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The "study" Romney referenced re: the number of naval ships? Attacks Cheney's and Rumsfeld's tenure!
Why the Navy needs more ships
BY MILAN VEGO
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/12/2955448
In mid-2007, the Navy had in active service 278 combat and support ships, including 11 aircraft carriers (CVs/CVNs), 14 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 53 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), four guided missile submarines (SSGNs), 22 guided missile cruisers (CGs), 49 guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and 30 guided missile frigates (FFGs). Striking force of the fleet comprised 11 carrier strike groups (CSGs) and 10 expeditionary groups (ESGs). Since 2000, the Navy’s plans for the future size of the fleet have varied in terms of total number and force composition. For example, in March 2005, the Navy’s report to Congress envisaged a total number of ships of between 260 and 325. In February 2006, the Secretary of the Navy submitted a Report to Congress (based on Sea Power 21 requirements) for fiscal 2007 that outlined requirements for 313 ships and 3,800 aircraft as necessary to meet all demands and to face the most advanced technological challengers.
In February, the secretary of the Navy submitted a report to Congress for fiscal 2008 that envisioned 313 ships, like the 2007 plan. However, the total number of ships to be built over the next 30 years was increased from 280 to 293. Despite the increase in numbers, the average annual expenditures to implement the 2008 shipbuilding plan will be the same as for the 2007 plan. Specifically, the new plan envisages the battle force comprising 11 CVNs, 69 DDGs, 19 CGs, 55 littoral combat ships (LCSs), 48 SSNs, four SSGNs, 14 SSBNs, 31 amphibious ships, 12 future maritime prepositioning force, and 50 logistics and support ships. The Navy plans to purchase 63 ships between 2008 and 2013. However, the Navy will not be able to maintain its stated goal of 313 ships over the long term. The size of the fleet will increase from today’s 276 ships to a peak of 326 ships in 2020, and then decline to 293 before rising again to 309 ships at the end of the 30-year period.
...
Advocates of a smaller battle force for the Navy repeatedly cite the increased performance of carrier-based fighter aircraft as the main rationale for their views. Reportedly, aircraft aboard a single carrier were able to engage about 200 targets per day in 1997, while in the opening phase of the war against Iraq in 2003, they engaged more than 600 targets per day. However, these and similar metrics are essentially useless. Among other things, they do not tell us about the true performance of these aircraft in combat, type of targets engaged or results achieved in combat. More importantly, the exclusive focus on the strike capabilities of naval aircraft completely ignores the entire spectrum of the Navy’s other missions in peacetime and in time of war. Among other things, advances in technologies in neutralizing the threat of enemy submarines, cruise missiles and mines were not nearly as great as the advances in strike capability. A successful antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability, defense against cruise missiles, and defense and protection of maritime trade require a combined employment of diverse forces and methods.
Network-centric warfare enthusiasts assert that traditional platform-centric warfare generates only combat power, while network-centric warfare generates increased power. They claim that in the information era, power comes from information, access and speed, while in the industrial era, it came from mass. Yet the gain in one’s combat power as a result of information technologies is extremely hard to express in meaningful terms. Information is not something tangible, like, for example, traditional firepower and mobility.
...
MILAN VEGO is a professor of operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Navy or Defense Department.
In February, the secretary of the Navy submitted a report to Congress for fiscal 2008 that envisioned 313 ships, like the 2007 plan. However, the total number of ships to be built over the next 30 years was increased from 280 to 293. Despite the increase in numbers, the average annual expenditures to implement the 2008 shipbuilding plan will be the same as for the 2007 plan. Specifically, the new plan envisages the battle force comprising 11 CVNs, 69 DDGs, 19 CGs, 55 littoral combat ships (LCSs), 48 SSNs, four SSGNs, 14 SSBNs, 31 amphibious ships, 12 future maritime prepositioning force, and 50 logistics and support ships. The Navy plans to purchase 63 ships between 2008 and 2013. However, the Navy will not be able to maintain its stated goal of 313 ships over the long term. The size of the fleet will increase from today’s 276 ships to a peak of 326 ships in 2020, and then decline to 293 before rising again to 309 ships at the end of the 30-year period.
...
Advocates of a smaller battle force for the Navy repeatedly cite the increased performance of carrier-based fighter aircraft as the main rationale for their views. Reportedly, aircraft aboard a single carrier were able to engage about 200 targets per day in 1997, while in the opening phase of the war against Iraq in 2003, they engaged more than 600 targets per day. However, these and similar metrics are essentially useless. Among other things, they do not tell us about the true performance of these aircraft in combat, type of targets engaged or results achieved in combat. More importantly, the exclusive focus on the strike capabilities of naval aircraft completely ignores the entire spectrum of the Navy’s other missions in peacetime and in time of war. Among other things, advances in technologies in neutralizing the threat of enemy submarines, cruise missiles and mines were not nearly as great as the advances in strike capability. A successful antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability, defense against cruise missiles, and defense and protection of maritime trade require a combined employment of diverse forces and methods.
Network-centric warfare enthusiasts assert that traditional platform-centric warfare generates only combat power, while network-centric warfare generates increased power. They claim that in the information era, power comes from information, access and speed, while in the industrial era, it came from mass. Yet the gain in one’s combat power as a result of information technologies is extremely hard to express in meaningful terms. Information is not something tangible, like, for example, traditional firepower and mobility.
...
MILAN VEGO is a professor of operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Navy or Defense Department.
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