Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

March 3, 4:00 pm EST

The Russian military has continued its unsuccessful attempts to encircle Kyiv and capture Kharkiv. The Russians continued to attack piecemeal, committing a few battalion tactical groups at a time rather than concentrating overwhelming force to achieve decisive effects. Russian commanders appear to prefer opening up new lines of advance for regiment-sized operations but have been unable to achieve meaningful synergies between efforts along different axes toward the same objectives. They have also continued conducting operations in southern Ukraine along three diverging axes rather than concentrating on one or attempting mutually supporting efforts. These failures of basic operational art—long a strong suit of the Soviet military and heavily studied at Russian military academies—remain inexplicable as does the Russian military’s failure to gain air superiority or at least to ground the Ukrainian Air Force. The Russian conventional military continues to underperform badly, although it may still wear down and defeat the conventional Ukrainian military by sheer force of numbers and brutality. Initial indications that Russia is mobilizing reinforcements from as far away as the Pacific Ocean are concerning in this respect. Those indications also suggest, however, that the Russian General Staff has concluded that the forces it initially concentrated for the invasion of Ukraine will be insufficient to achieve Moscow’s military objectives.

Operations to envelop Kyiv remain Russia’s main effort. Russian troops are also continuing three supporting efforts, one to seize Kharkiv, one to take Mariupol and secure the “land bridge” connecting Rostov-on-Don to Crimea, and one to secure Kherson and set conditions for a drive west toward Mykolayiv and Odesa.

The Russian attack on Kyiv likely consists of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and a supporting effort along the axes from Chernihiv and Sumy to encircle it from the east.

Russian forces in the south resumed offensive operations toward Mykolayiv on March 3 after securing Kherson on March 2, but do not appear to pose an imminent danger to Odesa. Russian forces likely seek to force Mariupol to capitulate by destroying critical civilian
infrastructure and killing civilians to create a humanitarian catastrophe—an approach Russian forces have repeatedly taken in Syria.[1]



https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3

In the two weeks prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Marine Corps University ran a four-day wargame to simulate the first several days of just such an invasion. One of us ran the wargame while the others played the Ukrainian and Russian forces. Despite a few stark differences, the current Russian offensive is playing out in ways eerily similar to that simulation.

By the time the wargame ended, the overall situation appeared very much as it does on the ground in Ukraine, with only two major deviations. First, the Russians have pushed harder out of Belarus to the west of the Dneiper — north of Kyiv — to strike the city from the rear. And secondly, the Russian assault in Kherson was temporarily halted, as the axis of advance in the south for a time turned northeast toward Mariupol. Both of these actions were, however, discussed by the players in the wargame.

Another difference was in the impact of the Russian air and missile campaign. In the game, Russian operations began with a series of missile and airstrikes, aimed at eliminating Ukraine’s air force and destroying the country’s integrated air defense system. Thus, the Russian players’ primary focus, during the first few days of the campaign, was aimed at gaining freedom of maneuver in the skies — air dominance — along with destroying Ukraine’s coastal defense systems. So, although the number of actual strikes made by the Russians in the conflict’s first 24-hours tracked almost exactly to what was employed by the Russians in the wargame, the impact was substantially different. In the wargame, every strike was focused on eliminating Ukraine’s air force and air defense network. In real life, the Russian strikes appear to have been more widely spread over a range of targets. Thus, the Russians employed far fewer munitions than required to cripple Ukraine’s air defenses or to significantly degrade their ability to control forces in the field. In short, unlike in the game, the Russian attacks were damaging but insufficient to overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses.

Much of the Ukrainian air force was destroyed on the ground as a result of Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missile strikes, special operations-enabled targeting and direct action, and air strikes. The surviving remnants were overwhelmed and destroyed in the air, some being shot down by long-range air defense systems in Russia, with ranges extending into Ukrainian airspace. This stands in stark contrast to what Russia has achieved in its actual operations. Going into the fifth day of the war, Ukraine’s air defenses are still functioning, even if at a reduced level of effectiveness. Moreover, by all accounts, the Ukrainian air force remains in the fight, and in combination with the remaining air defenses is having some success in contesting Ukraine’s airspace. At present, the Russians appear to possess air superiority, but the reported 30+ sorties the Ukrainians are launching daily have denied the Russians the level of air dominance that they achieved in the wargame. Primary initial targets in the wargame were Ukrainian S-300 systems around Kyiv, the Dnieper River bend, Kherson, and Odessa. Secondary targets were Ukraine’s dozens of BUK (SA-17) systems. The damage done to Ukraine’s air defense system was extensive, neutralizing the core integrated air defense network in the first two days, although the dispersion of Ukraine’s BUK systems assured a residual anti-air capability. Moreover, at the cost of 30 to 40 aircraft, in the wargame, the Russians gained air dominance, as the Ukrainian air force was virtually wiped out by day three of the wargame. There were likely some residual survivors, but Ukraine’s ability to operate at the squadron level was neutralized.

https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-wargame-before-the-war-russia-attacks-ukraine/

Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team

with the Critical Threats Project, AEI

March 2, 2022

ISW published its most recent Russian campaign assessment at 4:30 pm EST on March 2.

This daily synthetic product covers key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Key Takeaways March 2

Russian forces resumed offensive operations against Kyiv’s western outskirts on March 2 after pausing for resupply from February 27 to March 1 but failed to secure any additional territory.
Russian forces launched offensive operations in Zhytomyr Oblast, expanding their envelopment of Kyiv further west than ISW previously assessed—likely to outflank stronger-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance and limited Ukrainian counterattacks in Kyiv’s outskirts.
Russian forces renewed advances toward northeastern Kyiv on March 2, reaching a line approximately 65km from the city center on that axis.
Russian forces assaulted central Kharkiv and continued to heavily bombard the city on March 2, likely increasing civilian casualties.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-assessment-13

March 2, 4:30 pm EST

Russian forces resumed offensive operations in support of their envelopment of Kyiv on March 2 but made few territorial advances. Russian forces resumed offensive operations on both axes of advance toward Kyiv after largely pausing for 72 hours to reinforce and resupply their troops north and west of Kyiv. Russian operations to envelop Kyiv are Moscow’s main effort. Russian troops are also undertaking three supporting efforts, one to seize Kharkiv, one to take Mariupol and secure the “land bridge” connecting Rostov-on-Don to Crimea, and one to secure Kherson and set conditions for a drive west toward Mykolayiv and Odesa. The three supporting operations were active in the last 24 hours; Russian forces likely captured Kherson and began a bombardment of critical civilian infrastructure in Mariupol in a likely effort to force the city to surrender while making few territorial gains in Kharkiv.

The Russian attack on Kyiv likely consists of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and a supporting effort along the axes from Chernihiv and Sumy to encircle it from the east. The long Russian column of combat and logistics vehicles observed north of Kyiv in the last 48 hours is likely now supporting attacks directly into the city from positions Russian forces maintain in Kyiv’s northwestern outskirts. However, Russian forces are more likely to prioritize the envelopment/encirclement in the coming days, rather than a direct assault into the city.

Russian forces resumed frontal assaults on Kharkiv on March 2 and continued using area-attack weapons, dramatically increasing the damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties. Russian ground forces appear to be conducting another frontal assault on Kharkiv from the northeast rather than enveloping the city and will likely face protracted Ukrainian resistance.

Russian forces in the south likely secured Kherson, began bombarding civilian infrastructure in Mariupol in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender without a direct assault, and appear to be holding their positions south of Zaporizhya. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations towards Mikolayiv in the next 24 hours but do not appear to pose an imminent danger to Odesa. Russian forces likely seek to force Mariupol to capitulate by destroying critical civilian infrastructure and killing civilians to create a humanitarian catastrophe – an approach Russian forces have repeatedly taken in Syria.[1] A Russian drive north through or near Zaprozhya to cut off Ukrainian forces fighting along the line of contact appears very unlikely in the next 24-72 hours.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2

This is a fairly long read with more at the link provide. It seems to be a very authoritative grouping of information and while perhaps not fitting into the Drama Cable News and Twitter feed hyperbole narratives it gives some insight into current operational conditions.

Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

March 1, 3:00 pm EST

Russian forces are completing the reinforcement and resupply of their troops north and west of Kyiv and launching an envelopment of the capital likely aimed at encircling and ultimately capturing it. This effort will likely accelerate in the next 24-48 hours. Russian operations against Kyiv are Moscow’s main effort. Russian troops are also undertaking three supporting efforts, one to seize Kharkiv, one to take Mariupol and secure the “land bridge” connecting Rostov-on-Don to Crimea, and one to secure Kherson and set conditions for a drive west toward Mykolayiv and Odesa. The three supporting operations are active, with the operation against Mariupol making the most progress in the last 24 hours.

The Russian attack on Kyiv likely consists of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and a supporting effort along the axes from Chernihiv and Sumy to encircle Kyiv from the east. The long Russian column of combat and logistics vehicles north of Kyiv is likely setting conditions for the envelopment to the west, although it could also support attacks directly into the city from the positions Russian forces maintain in Kyiv’s northwestern outskirts. Russian forces are more likely to pursue the envelopment/encirclement than a direct assault into the city.

The Russian military has continued using area-attack weapons in the city of Kharkiv, dramatically increasing the damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties. Russian forces have not reportedly attempted large-scale ground operations against Kharkiv in the last 24 hours but are likely instead using air, missile, and artillery bombardment to set conditions for a renewed ground attack sometime in the next 24-48 hours. Russian ground forces appear likely to conduct another frontal assault on Kharkiv from the northeast rather than attempt to envelop or encircle the city.

Russian forces in the south appear to be holding their positions south of Zaprozhya, fighting to reduce Ukrainian positions in Kherson and seize that city, and encircling Mariupol to set conditions to seize it. Russian operations in the south do not appear to pose an imminent danger to Odesa within the next 24 hours. A Russian drive north through or near Zaprozhya to cut off Ukrainian forces fighting along the line of contact also appears very unlikely in the next 24-72 hours.


https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1

SPRINGFIELD - The Illinois Department of Agriculture (IDOA), along with the Office of the Illinois State Fire Marshal (OSFM) are encouraging Illinois farmers to set aside time to recognize Grain Bin Safety Week from February 20-26 and review safety practices while working in and around grain bins.

Based on Purdue University’s 2020 Summary of U.S. Agricultural Confined Space-Related Injuries and Fatalities (ACSRIF) report, the U.S. documented 35 grain entrapment cases. The 35 cases represent an almost 8 percent decline in grain entrapments from 2019, when 38 entrapments were recorded. The total number of fatal and non-fatal entrapments is the second highest in the past six years. In 2020, Illinois Fire Departments responded to a nation leading 12 rescue incidents at Illinois grain bins/elevators, according to National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) data.

“Often times we become complacent when doing tasks we have done a thousand times and for farmers that often means working in and around grain bins,” said IDOA Director, Jerry Costello II. “Unfortunately, problems involving flowing grain can snowball quickly. That’s why it’s important to set aside time to go over safety measures, to prepare farmers for a potential grain bin emergency.”

https://www.riverbender.com/articles/details/idoa-and-state-fire-marshal-encourage-farmers-to-practice-safety-while-working-in-grain-bins-56941.cfm

Last year, Glenda Seim became the poster child no one wants to be: a senior who went from being the victim of a Nigerian scam artist to joining him in fraud. In November, the 81-year-old Kirkwood widow pleaded guilty to two felony charges alleging she was a “money mule” who assisted in fraudulent transactions totaling as much as $1.5 million.

Seim, who now lives in Webster Groves, was sentenced in federal court yesterday. And while sentencing guidelines called for four years in prison, even the prosecutor urged the judge to show mercy.

Seim, said Assistant U.S. Attorney Tracy Berry, had shown “extreme remorse,” not only repenting from her crimes but filming a public service video for the FBI. In it, Seim detailed falling in love with a man she’d never met — and ignoring friends, family members and even law enforcement when they sought to persuade her to stop sending him money and, ultimately, facilitating his fraud.

Seim knew, Berry wrote in court filings, that the video could open her up to “substantial public attention and ridicule.” But she did it to warn others.

https://news.stlpublicradio.org/show/st-louis-on-the-air/2022-02-24/how-a-kirkwood-octogenarian-became-an-international-money-mule

Since the late 1970s, many North American bird species have decreased in size, scientists say. But during that period, bigger-brained birds, like the song sparrow, did not shrink as much as their smaller-brained counterparts, like warblers.

That’s according to researchers at Washington University, who drew on a data set of approximately 70,000 birds killed by window strikes in downtown Chicago between 1978 and 2016.

“We were really struck by how some species seem to be decreasing a lot more than others,” said study co-author, Justin Baldwin, a Ph.D. candidate with the Botero Lab at Washington University.

And the reason, researchers believe, is rising temperatures. Baldwin said further research could shed light on how exactly climate change has catalyzed the differences in size. Right now, he sees two possible explanations.

https://news.stlpublicradio.org/show/st-louis-on-the-air/2022-02-25/smaller-brained-birds-shrink-in-response-to-climate-change-wash-u-study-finds

Metro Transit is cutting the service frequency of buses on 12 MetroBus routes and making changes to six other routes.

Bi-State Development, which operates the transit system, is struggling to operate its routes because it is having trouble attracting and retaining bus drivers during the coronavirus pandemic. The company has boosted pay to $18.53 an hour to recruit drivers.

“Unfortunately, this is just about what our labor availability is,” said Taulby Roach, Bi-State Development president and CEO. “It still means that we have to be sure that our level of service is balanced with our labor availability.”

The transit company needs to fill about 130 positions to keep services operating across the St. Louis region.

https://news.stlpublicradio.org/economy-business/2022-02-25/bus-driver-shortage-drives-metro-transit-to-change-18-bus-routes-beginning-march-21

This story was originally published by The Kansas City Beacon.

Robert Petrie takes pride in his job. The 38-year-old started working as a Walmart cart attendant in Sedalia, Missouri, nearly two years ago. He made the move when he said his old job with McDonald’s wasn’t challenging enough anymore – the same reason he decided to move on from the job he held before that.

“What I like about Robert is he’s a self advocate,” said Kim Anderson, director of employment services for the Center for Human Services in Sedalia, which is about 90 miles southeast of Kansas City. “He literally was like I’ve had my first job, I’m ready to move forward.”

Petrie has developmental disabilities. Though he has held jobs in his community for more than five years, his time with Anderson goes back to his days working in CHS sheltered workshops – government-subsidized facilities where people with disabilities can work in controlled environments with accommodations and support from staff and supervisors.

Sheltered workshops also have governmental permission to pay workers less than the minimum wage to help offset the costs to employers for the purported lower productivity levels of employees with disabilities.

https://news.stlpublicradio.org/government-politics-issues/2022-02-26/sheltered-workshop-or-community-jobs-missouri-debates-disabled-adults-in-the-workforce