Insanity’s Definition is Sending More U.S. Ground Troops to Iraq--Michael Scheuer

[KoKo]

Insanity’s Definition is Sending More U.S. Ground Troops to Iraq

By Michael Scheuer -- former CIA intelligence officer, American blogger, historian, foreign policy critic, and political analyst.

June 03, 2015 "Information Clearing House" - There seems to be great Republican resistance to the idea that their interventions in Iraq and the Muslim world are the main cause of both the mess in Iraq and the growing and increasingly powerful worldwide Islamist movement. To the extent that Hillary Clinton and other Democratic senators and congressmen joined the Republicans in illegally delegating the war-declaring power to George W. Bush there is a point to the Republicans’ resistance. The correct formulation of the statement is that both parties are equally responsible for the mess in Iraq and for the formidable Islamist foe that now exists. Also a correct statement is that the bulk of both parties now want the United States to become an even stronger motivator of and recruiter for the Islamists by expanding the military re-intervention in Iraq that began in the summer of 2014. Before that occurs it would be best to review a few facts:

–The 2003 invasion of Iraq was approved by both parties and driven by the Neoconservatives in both parties. There was no need for a war in Iraq. Even if Saddam Hussein had WMD he was not a threat to the United States, and because we have none but parasitic allies in the Middle East, we needed to let them fend for themselves. (NB: We need to do this now.)

–Saddam Hussein was our best ally in the war against the Sunni Islamists, an ally that we did not have to cajole, pay, or urge to act against the Sunni militants. That he diddled around with and funded the Palestinian fighters is true, but he was reliably lethal — for his government’s own interests — when it came to killing mujahedin trying to transit or set up shop in Iraq. Without Saddam to hold the center of the Arab world and block the insurgents’ easy east-west movement, we now have a mujahedin theater of operations that extends from Morocco on the Atlantic, to Jakarta in the Pacific, and from the North Caucasus in the north, to Nigeria in the south.

–The U.S. military and its allies were defeated in Iraq. They were all shackled by political constraints and by suicidal rules-of-engagement, but U.S. generals dutifully played the role of toadies by telling the public there was “no military solution” in Iraq. There is always a military solution to war and, if it is not implemented, defeat is certain. (NB: This is equally true of the Afghan War.)

–All U.S. military personnel killed, wounded, or maimed in Iraq were a waste of our most precious assets. They were led to defeat by two presidents, myriad generals, and congresses that clearly never had any intention of winning the wars they started. (NB: (a) This is equally true of the Afghan War; (b) The cost of not winning either war has been the shredding of the 4th Amendment, and will be further constraints on civil liberty in the future.)

–U.S. Iraq policy in the Bush and Obama administrations was made by men and women who either cannot tell the difference between theory and reality, or were cursed with the feckless Ivy League educations that in the last four administrations have marched this country at quick step to the rim of hell. Saddam’s rule was brutal not only because he was brutal but because authoritarian government is the only way to keep Iraq united and the country’s Sunnis and Shias away from each other’s throat. The constant refrain by Obama, Cameron, Hollande, and other NATO leaders that there will be an “inclusive government” in Iraq — that is, Sunnis, Shia, Kurds, and Sufis amiably working together — is witness to either their deceit or stupidity. From March, 2003, until today there was never a chance of creating an inclusive regime in Iraq. It will not happen in the future.


–The now canonized “Surge” achieved a temporary halt in the mujahedin’s progress in Iraq, slowed the pace of U.S. casualties, and — as planned — got the Iraq war minimized on the agenda of the 2008 McCain-Obama presidential debates. But the most important long term result of the surge was that it pushed the mujahedin out of Iraq into Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon and so allowed them to regroup, rearm, and — as we now see in the Levant, Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere — live to fight and win another day. At bottom, the surge was a cynical political scheme and tactical military act concocted by a political general. It was not meant to defeat the enemy, only to buy time for the politicians.

Much More At..........

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article42038.htm

[jakeXT]

1. So what was the military solution ? Give the generals a free hand ?

–The U.S. military and its allies were defeated in Iraq. They were all shackled by political constraints and by suicidal rules-of-engagement, but U.S. generals dutifully played the role of toadies by telling the public there was “no military solution” in Iraq. There is always a military solution to war and, if it is not implemented, defeat is certain. (NB: This is equally true of the Afghan War.)

[bemildred]

2. Yeah, I noticed that too, the denial is still strong.

Usually based in some form or another of they cheated or we were stabbed in the back, but never their boys wanted it and were willing to die for it, and we weren't.

But that is still better than the loons that want to glass the place just to show them not to fuck with us.

[KoKo]

3. What would have been the military solution, then?

What could we have done differently that would have prevented what is now occurring? From my reading I think that Bremmer should have never been given orders to disband Saddam's army. And, what about the pallets of money that disappeared from Iraq? Where did that go? There are various reports but nothing conclusive and most news about the Iraq Invasion are disappearing from the Public Memory.

But, what would have been the better Military Solution? And, how was it so mismanaged from the beginning? Why?

[jakeXT]

4. I've reread a couple of interviews with Garner

On the one hand he laments that we went into Iraq, but on the other hand he thinks the US just barks and has no bite.

I always thought the plan was to destroy the country and split it into pieces.

Retired Gen. Garner: We should never have gone to war with Iraq

In his short-lived term as chief civilian administrator in Iraq, Garner had used Saddam Hussein's Baathist loyalists in crucial positions.

When Bremer took over, however, he issued decrees banning thousands of Baathists from being part of the government and dismantling the 500,000-member Iraqi army. Those moves have since been criticized by military historians as mistakes contributing to the instability in Iraq that aided the insurgency.

In an interview with the PBS investigative-news program "Frontline" in 2006, Garner called America's postwar decisions avoidable mistakes.

"I think that we stood a chance," Garner told the PBS program. "We would at least have [had] an opportunity to have a different outcome."

...

"You look at what's happened since we did that: North Korea's been firing missiles right and left all over to show they can attack from anywhere in their country; the Chinese have been pushing us around in the Far East; Russians have taken over Ukraine, and they don't care what we think about it; Hamas is now attacking Israel; and we've got this regional war going on in Iraq. That's all because we showed everybody we're all bark and no bite."

http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-general-garner-speaks-iraq-20140722-story.html

At that point, what had you accomplished? What was in the works?

The only thing in the works at that time [was] we were trying to locate the [Iraqi] army and bring it back. We had a call out to the police to bring them back. We were setting up to pay the civil servants and the police and the pensioners.

We were trying to re-establish the ministries. The problem with the ministries was that there were 22 or 23 ministries. We were going to use 20 of them, and of the 20 that we're going to use, 17 of those buildings had been destroyed. There are no excess facilities in Baghdad, so the ministry people couldn't come back to work. So if you wanted to start the Ministry of Agriculture again, you had to go out and find another [building], because they didn't have anywhere to come to work to. So we put out calls. It took us about a week to get a nucleus of every ministry where we could begin to try to start the functions of that ministry again and then begin to pay people.

That problem was exacerbated by the fact that all the civilian communications had been taken out during the war. So, say to start the schools, we had to call in the school officials from every major city, call them in, bring them into Baghdad, sit them down in the palace, tell them: "School's going to start on this day. We want you to let them out for their vacation on this day," that type thing. Then you send them all back. And if you change your mind on that, you had to bring them back again. There's no way to communicate. It was a manual operation from the day we got there, so it was very slow to get things going. ...

Tommy Franks meets with his commanders April 16, a few days before you go in. He's telling his commanders … within 60 days, there will be an Iraqi government set up. What was you guys' opinion of that Washington and military expectation?

... (Franks) was always promised a large constabulary force from allies. He was promised by DoD or by the administration -- I'm not sure (which). He was relying on me to bring back the Iraqi army, and we're talking about 250,000 soldiers.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html

[KoKo]

6. Thanks, Jake...Good to Revisit! A few more snips...

I couldn't readthe first interview from Orlando Sentinal because it was under a pay wall...but the second article from Frontline was a very interesting read bringing back some of the details of the early days after the Invasion.

It seems that Military wasn't coordinated with the DC Planners (PNAC Group) if they didn't realize that taking out infrastructure would be a huge hardship in trying to get Iraq together under elected leadership which Garner is talking about. ....So I would have to believe, if Garner is correct, that everything was dishonestly being done "behind the scenes" which he seems to be saying in this interview.

Either it was all a Giant Screw Up with "one hand not knowing what the other was doing" attributed to poor planning....or it was exactly coordinated according to the PNAC Plan but neither Garner nor some of the other military were aware of it. His view of Chalabi and the situation in DC giving mixed messages seems to go along with what those of us who were protesting against the Iraq Invasion were reading from sources other than Judy Miller at the NYT.

Here are some more snips that I thought were interesting:

Interview lt. gen. jay garner (ret.)--Frontline

We were trying to re-establish the ministries. The problem with the ministries was that there were 22 or 23 ministries. We were going to use 20 of them, and of the 20 that we're going to use, 17 of those buildings had been destroyed. There are no excess facilities in Baghdad, so the ministry people couldn't come back to work. So if you wanted to start the Ministry of Agriculture again, you had to go out and find another , because they didn't have anywhere to come to work to. So we put out calls. It took us about a week to get a nucleus of every ministry where we could begin to try to start the functions of that ministry again and then begin to pay people.

That problem was exacerbated by the fact that all the civilian communications had been taken out during the war. So, say to start the schools, we had to call in the school officials from every major city, call them in, bring them into Baghdad, sit them down in the palace, tell them: "School's going to start on this day. We want you to let them out for their vacation on this day," that type thing. Then you send them all back. And if you change your mind on that, you had to bring them back again. There's no way to communicate. It was a manual operation from the day we got there, so it was very slow to get things going. ...

-----------

.. (Franks) was always promised a large constabulary force from allies. He was promised by DoD or by the administration -- I'm not sure (which). He was relying on me to bring back the Iraqi army, and we're talking about 250,000 soldiers.


----------

But you guys were in charge of the postwar.

We were. Supposed to be.

Why did DoD not want to give you the plan?

I have no idea. ... At that point, I had so many problems that that was something going on back there, and I had an immediate problem right there in Iraq, specifically in Baghdad, and I was trying to deal with those things.

The way it's been told is that the neocons at the Pentagon didn't really want you guys to get too involved with setting things up. What they really wanted was the power to be handed off very quickly to Chalabi. That's the story. What are your thoughts about that?

That wasn't going to happen on my watch. I think that inside the Pentagon, inside the Beltway, that Chalabi was the favorite candidate. I don't think he was with Secretary Rumsfeld, because I never heard Rumsfeld say that. In fact, I heard Rumsfeld say several times: "I don't have a candidate. The best man will rise." But certainly he was the darling of Doug Feith and [former Defense Policy Board Chairman] Richard Perle and probably [then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz, perhaps the vice president. I'm not sure.

-----------
... The first big order is CPA Order No. 1, de-Baathification. How do you hear about it?

Yes. I'm walking down the hallway, and Robin Raphel, Ambassador Robin Raphel, says, "Have you seen this?" She has a piece of paper. I said: "No. What it is?" She says, "De-Baathification order." I said, "Wow." So I read it real quick, there in the hall. I said, "This is too deep." She said, "This is why you have to stay here." And I said, "Well, let me go talk to Ambassador Bremer."

So I walked down, and Charlie [the former Baghdad station chief] was coming across the hallway, CIA guy, great guy, and I said, "Hey, Charlie, have you read the de-Baathification [order]?" And he said: "Yeah, that's why I'm here. Let's go in and talk to the ambassador."

We went in, and we talked to Ambassador Bremer for a few minutes. I said, "You know, this is too deep." I said: "Give Charlie and I about 45 minutes to an hour. Let us digest this thing, and then let us recommend some changes to you, and come back here, and we'll get Donald Rumsfeld to see if we can't soften this a bit."

And he said: "These are the directions I have. I have directions to execute this." And I said, "Well, I think it's too deep." And he said, "Well, it's the directions we have, and we're going to execute those."

So I said, "Well, Charlie, what do you think?" To the best of my memory, Charlie said, "Well, if you do this, you're going to drive 40,000 to 50,000 Baathists underground by nightfall. The number is closer to 50,000 than it is [to] 30,000."

Bremer again said, "I understand what you're saying. I understand that's your opinion, but I have my directions. I have directions [to execute] these orders," which told me, I thought, he didn't have any choice. It was another one of the decrees he brought over in a briefcase that he was told to execute -- although, I was told in his book, he said that was his decision. But ... I think that was one of the things he was told to do. He gets blamed for it, but I don't really think the blame is [his].

Were you worried about it?

[What] I thought was going to happen was you wouldn't be able to bring back the government in a functional capability, because all the talent was in those first three or four levels of the Baath Party. Hell, you live in Boston. You take out the first three or four levels of government in Boston, see how well your electricity runs and how well the traffic lights work, and everything else goes.

------------

Do you think Order No. 2, along with de-Baathification, led to the insurgency?

The problem you have there is, with that order, you suddenly tell somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000 soldiers that they're out of jobs, and they're all still armed. Now, whether they became terrorists, we don't know. But to me, that's just not a good beginning. Sun Tzu says you don't want to go to bed at night with more enemies than you woke up with that morning. Well, we went to bed with a whole lot more enemies that night than we had begun the day with.

But again, I don't fault Ambassador Bremer for that. I think that was another decree that he brought over in his briefcase; I think he was told to do that. Now, that idea may have germinated with Walt Slocombe or somebody on his staff, but it had to get approved [in Washington] somewhere. That's another incredible decision of magnitude that I just don't think that would have been invested in [Bremer]. It had to be made over here. ...

[jakeXT]

7. I only had problems on a mobile device, the link works fine

with a PC browser. Sometimes typing the headline into a search engine and then clicking on it solves the pay wall problem.

Here is another snippet from the Sentinel interview

"I grew up absolutely in love with this country and believing everything the government said," said Garner, who served in the U.S. Army from 1962 until 1997. "In the last 10 years, I've gotten so disenchanted with the government, so disappointed with it."

[KoKo]

8. Thanks for tip about pasting in search engine...

The "OS" still put me behind a "block out ad" asking to "Subscribe to Read" but "Google Cache" showed up in Search and had the article.

This interview certainly puts him in an interesting light...(considering my views of the Iraq Invasion as a Protestor against it), though.
Still its interesting to read his outspoken, militarisically agressive view about the rest of the ME, China, Russia and Israel even if I strongly disagree. He sounds a bit more aligned with PNAC than he did in his "Frontline" interview. I don't think he's alone in his view amongst many of the Generals in command, though.


https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http%3A%2F%2Fwww.orlandosentinel.com%2Fnews%2Fbreaking-news%2Fos-general-garner-speaks-iraq-20140722-story.html

After his talk, he also expressed disappointment with every president who followed the elder George Bush.

"I grew up absolutely in love with this country and believing everything the government said," said Garner, who served in the U.S. Army from 1962 until 1997. "In the last 10 years, I've gotten so disenchanted with the government, so disappointed with it."

He criticized President Barack Obama's decision to first threaten Syria with military action over a stockpile of chemical weapons and then back off.

"We drew a red line in the sand with Syria, and then we cowardly backed away from it, sending a message to all of our enemies that we're all bark and no bite," Garner said.

"You look at what's happened since we did that: North Korea's been firing missiles right and left all over to show they can attack from anywhere in their country; the Chinese have been pushing us around in the Far East; Russians have taken over Ukraine, and they don't care what we think about it; Hamas is now attacking Israel; and we've got this regional war going on in Iraq. That's all because we showed everybody we're all bark and no bite."

Weighing in on the latest conflict between Israel and Hamas, Garner voiced strong support for Israel, which, he said, was responding correctly to rocket attacks from its enemies. He also criticized the media for overplaying the carnage and suffering of Palestinians in Gaza while failing to report enough on the indiscriminate firing of more than 1,600 rockets and missiles into Israel during the past 10 days.

"People say, 'Well, the Israelis ought to back off,'" Garner told his audience. "Hell, no, they shouldn't back off. They need to go in there and clean all that up," he said to applause.