A Lesson in Russian Strategic Deception
How Moscow tries to throw us off the trail.
The 2016 election will be remembered for, among other things, Russian attacks including cybertheft, propaganda, trolls, bots, disinformation, efforts to use social media to stoke negative passions, and possible espionage (in common parlance, collusion). Several commentators have correctly reminded us that such activity is wholly consistent with Russian intelligence activity over the decades. As such, we should also be on the lookout for another classic Russian trick: strategic deception. Lack of public awareness about this part of the Kremlin playbook threatens to unravel whatever traction we gain in finding the truth about 2016 and in defending ourselves against current threats and ones over the horizon.
Strategic deception is a secret, offensive effort to create an alternative narrative that serves Moscow’s interests. Unlike Russia’s fake news and disinformation efforts designed to confuse or meet tactical ends, strategic deception is designed to build a believable and consistent narrative forcing the recipient to take a specific action. It was used in the past to safeguard the identity of Russian spies in the U.S. and uncover perceived threats to the regime. Efforts to deceive are most effective when they play to preconceived notions and tell an adversary something it is desperate to know. In this sense, Facebook and Russian deception have something in common—they succeed by selling us exactly what we want to hear. Facebook tracks your likes and interests, providing you with what you are inclined to believe. Clever deception, especially when dipped in some of the same insights of behavioral psychology, does much the same thing.
While I can’t pretend to know when and how the Russians will undertake a deception operation, my sense is that it will be around the issue of collusion. If there was collusion with the Trump team, the Russians will surely be looking to steer U.S. authorities toward alternate explanations for the activities of 2015 and 2016. If there was no collusion whatsoever, the Russians may follow an alternative strategy of actively promoting the story as a means of weakening the Trump administration and our trust in the democratic system. In either case, their goal is the same: turn the U.S. against itself and protect Russian interests.
Moscow’s effort to safeguard the identity of its spies in 1980s Washington is a classic example of this deception strategy in action.
In the mid-1980s, the KGB was facing a dilemma. They found themselves in the enviable position of having two highly placed spies inside the U.S. national security apparatus—Aldrich Ames at CIA and Robert Hanssen at FBI. The two had informed the KGB of a group of Soviet officials who had been spying for Washington. Despite KGB efforts to quietly remove the traitors from positions of access, the Soviet leadership insisted that the Russian spies be immediately arrested, imprisoned, and executed. The KGB was left with the burden of safeguarding Ames and Hanssen from U.S. officials who would now be looking hard for explanations of why their longtime spies were suddenly uncovered. The Soviets needed to provide alternative explanations rather than allow the Americans to accept the real answer—that they had their own spies in their midst.
http://amp.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/11/the_mueller_probe_and_a_lesson_in_russian_strategic_deception.html
