Are Thawed Relations with Iran Obama's Saving Grace?

[KoKo]

Are Thawed Relations with Iran Obama's Saving Grace?

After failing to garner support on a military strike on Syria, President Obama hinted at reconciliation with Iran at the UN General Assembly - September 25, 13


After failing to garner support on a military strike on Syria, President Obama hinted at reconciliation with Iran at the UN General Assembly - September 25, 13

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Reza Marashi joined NIAC in 2010 as the organization’s first Research Director. He came to NIAC after four years in the Office of Iranian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Prior to his tenure at the State Department, he was an analyst at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) covering China-Middle East issues, and a Tehran-based private strategic consultant on Iranian political and economic risk. Marashi is frequently consulted by Western governments on Iran-related matters. His articles have appeared in The New York Times, Foreign Policy, The Atlantic, and The National Interest, among other publications. He has been a guest contributor to CNN, NPR, the BBC, TIME Magazine, The Washington Post, and the Financial Times, among other broadcast outlets. Follow Reza on Twitter: @rezamarashi

Transcript
Are Thawed Relations with Iran Obama's Saving Grace?JESSICA DESVARIEUX, TRNN PRODUCER: Welcome to The Real News Network. I'm Jessica Desvarieux in Baltimore.

On Tuesday at the UN General Assembly, President Obama and the new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, gave speeches that marked the opening of new diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran. Let's take a listen to what President Obama and the Iranian president, Rouhani, had to say.

~~~

DESVARIEUX: With us to discuss the significance of this change in U.S.-Iranian relations is Reza Marashi. He is a research director for National Iranian American Council.

Thanks for joining us, Reza.

REZA MARASHI, RESEARCH DIRECTOR, NATIONAL IRANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL: Thanks for having me.

DESVARIEUX: So, Reza, why is this change in diplomatic relations happening now? Is this due to the effects of sanctions and what's been happening over there economically in Iran? Or is this more about Obama trying to actually score a political win after failing to shore up support in Congress for military intervention in Syria?

MARASHI: I think it's a byproduct of a few different things. You know, sanctions are certainly sharpening the choices of the Iranian government. I don't think anybody doubts that. And certainly Obama's looking for political winds where he can find them.

I would argue that the biggest change we've seen so far is the mandate that the Iranian people gave to the new Iranian president when they elected him. He has a track record of trying to pursue peaceful solutions to Iran's conflicts with members of the international community, and that's very powerful. So I think Obama recognizes that, and as a result we have this new opening. It's a very slow diplomatic thaw. And right now I think both sides are taking steps rhetorically, you know, a change in style, a change in tone, and hopefully later on down the line can facilitate change in substance.

DESVARIEUX: Okay. So you essentially see both things happening at once here. Obama needs to score a political win, as well as Rouhani, his past, his resume, essentially, coupled with the economic sanctions that have been placed on Iran, both these two forces are coming together, and now we're seeing this opportunity for thawing between both sides.

MARASHI: Yeah. And, like I've said, [incompr.] sum of all parts. And I think both men know, both Obama and Rouhani know that they have the support of the vast majority of their respective populations to try and solve this U.S.-Iran conflict peacefully that's been bubbling over 34, 35 years now and has kind of reached a point where--you know, in the old game of chicken where two cars drive towards the end of the cliff, both sides kind of hit the brakes and say, wait a minute, if we go over this cliff, so to speak, it's going to end up in a military confrontation that both sides [incompr.] to avoid. So I think it's good that cooler heads have prevailed and both sides are trying something they frankly hasn't really been tried anytime over the past three decades prior. And that's positive. But it is going to take some time.

DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about how this is going to affect U.S.'s primary alliances in the region. We have, of course, Saudi Arabia and their long-standing tension with Iran. We have Israel and their tension with Iran over Hezbollah. And of course Qatar: Iran and Qatar actually share natural gas fields. So what do you see happening between the two--between all these allies based on the U.S. thawing relations with Iran now?

MARASHI: Well, Iran has been a strategic rival to other countries in the Middle East for quite some time. And when you are a rival, the relationship can either be one of cooperation amongst rivals or it can be confrontation amongst rivals. And we've seen different phases of this confrontation or cooperation take place over the past 30 years.

I think President Rouhani, if we take his words at face value, will seek to pursue a more cooperative rivalry with other countries in the region, Israel included. And that's something that we saw not only with Israel but Saudi Arabia and other countries in this part of the world in the late '90s and early 2000s. Obviously, Israel is a bit more difficult pill for folks in Iran to swallow in terms of repairing the relationship quickly, as it is for Israel as well. But again, moving back from the precipice of conflict I think is very important, and the Iranian president has rhetorically taken a step back. And now we'll see if he's willing to back up the words with actions. And we'll also see if the Israeli prime minister, Mr. Netanyahu, is willing to do the same. So far, unfortunately, we've not seen anything that would lead us to believe that that's going to be the case.

DESVARIEUX: Not just Israel, but what about Saudi Arabia? They've been really gunning for regime change over there in Iran.

MARASHI: Well, the Saudis are the natural rival to Iran in the region--the two biggest countries in terms of landmass, large populations, massive amounts of energy resources. And, you know, this is something that the Saudis are going to want to--they're going to want to see it to believe it in terms of Iran taking a different approach to its regional policies. They're going to want to see Iran take steps. Perhaps Iran goes first to demonstrate goodwill and build trust with the Saudis.

It remains to be seen how that process will play out, but I do think it's something that they're going to try. And the men who tried this 10, 15, 20 years ago in Saudi Arabia and Iran are still major players in their respective governments. So it's certainly not outside the realm of possibility. And I wouldn't be surprised if it was the first domino to fall in terms of Iran repairing its relations with the world more broadly and the Middle East more specifically.

DESVARIEUX: Okay. Well, let's switch gears a little bit and talk about domestic politics in Iran. Can you explain how different actors within the Iran, such as the Revolutionary Guard and Ayatollah Khomeini, have influenced the decision to change its relations with the United States?

MARASHI: That's a great question. You know, I think that at the end of the day, entities like the Revolutionary Guard are not monolithic in terms of their politics. So as a result of that, you have a fair number of folks inside the Revolutionary Guard that support Rouhani's approach and disagree with the approach that Ahmadinejad had taken. You also have some that disagree with Rouhani's approach. The supreme leader himself has often tried to portray himself as this magnanimous guy that stays above the day-to-day domestic political fray in Iran. That's no longer really the case, though, in terms of the practical application.

What's telling, though, is that the former president Khatami of Iran, the current president Rouhani, have both said that the supreme leader is backing Rouhani's initiative to try diplomacy and negotiations with the West more generally and Iran more specifically. That bodes very well for the possibility of finding a peaceful solution.

DESVARIEUX: Okay. Well, thank you so much for joining us, Reza.

MARASHI: Thanks for having me.

DESVARIEUX: And thank you for joining us on The Real News Network.

"Real News Network" is a Great Resource covering current Topics.

http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=10778&updaterx=2013-09-25+11%3A11%3A16

[leveymg]

1. It doesn't make up for all the dead Libyans and Syrians, but it limits the damage - for now.

The deadly legacies of regime change and "humanitarian intervention" in the Mideast definitely belong to this Administration along with the one before it. We will see if that tradition extends to the next one.

If Hillary is nominated and elected, and past is any guide to the future, there seems a pretty good chance of just that.

[Zynx]

3. What exactly did we do that made Libya worse?

I think I must have missed that. By the way, please be very specific.

[leveymg]

6. State Dept/CIA directed the uprising of extremists in E. Libya and unleashed them on the region

Last edited Fri Sep 27, 2013, 10:05 AM - Edit history (3)

The Libyan revolution was largely driven by an armed uprising in Eastern Libya that was organized by this American official, who you should recognize.


In February, 2011, as the rebellion started, Chris Stevens set up camp in Benghazi not in Tripoli, Misrata or the Berber areas.

The area in E. Libya between Benghazi and Tobruk also accounted for the largest percentage of foreign al-Qaeda suicide bombers in Iraq. Stevens was well aware of the presence of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in Benghazi, he wrote a 2008 cable analyzing the groups. Obviously, it was very important to the Obama Admin. to have someone on the ground in Benghazi coordinating Jihadist and Salaafist groups in the area, as they were the most effective part of the opposition. See, my post, Blowback in Benghazi, http://www.democraticunderground.com/10021343355

Ambassador Stevens and the oversized CIA station developed another interest in Benghazi: looted Libyan antiaircraft missiles and Jihadis going to Syria. Thousands of them. The spread of arms and escalation of violence across the region was the known and inevitable result of the breakup of the Libyan military and the scattering of sophisticated weapons following regime change in Libya. The State Department and CIA thought they had it under control, in large part because Stevens and Petraeus convinced the Administration that they were in charge of the situation. They were wrong.


Please see related post, http://www.democraticunderground.com/?com=view_post&forum=1002&pid=3708699 If you need more cites or sources, please let me know.

[KoKo]

7. The choice of a State Department Ambassador

to be dealing with that collection of "insurgents" (or whatever one wants to call them) does make me wonder if the mission of the State Department has changed. I realize from his Bio that he had excellent experience dealing with those kinds of groups in the past..and particularly in Libya. But, it would seem there should have been more military input for strategy than there seemed to be with him.

Assume it's thought that using State Department insiders to coordinate tricky operations gives the operations cover without involving any military coordination from Pentagon. But, Stevens seemed to be in over his head. That "safe house/compound" in photos looked like a sitting target. I don't know how he thought he could be comfortable there, knowing that he was dealing with differing factions of insurgents/terrorist groups and having warnings that they were becoming more aggressive with the Red Cross bombing and Embassy attack. It does seem that he wasn't aware that there could be blowback on him and that he seemed to feel he was in control speaks of maybe some arrogance on his part? Or, maybe he felt he was comfortable and secure with the people he was dealing with and didn't expect that he would be set up, attacked and maybe double-dealed.

Both Stevens and Petraeus seemed to have gotten "Blowback" from our interventions in that area. But, I still question why our State Department would have been involved in what would seem to be a CIA Operation there and controlled by CIA. He should have been neutral as an Ambassador instead of coordinating arms shipments and strategy for different insurgent groups that we favor over others. But, since he'd been involved with terrorist/insurgent groups before in other areas maybe was always working for CIA. State Department Ambassador title would seem to be a fragile cover since he was so well known from his other activities in the past.

Whatever....it's interesting. I'm just throwing out my puzzlement about why the attack on Stevens was successful from reading your work on this plus other news reports about the attack after it happened.

[leveymg]

8. Stevens was no ordinary Ambassador - he was a career spook diplomat. The DOS and CIA overlap in

many ways as far as the execution of covert action is concerned. You are right, probably more so under Secretary Clinton than in the past. You only need to look at Steven's background -- he attended UC Berkeley, UC Hastings Law and the National War College -- to see that he is a melding of the martial and intellectual in the tradition of Teddy Roosevelt or T.E. Lawrence. He has worked in every significant center of foreign policy-making and every posting in the Mideast where the US has intense covert activities and strategic relationships during the past two decades:

Stevens joined the United States Foreign Service in 1991. His early overseas assignments included: deputy principal officer and political section chief in Jerusalem; political officer in Damascus; consular/political officer in Cairo; and consular/economic officer in Riyadh. In Washington, Stevens served as Director of the Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs; Pearson Fellow with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; special assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs; Iran desk officer; and staff assistant in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

He had served in Libya twice previously: as the Deputy Chief of Mission (from 2007 to 2009) and as Special Representative to the National Transitional Council (from March 2011 to November 2011) during the Libyan revolution. He arrived in Tripoli in May 2012 as the U.S. Ambassador to Libya.[4]

There were actually over 50 CIA people based in the nearby compound who showed up at the airport for evacuation. That's the "Annex" group of buildings next to the 14 large storage units in the adjacent warehouses where some have speculated the CIA actually stored the missiles and other sophisticated armaments that had been seized and purchased during the previous year. So, Stevens probably thought he was reasonably safe, as help or refuge was less than 1/2 a mile away from his unfortified diplomatic compound. He was comfortable with the militant groups he worked with in Eastern Libya - after all, he had handed them independence.

[madrchsod]

2. no....

i see no failure in his policies. i do see that the iranians looked upon obama as maybe someone that is mature enough to deal with. the iranians respected obama enough to deal with him and obama showed mutual respect. neither side lost face in this exchange. that in itself is a major difference in america policy in many, many years.

the talk softly and carry a big stick was a big gamble but obama played his hand quite well. he forced the house to grow up and face the fact that they would be put on record for war or no war. he knew they did`t have the guts to vote. putin decided that it would be best to go along because he really didn't know what the right wing in this country would do and was`t to sure what obama would do either. after finding out it was in their mutual interests to actually do something it seems that it is working.

whether or not this problem is defused to a somewhat normal state of affairs remains to be seen . i will give credit to obama,putin,and the iranians for starting to talk about mutual interests in the region and hopefully further cooperation on these and any future problems.

after all those pipelines need to be built and they need to be protected.

[Zynx]

4. Obama managed to get a deal on Syria precisely because of the threats.

If he hadn't threatened anything, do you think Assad would have buckled and coughed those things up? Not a fucking chance.

Obama's intervention in Libya, the relatively minor incident with the Benghazi consulate notwithstanding (and it was minor in the grand scheme of things), was a very successful one. Qaddafi was about to massacre his political opponents. We not only thwarted that, but resolved the civil war in relatively short order. That thing could still be going on with many more dead by this point. The result in that we have the closest thing to a pro-Western regime that has existed in a long time in that part of the world outside of Israel. Is it perfect? Certainly not, but compared to the alternatives I think things went well.

[Uncle Joe]

5. Normalized relations with Iran would be a major accomplishment.

Last edited Fri Sep 27, 2013, 12:13 AM - Edit history (1)

If the U.S. can work through the U.N. Russia, et al to peacefully eliminate chemical weapons from Syria that would also be a major accomplishment.

If Obama can swing both, his foreign policy record would be in the elite catagory in regards to the Middle East; a region that has been problematic for the U.S. at least since the middle of the 20th century.

Thanks for the thread, KoKo.