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Sun Jul 8, 2018, 01:44 PM

US Election Fraud 2004 to Present -- Part I: Vulnerability of Electronic Vote Counting Dale Tavris



Dale Tavris -- World News Trust

June 11, 2018

Election Fraud in the United States: 2004 to Present

Part I. Vulnerability of Electronic Vote Counting in U.S. Elections

The United States is ranked last among the 47 long-established democracies by the Election Integrity Project founded by the Kennedy School of Government. There are many reasons for this. One of the most important reasons is the vulnerability of our electronic vote counting process to election fraud -- i.e. electronic manipulation of the vote.



Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines

DRE voting machines are those that directly record the voter’s vote electronically, without the necessity for any paper evidence of the vote. As of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, 28 percent of registered voters lived in DRE only jurisdictions and another 19 percent lived in jurisdictions where both DRE and optical scan voting systems were in use.

What do you think would be the reaction of most U.S. citizens if they were told that a law had just been passed that gave the Party in power the right to count the votes and determine the winner of elections in private -- without any oversight? Outrage, I would hope. And yet, today we find ourselves in a situation where many of our votes are counted by computer software that is written in secret and made inaccessible to the public, with the rationale that the machines and software that count our votes are “proprietary.” Just as bad, they leave no record of the vote counting process, making recounts impossible. Is that situation different than giving one Party a box of paper ballots and allowing them to count them and determine the winner in private? And yet, where is the outrage?

(more)

https://worldnewstrust.com/election-fraud-in-the-united-states-2004-to-present-part-i-vulnerability-of-electronic-vote-counting-in-u-s-elections-dale-tavris

This is an important story by DU's Time for change, Dale Tavris, M.D. He posted about it last week on DU here, if you want to read some background and a discussion of some of the issues. I know that this is a controversial issue, yet I have complete confidence in Time for change and this story.

https://upload.democraticunderground.com/100210782481

--Tace

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Arrow 9 replies Author Time Post
Reply US Election Fraud 2004 to Present -- Part I: Vulnerability of Electronic Vote Counting Dale Tavris (Original post)
Tace Jul 8 OP
Time for change Jul 8 #1
Botany Jul 8 #2
Time for change Jul 8 #3
Gothmog Jul 8 #4
Gothmog Jul 8 #5
Tace Jul 8 #6
Gothmog Jul 8 #7
RussBLib Jul 8 #8
Gothmog Jul 8 #9

Response to Tace (Original post)

Sun Jul 8, 2018, 02:04 PM

1. I just read a DU post asking why Trump tries so hard to obstruct the Russia investigation if he's

innocent.

I would ask the same thing about the voting machine corporations.

If they don't engage in election fraud, why do they always prohibit investigations of their machines in controversial elections? Worse yet, why does our government let them get away with that? By what logic should the voting machines that count our votes be considered private property, off limits to inspection by the public?

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Response to Tace (Original post)

Sun Jul 8, 2018, 04:08 PM

2. After they passed HAVA we have seen a "red state shift" in the voting returns despite ...

.... the issues and the demographics are going strongly against the GOP.

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Response to Botany (Reply #2)

Sun Jul 8, 2018, 05:21 PM

3. Absolutely

The red shifts are ubiquitous and consistent from one election to another.

I talk a lot more about them in Part II of my election fraud series at World News Trust.

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Response to Tace (Original post)

Sun Jul 8, 2018, 05:54 PM

4. There are procedures in place to test

I sit through the testing of machines in my county. Before being sealed each machine is tested and a zero tape is prepared that show no votes are recorded.

Here are some procedures that are in place from the Texas Election Code https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/EL/htm/EL.129.htm

Sec. 129.021. ACCEPTANCE TESTING. Immediately after receiving a voting system from a vendor, the general custodian of election records shall:
(1) verify that the system delivered is certified by the secretary of state;
(2) perform a hardware diagnostic test on the system as provided by Section 129.022(b);
(3) perform a public test of logic and accuracy on the system as provided by Section 129.023; and
(4) perform any additional test that the secretary of state may prescribe.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

Sec. 129.022. HARDWARE DIAGNOSTIC TEST. (a) The general custodian of election records shall conduct a successful hardware diagnostic test before a voting system is used in an election.
(b) The hardware diagnostic test must ensure that each part of the system functions properly as prescribed by the secretary of state.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

Sec. 129.023. PUBLIC TEST OF LOGIC AND ACCURACY. (a) The general custodian of election records shall create a testing board consisting of at least two persons. The general custodian of election records shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that the testing board consists of at least one person from each political party that holds a primary election.
(b) Not later than 48 hours before voting begins on a voting system, the general custodian of election records shall conduct a logic and accuracy test. Public notice of the test must be published at least 48 hours before the test begins, and the test must be open to the public.
(b-1) If the test is being conducted for a primary election, the general custodian of election records shall notify the county chair of the test at least 48 hours before the date of the test. The county chair shall confirm receipt of the notice.
text of subsection effective until September 01, 2020
(c) The general custodian of election records shall adopt procedures for testing that:
(1) direct the testing board to cast votes;
(2) verify that each contest position, as well as each precinct and ballot style, on the ballot can be voted and is accurately counted;
(3) include overvotes and undervotes for each race, if applicable to the system being tested;
(4) include straight-party votes and crossover votes;
(5) include write-in votes, when applicable to the election;
(6) include provisional votes, if applicable to the system being tested;
(7) calculate the expected results from the test ballots;
(8) ensure that each voting machine has any public counter reset to zero and presented to the testing board for verification before testing;
(9) require that, for each feature of the system that allows disabled voters to cast a ballot, at least one vote be cast and verified by a two-person testing board team using that feature; and
(10) require that, when all votes are cast, the general custodian of election records and the testing board observe the tabulation of all ballots and compare the actual results to the expected results.
text of subsection effective on September 01, 2020
(c) The general custodian of election records shall adopt procedures for testing that:
(1) direct the testing board to cast votes;
(2) verify that each contest position, as well as each precinct and ballot style, on the ballot can be voted and is accurately counted;
(3) include overvotes and undervotes for each race, if applicable to the system being tested;
(4) include write-in votes, when applicable to the election;
(5) include provisional votes, if applicable to the system being tested;
(6) calculate the expected results from the test ballots;
(7) ensure that each voting machine has any public counter reset to zero and presented to the testing board for verification before testing;
(8) require that, for each feature of the system that allows disabled voters to cast a ballot, at least one vote be cast and verified by a two-person testing board team using that feature; and
(9) require that, when all votes are cast, the general custodian of election records and the testing board observe the tabulation of all ballots and compare the actual results to the expected results.
(d) A test is successful if the actual results are identical to the expected results.
(e) To provide a full and accurate account of the condition of a given voting machine, the testing board and the general custodian of election records shall:
(1) sign a written statement attesting to:
(A) the qualification of each direct recording electronic voting machine that was successfully tested;
(B) any problems discovered; and
(C) the cause of any problem if it can be identified; and
(2) provide any other documentation as necessary.
(f) On completing the testing:
(1) the testing board shall witness and document all steps taken to reset, seal, and secure any equipment or test materials, as appropriate; and
(2) the general custodian for election records shall preserve a copy of the system's software at a secure location that is outside the administrator's and programming entity's control until at least 22 months after election day.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.
Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 1164 (H.B. 2817), Sec. 27, eff. September 1, 2011.
Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 404 (H.B. 25), Sec. 7, eff. September 1, 2020.
Acts 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Ch. 828 (H.B. 1735), Sec. 21, eff. September 1, 2017.

Sec. 129.024. SECURITY OF TEST MATERIALS. (a) On completing each test, the general custodian of election records shall place the test materials in a container provided for that purpose and seal the container in a manner that prevents opening without breaking the seal. The general custodian of election records and at least two members of the testing board shall sign the seal.
(b) The test materials shall remain sealed for the period for preserving the precinct election records.
(c) The container may not be unsealed unless the contents are necessary to conduct a test under this subchapter or a criminal investigation, election contest, or other official proceeding under this code. If the container is unsealed, the authority in charge of the proceeding shall reseal the contents when not in use.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

None of these machines are hooked to the internet. Each voting machine communicates to a Judge Booth Controller that records the vote. The JBC has a seal that is visible to all voters when they vote. After voting, the JBC's are transported to the county election office and the seals are only broken at the headquarters. Each party has the right to have representatives there to observe.

I serve as an election judge once a cycle to observe the process and I get to sit in on the election law class attended by all electoin judges. There are procedures to protect the vote in place.

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Response to Tace (Original post)

Sun Jul 8, 2018, 06:01 PM

5. Here are the procedures used in Texas

This is from the Texas Election Code https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/EL/htm/EL.129.htm

Sec. 129.051. PRE-ELECTION SECURITY PROCEDURE. (a) The general custodian of election records shall create and maintain an inventory of all electronic information storage media.
(b) The general custodian of election records shall develop a procedure for tracking the custody of each electronic information storage medium from its storage location, through election coding and the election process, to its final post-election disposition and return to storage. The chain of custody must require two or more individuals to perform a check and verification check whenever a transfer of custody occurs.
(c) The general custodian of election records shall establish a secured location for storing electronic information storage media when not in use, coding a medium for an election, transferring and installing the medium into voting system equipment, and storing voting system equipment after election parameters are loaded.
(d) An election information storage medium shall be kept in the presence of an election official or in a secured location once the medium has been coded for an election.
(e) The general custodian of election records shall create a procedure for tracking the custody of voting system equipment once election parameters are loaded.
(f) The general custodian of election records shall create a recovery plan to be followed if a breach in security procedures is indicated. This plan must include immediately notifying the secretary of state.
(g) The general custodian of election records shall conduct a criminal background check for relevant election officials, staff, and temporary workers upon hiring.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

Sec. 129.052. TRANSPORT OF VOTING SYSTEM EQUIPMENT. (a) The general custodian of election records shall adopt procedures for securely storing and transporting voting system equipment. The procedures shall include provisions for locations outside the direct control of the general custodian of election records, including overnight storage at a polling location. Procedures relating to the chain of custody must require two or more individuals to perform a check and verification check whenever a transfer of custody occurs.
(b) The general custodian of election records shall create a recovery plan to be followed if a breach in security procedures is indicated. This plan must include immediately notifying the secretary of state.
(c) The general custodian of election records shall provide a training plan for relevant election officials, staff, and temporary workers that addresses the procedures authorized under this section.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

Sec. 129.053. ACCESS TO VOTING SYSTEM EQUIPMENT. The general custodian of election records shall secure access control keys or passwords to voting system equipment. Use of access control keys or passwords must be witnessed by one or more individuals authorized to use that information. The use of an access control key or password must be documented and witnessed in a log dedicated for that purpose that is retained until the political subdivision disposes of the equipment.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

Sec. 129.054. NETWORK CONNECTIONS AND WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY. (a) A voting system may not be connected to any external communications network, including the Internet.
(b) A voting system may not have the capability of permitting wireless communication unless the system uses line-of-sight infrared technology that shields the transmitter and receiver from external infrared transmissions and the system can only accept transmissions generated by the system.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

Sec. 129.055. EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE. The sole purpose of voting system equipment is the conduct of an election, and only software certified by the secretary of state and necessary for an election may be loaded on the equipment.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

Sec. 129.056. PLAN FOR MACHINE FAILURE. The general custodian of election records shall create a contingency plan for addressing direct recording electronic voting machine failure. This plan must include the timely notification of the secretary of state.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

Sec. 129.057. USE OF MACHINE IN EARLY VOTING. A direct recording electronic voting machine deployed for early voting may not be deployed on election day.
Amended by:
Acts 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 682 (H.B. 2524), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2009.

I have served as an election judge numerous times. I have participated in the procedures used to test machines and maintain the chain of custody of these machines. I have made a number of trips to deliver the Judge Booth Controller to the election office and the first thing they check is the seal on the JBC.

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Response to Gothmog (Reply #5)

Sun Jul 8, 2018, 06:32 PM

6. Gothmog, Thanks for the first-hand info.

--Tace

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Response to Tace (Reply #6)

Sun Jul 8, 2018, 06:47 PM

7. I would encourage any DUer who can to serve as an election worker

It is a very long day but you can help people vote and make sure that the procedures are observed

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Response to Gothmog (Reply #5)

Sun Jul 8, 2018, 09:46 PM

8. Are you saying the machines cannot be hacked?

I was active in the Harris County Democratic Party when Texas began adopting the electronic machines in 2000, and I participated in some of the first training. They seemed vulnerable to hacking then and I have seen so many reports since then that they should not be trusted. Hackers can hack just about anything these days and I think the vote is too important to rely on vulnerable machines.

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Response to RussBLib (Reply #8)

Sun Jul 8, 2018, 10:07 PM

9. These machines can not be hacked at the election site

It is a closed system. No voting machine is every connected to the internet. Heck on election day, Harris County still uses paper poll books for voting. Each booth sends its vote to a machine at the site (the Judge Booth Controllers) which is connected by a cable to the voting booths. This is a closed system. The machines could be reprogrammed in the election office but there would be signs of tampering. Some of the testing done before each election looks for signs of such tampering. Once certified and after the seal is put on, there is no way to tamper with a machine when it is in the fields

Part of the closing of poll procedures is to verify the number of votes cast on the JBC and compared that to the number of voters who voted. In addition, a report is generated when the polls are opened to show that there are no votes on the machine (this is called a zero tape).

I work with the Harris County party. They have teams of people who watch the testing and verify the status of the machines prior to each election. Harris County also has people who watch the county cut the seals on each machine and watch the removal and counting of each vote. My friend who was in charge was at the election office until 2 in the morning on election day in 2016 even though the races in Harris County were mainly decided by early vote.

The issues with the current machines are that they are old and are breaking down. We have two JBCs at most voting locations to handle this issue. I was nice and agreed to serve as the GOP judge in the 2014 primary and my machines broke down a couple of times and had to be rebooted (you unplug and plug back in each voting both in order). I had a great college student with me and we got good at this.

Most counties are looking for new machines. Travis County spent a couple of years looking for a new design and eventually gave up https://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2017-10-13/county-ditches-star-votes-innovative-voting-system/

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