same is true of Ahn's arrest. That the US authorities will continue to search for the other members of the group is the intention his arrest is meant to convey to the international community.

Free Joseon: Cut off the tail- protect the vital organs

https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2019/04/free-joseon-cut-off-tail-protect-vital.html

Free Joseon - limited hangout?


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 3.29) According to, Kim Jong Bong, a former ROK National Intelligence Service employee, Adrian Hong Chang had previously contacted Kim Jong Nam, Kim Hong Un's half brother, and asked him to lead a government in exile repeatedly which he refused to do.


(Source- YTN News 3.29) Kim Han Sol receiving US protection...going forward will this be a variable in negotiations? Story of Kim Han Sol's journey. State Department has nothing to say. Who assisted in Kim Han Sol's American journey? During the YTN interview, national security analyst Kim Jong Bong, said a Japanese language report stated that Kim Jong Nam met with two CIA people directly before he was killed at the Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. (Kim Jong Nam was Kim Han Sol's father and Kim Jong Un's half brother.) In his opinion the Japanese report was credible. The YTN news graphic in the background shows the relationship he observes among three entities during the rescue of Kim Han Sol after his father's death: Choellima Civil Defense, extract; CIA, transfer; FBI protect.


Kim Jong Bong, a former National Intelligence Service, North Korea desk analyst, stated he felt there was involvement by the CIA in the Kim Han Sol defection and protection operation by the so called Choellima Civil Defense group, but doesn't believe they provided the command or direct support for the Madrid Embassy break in. He concedes that other observers perceive the possibility of US direct support but feels that this kind of action by the US is unlikely because it would hurt US interests and be futile in that respect.

The timing of the attack was intended to discourage the negotiations with the DPRK in Hanoi. The "Free Joseon" group also provides a useful pipeline for operations to weaken the DPRK political position in prospective negotiations and otherwise. Namely, an "independent group" carried out the embassy attack and then provided the FBI with intelligence information they took by force. Most Korean analysts seem to agree that the group that carried out the embassy attack has had extensive training in such special operations from military or intelligence training sources. The YTN guest, who also appears regularly on Channel A News Top Ten as an expert commentator, thinks the US relationship with Adrian Hong Chang probably emerged during his experience assisting and providing refuge to North Korean defectors.

Shin In Kyun's Analysis of "Free Joseon" suggests CIA operation

Shin In Kyun's Daily Defense Analysis of "Free Joseon" suggests CIA operation.

Title of the Defense Daily program on youtube 3.27 is US, North Korean regime change operation already in progress!? ( 美, 이미 北 레짐체인지 작업 진행중!? )


(Source- Shin In Kyun's Daily Defense TV 03.27) Was Free Joseon really made by North Korean defectors?

Established: 3.4.17 time of Park-US, military options being prepared; immediately after the assassination of Kim Jong Nam in February. Name: The use of words not used by North Koreans and the spelling of Choellima and Joseon in English and Civil Defense in Hangul; The main logo image used the national interior (South Korea) portal site Naver "shared gothic" font.

Tracks of expert participation: Site and email detoured through three countries; tracks of web site coding erased- unable to trace; cloud player server used location concealed; money collected by crypto-currency.

Principal activity: Multinational intelligence organization related Kim Han Sol defection and protection mission carried out.

Shin points to inauthentic word usage, spelling and translation between the two languages of English and Korean as evidence the organization's web site doesn't reflect the efforts of a natural Korean speaker but rather suggests the use of a digital translator by an outsider not sufficiently familiar with the Korean language. Shin says that the language and word usage in the very names and logos of the group are too mechanical and literal in nature. Despite the group's claims that it didn't use violence, and was "invited" into the DPRK embassy in Madrid, Shin finds that proposition dubious, that the entry was forcible and illegal, and for this reason the perpetrators used false names to conceal their identities. The origins of their web site and emails are concealed in an impressive and expertly proficient manner. The coordination of the attack by persons from three countries, and their skillful escape from accountability in Spain suggests military like organization and the sponsorship of a powerful international intelligence organization.

According to Shin, a national security analyst, no group of North Korean defectors could possess the full complement of skills, organization and resources necessary to accomplish either the defection of Kim Han Sol, nor the attack on the DPRK embassy, successfully without any one being caught. He notes that the origin of the alleged provisional government group go back to the Park Geun Hye administration in early 2017, which shortly thereafter fell from power in Korea, due to her impeachment. The effort in spiriting away Kim Han Sol, Kim Jong Nam's son (and Kim Jong Un's nephew), after the reported assassination of Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia, is clear evidence of a multinational intelligence organization's assistance to the alleged group. The Saenuri conservative government of former President Park would not have any problem with this sort of group being covertly organized and supported in early 2017. The current Moon administration would not approve. Shin concludes that the organisation involved is the CIA. Shin doesn't find the Free Joseon public comments concerning their relationship with the FBI credible either.

Shin hasn't appeared on the conservative Channel A News analysis program Top Ten recently, as he often does. The program focuses on diplomatic and military affairs affecting South Korea. This may be the second time his appearances have been suspended. This perhaps reflects an effort to muzzle his views. Shin is very conservative, but doesn't shrink from calling things as he sees them. His commentary is often impolitic as are the views he expresses on this subject. Yet, he has no objections to the regime change objectives of the CIA. He wishes them well.



친구여 조용필 가사 Dear Friend by Jo Yong Pil, lyrics

꿈은 A dream
하늘에서 잠자고 In the sky sleeping
추억은 Memory
구름따라 흐르고 flows following clouds
친구여 Dear Friend
모습은 어딜 갔나 Your visage, where has it gone?
그리운 친구여 Missed dear friend.

옛 일 Past days
생각이 날때마다 each time those thoughts arise,
우리 our
잃어버린 정 찾아 lost affection, I seek
친구여 Dear Friend
꿈속에서 만날까 in a dream shall we meet
조용히 눈을 감네 Quietly, close our eyes

슬픔도 기쁨도 Sadness and Joy too,
외로움도 함께 했지 loneliness too, we had together.
부푼 꿈 을 안고 Risen dream, embrace
내일을 다짐하던 Tomorrow, our promised
우리 굳 센 약속 어디에 Our sure strong pledge where is it?

꿈은 The dream
하늘에서 잠자고 Sleeps in heaven
추억은 The memory
구름따라 흐르고 flows following clouds
친구여 Dear Friend
모습은 어딜 갔나 Your visage, where has it gone?
그리운 친구여 Missed dear friend.

I'm sure Dan Coats got an earful during his visit in South Korea

On the visit to South Korea by DNI Dan Coats, he was accompanied by former CIA Korea Team chief, Andrew Kim, who is now "retired" and working at Stanford. It is said that Coats made a formal visit with President Moon, and gave a classified intergovernmental presentation concerning North Korean issues. One of the few comments publicly revealed by Andrew Kim was that there are large differences in views between the South Korean administration and the US concerning the nature of an effective approach to denuclearization objectives.


(Source JTBC News 3.22) Number 2 story today. North Korea withdraws from Kaesong Liaison Office. No. 1 story on Channel A News Top Ten. It appears as if North Korea withdrew from the joint North South Liaison office as a response to increasing sanctions from the US.


Dan Coats cancelled his visit to Panmunjum for unknown reasons. Some Americans say North Korean withdrawal of its Kaesong Liaison delegation doesn't matter because...they're not Koreans? Because they don't like the Moon government anyway? It's just another "edge of cliff" maneuver by the North? Maybe they withdrew because the US completely disregarded advice from their South Korean ally at Hanoi and are currently blocking virtually all joint South Korean economic initiatives with the North. The office had been open for 190 days and was the first such joint office operated by the two Korean states since the Korean conflict.

Unfortunately, there are quite a few other measures that North Korea can take to damage relations with South Korea, and increase tensions, short of launching a missile. They could start disregarding or deconstructing the extensive measures agreed to in military agreements with South Korea to defuse tensions in the DMZ and the Joint Security Area, and the buffer zones restricting military air and ship activities north and south of the DMZ and Northern Limit Lines in the West and East Seas. Likely such measures would just be the beginning of an unproductive and dangerous escalation cycle. Such actions would have the effect of discrediting and destabilizing the Moon government, something about which conservatives in South Korea, and opponents to negotiations in the US could care less.

The illusion of the Hanoi summit

Stephen Biegun has the temerity to say, that he cannot trust Kim Hyuk Chol, who refused to respond to demands that North Korea give up all of it's nuclear weapons, resources and facilities, as if this was something that was in the cards or on the agenda for the Hanoi summit. To get Kim to the summit Biegun implied there was wiggle room or flexibility in the US approach to negotiations and that not everything need be achieved at once. Yet once at the summit, US demands included everything, in an all or nothing approach, that exceeded the parameters of the Singapore summit, with no offers of any sanctions relief of any kind for interim measures. For example, the US demanded that all weapons of mass destruction, (a pet phrase of the neo-con proponents of interminable middle east wars) including chemical and biological weapons, as part of the US demands that would require fulfillment in addition to the so called hek list or inventory of all nuclear weapons, enrichment facilities, missile sites, production facilities and so on. It was this all or nothing approach that previously caused the talks to falter last summer after the Singapore summit, when Pompeo made similar demands in Pyongyang and Kim Jong Un refused to meet with him or other US representatives for months.

Moon Chung In, the unofficial advisor and spokesperson for the Moon administration has to maintain an optimistic attitude as does the National Security Advisor, because the Moon Jae In administration in South Korea committed itself to this course politically, regardless of how incompetent or offensive US policy is toward North Korea.

While the Blue House is not taking Choi's statements as an accurate indicator of no possibility of further negotiations, that possibility hangs by unlikely threads. The first according to Moon Chung In is that the US needs to demonstrate flexibility toward North Korea and toward South Korean economic overtures such as Kumgansang and Kaseong. Otherwise South Korea has no leverage. The US has stated repeatedly that isn't going to happen. In fact sanctions are closing on North Korea, and foreign revenues are drying up and food is in scarce supply. Humanitarian efforts such as the public health anti TB efforts in North Korea are even being shut down. Discussion of more sanctions is counterproductive according to Moon, but everyday, we hear Bolton and a coterie of demagogues in the Congress either initiating or threatening more sanctions on a daily basis. This is little more than a regime change policy.

Secondly, Moon says the smallest disputes now can result in disaster. Yet the largest dispute has already happened and shows no prospect of compromise possible on the US side.

This fundamental difference which is well understood by long term observers of the negotiations between the US "one bundle" or Libyan approach, and a simultaneously reciprocal step by step, phased trust building approach, favored by North Korea, has been the obstacle to negotiations all along. A retreat was required from the US all or nothing approach after Singapore which Stephen Biegun played out in working level talks, as evidenced by his presentation at Stanford before the Hanoi summit could even occur. Once, the North Koreans committed to meet at Hanoi, the US went back to the old playbook of all or nothing, give up everything in return for vague promises of future benefits and no sanctions relief of any kind in the interim. No one who knows anything about North Korea could have seriously thought this would work.

It was a duplicitous approach for a US administration which cannot stand up to domestic criticism of its North Korean initiatives by the intelligence establishment, the neo-cons, the press, the opposition, and the military industrial complex of think tanks, and Congressional defense industry flunkies. One can be assured of one thing in US East Asian policy in a conflict situation- when there is a bipartisan consensus in the US on what US policy should be, it is invariably based upon grandiose illusions. Such policies typically have the disastrous consequences we know so well- the so called loss of China, the "loss" of the first Korean conflict which resulted in war with China and an armistice rather than the expected military victory, the disaster in Vietnam, and finally this, the development of North Korea as a nuclear power.

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