27||0|0
0|0|Notes On A Guerrilla Campaign|The Magistrate||19:35:21|06/28/2003|[font size="1" color="#FF0000"]LAST EDITED ON Jun-28-03 AT 07:49 PM (ET)[/font][p]Current events in Iraq seem to me to bear some striking similarities to the Japanese conquest of Manchuria early in the 1930s%2C at least when some allowance is made for differences in cultural and physical geography%2C  and levels of technology. Examining a thing in a novel setting can be helpful in revealing general principles.%0D%0A%0D%0AThree leading similarities stand out to me%3A the mixed results of success at rapid overthrow of central authority when there are traditional and local structures greatly influencing the people%3B the self-sustaining synergy between armed and economic chaos%3B the limiting factor of irregular supply on guerrilla activity.%0D%0A%0D%0AThis campaign has been an object of especial study to me for many years%2C and what follows is a portion of the fruits of my researches into it. It is not a narrative%2C but a survey of characteristic features of the campaign. Some elements of the article have been ommitted%2C as being too particularized to their actual setting for the purpose at hand. The section on railway sabatoge%2C for example%3A while railways and petroleum pipelines share features of vulnerability even to quite primitive attack%2C and the assault on Manchurian railways did have great economic effect%2C its principal purpose and effect was the isolation of garrisons and spearheads dependent on the rails for supply%2C while the attacks on pipelines are purely economic. Similarly%2C the overthrow of Jehol province was greatly conditioned by political factors peculiar to Nationalist China at that time%2C and the final mopping up of the Manchurian partisan forces rests too closely on peculiar features of the local geography to add much by way of general illustration.%0D%0A%0D%0A|
1|1|Part I|The Magistrate||19:38:22|06/28/2003|Some Features of Chinese Partisan Resistance to Japan%27s Creation of Manchukuo%2C 1931-1933%0D%0A%0D%0A%0D%0AIntroduction%0D%0A%0D%0AJapan%27s Kwantung Army launched its assault on Manchuria with the so-called %22Mukden Incident%22 of September 18%2C 1931%2C and seized within 48 hours the city of Mukden along with other principal towns of Fengtien province%2C and the capital of Kirin province as well. At this time%2C both China%27s central government and local Chinese governments in the region were in a state of paralysis. That of the former was owing to the Nationalist Party%27s hostile division that summer into the %22Northern Faction%22 of Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking and the %22Southern Faction%22 at Canton%2C which hovered at the brink of civil war%3A that of the latter was owing to the recent departure of the war lord viceroy of China%27s Northeastern Provinces%2C Gen. Chang Hseuh-liang%2C from his capital at Mukden%2C which he had left for Peiping along with his best troops and his provincial governors in order to seek his own advantage from the Nationalists%27 quarrel. Thus left leaderless when the Japanese garrison along the South Manchuria Railway line began its attack%2C local Chinese generals%2C with the signal exception of Gen. Ma Chun-shen in the northern province of Heilungkiang%2C displayed initially an unwillingness or inability to oppose the Kwantung Army%27s rapidly unfolding conquest of Manchuria. Defence of the Northeastern Provinces came to rest upon a popular outpouring of ordinary Chinese%2C who took up arms against the %22alien invader%22 as the Japanese sought to extend the success of their extraordinary initial coup. In beginning to describe the resultant guerrilla campaign late in 1932%2C journalist E. U. Barung wrote from his vantage at the northern metropolis of Harbin %28itself a principal seat of conflict%29 that %22there is%2C probably%2C in Manchuria no town%2C village or railway station which would not have been the arena of fighting%2C%22 for the Japanese%2C in seeking to create the %22New State%22 of Manchukuo in China%27s Northeastern Provinces%2C soon found themselves confronted by a partisan resistance which was firmly rooted in a hostile populace of some thirty millions%2C and spread throughout a land comprising some 400%2C000 square miles of prairie%2C steppe%2C and forested mountain ranges%2C drenched by monsoon summers and gripped by Siberian winters.%0D%0A%0D%0AChina%27s Northeastern Provinces being then the most productive region of the Asian mainland%2C and seat to Japan%27s vast%2C quasi-governmental South Manchuria Railway Company %28with its mainline running north from the great port of Darien in Japan%27s Kwantung Leased Territory through the heart of populous Fengtien province to Changchun%29%2C at the time of their occurrence these events roused considerable interest around the globe. They have since been overshadowed to history by the further and far wider hostilities between Japan and China which succeeded them%2C and a general impression has arisen that Japan%27s triumphant establishment of Manchukuo involved no appreciable combat. Drawing on contemporaneous accounts of journalists %28many appearing in the pages of The China Weekly Review at Shanghai%29%2C and the authoritative report of the Lytton Commission of Inquiry to the League of Nations%2C this article will attempt to remedy such misapprehensions by presenting a summary account of the formation of Chinese partisan forces in defense of China%27s Northeastern Provinces against the Japanese%2C and their military capabilities. Place names and personal names will be presented in the form used by authors quoted %28i.e.%2C will be those current at the time%29%2C and these forms will be used in the current text as well to minimize initial confusion%3A readers seeking to enquire further on their own should have little difficulty recognizing the modern pin-yin equivalents of these forms%2C but should be aware that provincial boundaries in the region under Nationalist rule differ appreciably from those of the current People%27s Republic.%0D%0A%0D%0AThe Northeastern Volunteers%0D%0A%0D%0AThe appearance of anti-Japanese partisans throughout the Northeastern Provinces was a complex phenomenon. Partisan forces were slow to rise in Heilungkiang province%2C where Gen. Ma Chun-shen made effective use of regular troops against the Japanese from the outset%2C and it is clear the earlier formation of significant partisan bodies in the populous southern province of Fengtien and the eastern province of Kirin owed much to the pusillanimous performance of the Fengtien Army in the initial crisis%2C and to Japan%27s almost immediate success in dissolving or decapitating provincial authority in Fengtien and Kirin. Throughout Chinese history%2C leading citizens and village authorities have responded to a collapse in effective governance by forming private %22peace protection%22 militias%2C and in the highly charged hostility of Sino-Japanese relations at the time%2C this traditional recourse of local gentry for prevention of anarchy readily took on a patriotic and nationalist coloring. Since the bulk of Kwantung Army combat strength during November 1931 was concentrated against Gen. Ma Chun-shen in north-central Heilungkiang%2C such units were free to muster openly and un-molested elsewhere%3A Japanese soldiery in Manchuria at this time totaled no more than 15%2C 000 men. In some areas%2C these citizen militias were able to form round an appreciable cadre of provincial regulars%2C loyal to officers who were operating on their own%2C sometimes semi-mutinous%2C initiative. The viscerally xenophobic patriotism which has traditionally marked the lower rungs of Chinese society moved many members of bandit gangs and peasant brotherhoods to resist the Japanese%3B both the bandits and the vigilante-insurrectionist braves of the brotherhoods were to a degree familiar already with arms and the usages of guerrilla war. Once begun%2C the conflict brought sufficient desolation and economic dislocation in its train to provide itself a ready fuel for further recruitment among the desperate and dispossessed that it created. These were often moved to great hatred by the enormities which came to mark Japanese operations as the fighting continued%2C but in many cases%2C they simply became %22bandits of despair%22%2C or even enlisted in the forces of Manchukuo. The resurgence of Gen. Ma Chun-shen%27s regulars northwest of Harbin in the spring of 1932 both aggravated and facilitated these developments by once again drawing the principal Kwantung Army efforts onto themselves in the early summer. The final wave of partisan recruitment occurred in the autumn as the western reaches of Heilungkiang were finally drawn into the fray by the actions of still intact %28and hitherto quiescent%29 Heilungkiang Army formations in the distant %22Barga District%22 on the Soviet frontier.%0D%0A%0D%0AKnown contemporaneously as %22plain-clothes%22 men from their lack of uniform%2C the partisan bands which Mr. P. S. Yin in China Voice describes as %22common citizens who took up arms%22 under such titles as Self-Protection Militia%2C Anti-Japanese Militia%2C or simply Chinese Volunteers%2C were essentially traditional %22peace protection%22 militias raised at the initiative of leading local citizens. They operated principally in the region%27s southern province of Fengtien%2C where half Manchuria%27s population dwelled%2C and which had come almost immediately under Japanese dominance since its most populous centers%2C including its capital of Mukden%2C all lay along the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway %28in the so-called %22S.M.R. Zone%22%29%2C and in consequence had hosted Kwantung Army garrisons already at the start of the crisis. The apparently first such force to form%2C calling itself the Courageous Citizens Militia%2C had been established by November 1931 near the estuary port of Chinchow in Fengtien%27s southwest%2C a narrow strip of littoral between the Liaoning Gulf to the east and the mountains of Jehol province to the west%2C and stoppered at the south by the ancient gates at Shanhaikwan%2C where the Great Wall meets the sea. Journalist C. Y. W. Meng in Nanking was told by one of a delegation from the Courageous Citizens Militia that its recruitment had been largely carried out among %22people from well-to-do families%3B many of them are merchants%2C and some of them are students.%22 When the Japanese finally struck into southwest Fengtien towards the end of the following December%2C it was reported %22In some places the Chinese volunteers%2C financed by the village gentry%2C have put up a strong fight%2C%22 by J. B. Powell%2C editor and publisher of The China Weekly Review %28who had himself arrived in Chinchow from Mukden on December 29%2C and was %22practically the last foreigner to get out of the place before the arrival of the Japanese forces%2C%22 departing late on New Year%27s Eve with several military observers from the League of Nations%29. As the Japanese pressed on past Chinchow down the Pieping-Mukden railway to seize Shanhaikwan and seal the region against counter-attack from below the Great Wall%2C the expanding militia in the Jehol borderlands%2C according to C. Y. W. Meng%27s informants%2C patterned itself %22after the organization of the regular Chinese armies%2C%22 calling its bands %22route armies%22%2C and claiming%2C at least%2C to have by May of 1932 some forty such%2C each %22consisting of several thousand.%22 While certainly a considerable exaggeration on the part of this particular group%2C the picture it presents is accurate in outline. The Lytton report confirms the existence by that time of numerous militia formations of wholly civilian character operating against the Japanese in various portions of Fengtien province%2C stating their collective %22field of activity extends to the area around Mukden and the Mukden-Antung Railway%2C to Chinchow and the boundary between Jehol and Fengtien Provinces%2C to the western branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to the district between Hsinmin and Mukden.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AIn the timbered mountains of Kirin province at the east%2C where about a third of the region%27s populace dwelt%2C the Japanese had succeeded almost immediately in achieving a bloodless occupation of the capital%2C Kirin City%2C establishing there a puppet-governor%2C Gen. Hsi Hsia of the Kirin Army%2C to declare the province independent of China. Military and civil authorities in the province fractured into %22New Kirin%22 adherents of his regime and loyalist %22Old Kirin%22 elements in opposition to it%3A the former predominating near the capital%2C and the latter predominating in the rugged hinterland. Hostilities did not commence in this area until the end of January 1932%2C when Gen. Ting Chao resolved to defend the northern metropolis of Harbin%2C a key hub of rail and riverine communication%2C against the approach of first %22New Kirin%22 and then Japanese troops. He appealed to the city%27s Chinese residents to join his railway garrison regulars in battle. Josef Franz%2C a popular writer on Oriental matters of the day %28widely published under the pseudonym Upton Close%29 was told by a north Kirin guerrilla the following summer that in response to this appeal %22Hundreds joined Gen. Ting%27s army%2C among these myself. The volunteers were mostly from among students and shop-assistants.%22 This fighting in Harbin at the start of February%2C rallied to so enthusiastically by the urban equivalents of those elements which in Fengtien were already risen to form militias%2C went far to convince local authorities and leading citizens in the hinterlands of Kirin that they should commence open resistance to Japan%27s clearly impending occupation of the province.%0D%0A%0D%0AWhile Gen. Ting Chao%27s beaten forces retired from Harbin to the northeast down the Sungari River%2C to join the Lower Sungari garrison of Gen. Li Tu as the nucleus of armed opposition in north Kirin%2C sizeable forces were raised with varying degrees of regularity in west Kirin by a regimental commander of the Kirin Guards Division%2C Feng Chan-hai%2C and in southeast Kirin by Wang Teh-lin%2C a mere battalion commander %28and for fifteen years before that%2C a bandit chieftain in the region%29. According to journalist Hoh Chih-hsiang%2C who at Shanghai compiled biographical sketches of several principal partisan leaders%2C Feng Chan-hai %22withdrew his forces to Shan-Ho-Tun%2C a village in the vicinity of Wuchang District.%22 When he called for volunteers in company with other officers there%2C %22the Commissioners of the Public Safety Bureau at various districts turned over to them with police and militia%2C%22 establishing Gen. Feng Chan-hai in command of a considerable force in the hills%2C with the capital of Kirin City to his south and the metropolis of Harbin to his north. The once-bandit Wang Teh-lin%27s actions during late March took far less cognizance of formal authority. As Hoh Chih-hsiang recounts the tale%2C Wang Teh-lin%2C evidently acting wholly on his own immediate authority over his soldiers%2C %22proceeded%2C at the head of over five hundred of his bravest and most devoted followers to Tunhua%2C%22 a railhead dominating the southeast of Kirin towards the Korean frontier%3B there braves of peasant brotherhoods and bandits %28as well as a smattering of Korean nationalists%29 were already taking up arms against the recent proclamation by Japan of the %22New State%22 of Manchukuo. When Wang Teh-lin %22raised up the standard against the Japanese%22 on his arrival at Tunhua%2C %22hundreds of compatriots daily threw in their lot with him%22 amid the chaos. Their number led to his quick recognition as a general by the %22Old Kirin%22 leader Gen. Li Tu at his headquarters at Sahnsing on the lower Sungari%2C who along with Gen. Ting Chao had raised a number of volunteers to supplement their regulars there. In sometimes uneasy combination%2C these various forces constituted themselves initially as the Kirin Self-Defence Army%2C but by the end of April 1932 they were known as the National Salvation Army. The great proportion of civilian volunteers incorporated in these bodies%2C and the imperatives of guerrilla tactics in the rugged terrain which enabled their survival%2C caused them to quickly lose any resemblance to conventional military formations. Despite the leadership of regular officers at the highest levels%2C and initially appreciable regular cadres%2C their operations differed little from those of the wholly civilian militias of Fengtien.%0D%0A%0D%0AThe emergence of resistance to Japan by bandit gangs and peasant brotherhoods was%2C like the formation of citizen militias%2C greatly facilitated by Japan%27s success in rapidly destroying the normal governance of the region. The respected %22old China hand%22 Owen Lattimore wrote that as the population of the Northeastern Provinces had increased hugely in the preceding half-century%2C %22the pioneers were often squatters%2C wanderers%2C and outlaws by turn%2C%22 rooting banditry deeply in the region%27s frontier%2C where it remained %22one of the outstanding features of the situation in Manchuria%22 according to E. U. Barung at Harbin. Even in long settled Fengtien province bandits %28known generally as hun-hutze%2C or %22red beards%22%29 were solidly established in districts west of Mukden along the Pieping-Mukden railway and in the timbered southeastern hinterkland of the province along the Mukden-Antung railway towards Korea%2C with %22powerful bandit gangs%22 reported by United Press correspondent John Miller to be even %22operating within a day%27s match of such cities as Mukden and Harbin.%22 Peasant brotherhoods for mutual protection were as traditional a resort of small-holders and tenants in troubled times as the gentry%27s %22peace protection%22 militias%2C and though such organizations had not in earlier days played much role in the Northeastern Provinces%2C the most recent waves of immigrants to the region %28arriving since 1926 at the rate of one million a year in flight from war ravaged north and central China%29 included many adherents of the two then-predominant brotherhoods%2C the Red Spear Society and the Big Sword Society%2C which had been conjured up to fresh strength below the Great Wall in opposition to the misrule and chaos of warlordism. Braves of the Red Spear Society were well dispersed throughout the hinterlands of Fengtien and the country round Harbin%2C while the Big Sword Society %28adherents to which were generally slightly more prosperous%29 was solidly established in southeastern Kirin and adjoining portions of Fengtien%3A there in 1927 they had spearheaded an uprising triggered by the collapse of the prevailing Feng-Piao paper currency%3B a rebellion during which%2C according to the Research Department of the South Manchuria Railway Company%2C %22the peasants came to respect the Big Swords%2C%22 for %22they neither harmed nor plundered the common people%2C%22 but %22resisted only the Officials%0D%0A%0D%0AWith the destruction of the legitimate Fengtien provincial authorities bandits %22took advantage of the general slackness%2C%22 wrote E. U. Barung. %22First to rise were the bandits of the Liaohsi region%2C%22 who commenced robbing trains %22with admirable coolness and precision%22 within 50 miles of Mukden on the Mukden-Pieping railway. The rapid rout of the Fengtien Army%2C and attempts by its fragments to obey their last orders to retire towards Chinchow turned loose upon the countryside in addition %22thousands of deserting soldiers%2C%22 U. P. correspondent Morris reported%2C who %22had no means of getting a living except by their guns.%22 Japanese soldiers made their first drives into the Fengtien countryside beyond the %22S. M. R. zone%22 in December 1931%2C in actions announced by Kwantung Army H.Q. as %22for the clearance of undesirable Chinese%22 in counties west of Mukden%2C and highlighted by fights in which Mr. Miller reports %22aeroplanes have broken up several of the best-known gangs.%22 There naturally were in consequence bandits %22who resent the Japanese invasion%2C%22 as P. S. Yin phrases the origin of bandit resistance%2C which%2C apart from attempts at self-defense in western Fengtien%2C commenced most significantly towards the end of December in southeastern Fengtien with attacks against isolated Japanese communities along the Mukden-Antung railway. Here a hun-hutze chieftain was able to rally a considerable following and lead it to assail the southern portion of the S. M. R. mainline itself%3A Kwantung Army H.Q. announced on January 19%2C 1932%2C that %22the Japanese garrison of the walled city of Newchwangchen was in a precarious situation%2C%22 encircled and attacked by %221500 Chinese bandits under Lao Pie-fang%2C%22 while %22other troops operating under Lao Pie-fang%27s orders have created a serious situation in the Haicheng area.%27 Though forced to retire by reinforcements quickly dispatched from Mukden%2C Lao Pie-fang emerged a general and acclaimed as commander by even bands of brotherhood braves and citizen militia. P. S. Yin acknowledges there were many bandits %22admitted into the Volunteers%27 bands by their leaders%22 as the Japanese conquest advanced and the partisan resistance became an increasingly popular cause%2C but there was not always much resultant change in their behavior. Josef Franz%27s informant among the north Kirin guerrillas told him %22the looting of villages along the railway is being done by real bandits%2C who have joined our ranks%2C and for whom banditry has become%2C so to speak%2C a sort of second nature.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AThe Big Sword Society %22created considerable disturbance in the Chientao District%22 in southeast Fengtien along the Korean border%2C wrote the Lytton commissioners%2C and rose en masse in the regions of their strength in response to the declaration of Manchukuo on march 9%2C 1932. they would remain a principal component of partisan resistance here%2C accepting loose ties with other more %28or less%29 formal authorities. E. U. Barung writes that Lao Pie-fang commanded %22several bands of Big swords%2C%22 while the Lytton Report describes the Big Swords in southeast Kirin as %22keeping in touch with Wang Teh-ling%2C%22 and Gen. Feng Chan-hai%2C according to Hoh Chih-hsiang%2C %22organized and trained up a Big Sword Corps of 4%2C000 men.%22 The more widely distributed Red Spear Society%27s adherents formed important rallying points as the struggle widened throughout the countryside%3B they displayed great strength round Harbin%2C and also in Fengtien%2C where they gathered frequently to assail the %22S. M. R. Zone%22 from the Hsinlintun and Tungfeng districts. Here%2C only a few days march from Mukden and the great Fushun collieries%2C they were willing to accept leadership from a somewhat flamboyant young officer of the Fengtien Army willing himself to take on a certain insurrectionist coloring%2C Tang Chu-wu. %22Deeply grieved over the loss of his homeland and the intolerable humiliation endured by his countrymen%2C%22 according to Hoh Chih-hsiang%2C after his regiment was disarmed and interned without struggle by the Japanese%2C Tang Chu-wu %22effected his escape%22 and then %22To show his grim resolution cut one of his fingers and wrote eight Chinese characters meaning %27Kill the enemy%2C punish the traitors%2C save our country and love our people.%27%22 Red Spear Society bodies would display extraordinary staying power in this area%3A almost two years after the %22Mukden Incident%22 J. B. Powell%27s survey of %22the Manchuria bandit news%22 noted %22one item told of the operations of a gang of 1%2C000 Chinese who styled themselves the %27Crimson Spear League%27 which stormed the Tungfeng prefecture near Mukden June 3rd %5B1933%5D.%22 The large numbers of countrymen inspired to take up the fight against an %22alien invader%22 under the fiercely traditionalist and quasi-religious auspices of the Red Spear Society or the Big Sword Society formed forces of striking character. To Ed Hunter of International News Service%2C the inhabitants of market towns round Mukden described as %22primitive-minded people%22 the bodies of Red Spear braves who periodically flooded into the area. Devotees of the brotherhoods placed an abiding faith in rustic magics and righteous character%27s Heavenly reward. Big Sword braves were accurately described by a correspondent for Japan%27s official South Manchurian News as %22claiming they lead charmed lives and are immune from bullets%2C%22 while Red Spear bodies formed in the countryside round Harbin%2C E. U. Barung observed%2C were %22in many cases led by Buddhist monks%22 as they went into battle%2C with themselves and their weapons bedecked with magic inscriptions in a manner not unlike the turn of the century Boxer rebels %28or%2C for that matter%2C Imperial Japanese Army soldiers themselves beneath their uniforms%29.%0D%0A%0D%0AWith the end of winter in 1932%2C the Japanese launched expeditions from Harbin into the interior of Kirin province%2C striking northeast down the Sungari River and east along the Chinese Eastern Railway mainline. Shen Hsue-chuan%2C a Mukden student who fled the region during April%2C writes in moving%2C if polemic terms%2C of the plight faced by the folk of the countryside amid these rapidly expanding hostilities. %22The Japanese troops have called the so-called Chinese %27plain-clothes%27 men bandits. They fight against them disregarding the innocent people%2C who often suffer the same fate%3B and their houses are always exposed to the battle fire%2C%22 with the result that %22almost every house is empty and some of them have been set on fire.%22 As they progressed through the countryside %22the nefarious Japanese soldiers kill the innocent Chinese indiscriminately%2C stab and bury alive those who talk about Japan%2C%22 hoping thus to stifle resistance by terror. %22However%2C the %27plain-clothes%27 men are not discouraged%2C but become more and more desperate. In order to defend their lives most of the farmers have left their fertile lands uncultivated and have enlisted as %27plain-clothes%27 men.%27 Throughout the ensuing spring and summer they would continue to do so%2C despite what E. U. Barung called %22appalling losses in killed or wounded at every battle they fight against Japanese and Manchukuo troops%2C%22 endowing the partisan resistance with a genuine mass character. Many of these men who %28as the delegate from the Courageous Citizens Militia phrased it to C. Y. W. Meng%29 %22decided to give up their lives for the country%22 were as much in the grip of despairing rage as patriotic ardor. E. U. Barung reported %22the life of the country has been disorganized by the marching of troops both Japanese and Chinese throughout the country%2C%22 and consequently %22unemployment%2C poverty%2C and pauperism are on a rapid and steady increase.%22 Josef Franz wrote from Changchun %28as %22the Review%27s special correspondent%22%29 that %22the draft animals and carts were commandeered%2C the seed grain%2C in fact all the supplies of grain%2C were requisitioned by the military authorities%2C the houses being destroyed by cannon and airplane bombs and fires.%22 Alongside these official depredations continued the depredations of the hun-hutze. Reverend Leonard%2C a veteran Baptist missionary%2C preaching his sermons in fluent Chinese to converts in the east Kirin hinterland during April describes how bandits there %22may attack a village at any time%2C loot it%2C carry away for ransom those who have money and burn those stores which they were not able to loot.%22 as they did at the town of Siaosuifu %22shortly after he left there.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AAmid the conflict turning the Northeastern Provinces into what Shen Hsue-chuan in his final peroration describes as %22an abyss of sorrow%2C%22 many who took up arms did so without the least patriotic purpose%2C becoming bandits themselves or even joining the forces of the %22New State%22 of Manchukuo. The Lytton commissioners describe even the Japanese as %22admitting the fact that the complete overthrow of Chang Hseuh-liang%27s government and army greatly added to the number of bandits in the country%2C%22 and observed that %22Many of the present bandits are believed to have been peaceful citizens who on account of the complete loss of their property were induced to take up their present occupation.%22 In and near the %22S. M. R. Zone%22%2C leading local citizens were beginning to make common cause with the Japanese against the prevailing chaos in the spring of 1932%2C and the Lytton commissioners noted the Japanese %22hope that the organization of %27Manchukuo%27 police and self-defense corps in each community will help put an end to banditry.%27 Reverend Vos%2C a Presbyterian missionary who served on occasion as a translator for foreign correspondents%2C described an early contingent of Manchukuo recruits from Fengtien unkindly but not inaccurately as %22trying desperately to present an orderly military appearance%2C but showing plainly they were having a hard time of it. The appearance of the men would be quite in accord with the current report that most of them are bandits and unemployed undesirables.%22 Many of the soldier-bandit remnants of the relict Fengtien army%2C unable to return safely to their homes%2C and harried by Japanese airplanes in the winter countryside%2C sought for a refuge by enlistment in the Manchukuo forces. Manchukuo forces also incorporated established Chinese formations commanded by a Chinese general who%2C for reasons of his own%2C had thrown in his lot with Japan and the %22New State.%22 Chief among these were the %22New Kirin%22 units of Gen. Hsi Hsia. Another such was Gen. Chang Hai-peng%2C Military Commissioner at Taonan in the northwest of Fengtien%2C who was willing %28for a price%29 to provide the Kwantung army an entre into the region%27s north when Imperial H.Q. in Tokyo had initially forbidden the Kwantung Army to make any attempt to occupy Harbin in September of 1931. J. B. Powell reported that November from Mukden that %22the Japanese Army%2C shortly after the Mukden Incident had shipped a large quantity of military supplies to Taonan%22 following which in early October Gen. Chang Hai-peng had declared the district independent of China%2C and led men of the Hsingan Reclamation Army north to assail Gen. Ma Chun-shen in Heilungkiang. The combat performance of such soldiers%2C un-consulted over their new national allegiance%2C would not only prove extraordinarily poor%2C but as the partisan movement gained in strength%2C they became themselves an important source of partisan recruitment by defection. Gen. Amato%2C commander of a Japanese brigade operating in the Kirin interior in the spring of 1932%2C told a correspondent for the Harbinskoye Vryema %28a Russian language newspaper established by the Japanese to sway the substantial White Russian populace of Harbin%29 %22that the troops of the New Government go into battle with great reluctance and very many of them go over to the side of the champions of the Old Government.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AIn Heilungkiang province%2C where Gen. Ma Chun-shen %28after first handily defeating Gen. Chang Hai-peng%92s men%29 led formed regulars into battle against the Japanese at their earliest incursion%2C civil order would prevail for some while%2C despite that province%92s most settled areas being the seat of considerable fighting. Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s initial successes in defense of the provincial capital%2C Tsitsihar%2C during November 1931 %28achieved with some 8%2C000 men and a dozen well-served fieldpieces%29%2C earned him nationwide adulation as the %22Hero of the Nonni River%2C%22 and once he was forced to retire up the Nonni valley%2C he managed to regroup his forces and maintain their fighting spirit. Reverend Leonard%2C in Tsitsihar to inspect hospital care for the Harbin Christian Cross Society%2C reported that Japanese troops attempting to press Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s men further up the Nonni towards Koshen amid the killing cold of the winter prairies %22have been at the disadvantage of having to make advances on level ground and have been cut down in large numbers on several occasions.%22 At the fall of Harbin%2C Gen. Ma Chun-shen agreed to accept from Japan the post of Minister for the Army in the first Manchukuo cabinet%2C along with confirmation as Governor of Heilungkiang. With the first raising of the Manchukuo flag in March 1932%2C Heilungkiang Army troops%2C including Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s original Taheiho garrison on the Amur River frontier with the Soviet Union%2C rioted enthusiastically. Hoh Chih-hsiang reports that then %22After realizing a huge sum of funds and a large amount of military equipment from the Japanese%2C Gen. Ma swiftly but ingeniously carried out  a coup d%92etat%2C%22 returning to Taheiho and on April 16 proclaiming by telegram%2C %22Now I intend to push the campaign of salvation to the limit with all the power at my command.%22 This%2C according to J. B. Powell%2C consisted of %22infantry%2C cavalry%2C artillery %2820 field pieces%29 and also a small air squadron%22 of seven planes%3B the Lytton commissioners write %22The number of troops at his disposal between Hulan River%2C Hailun and Taheiho is estimated by Japanese authorities as six regiments%2C or between 7%2C000 and 8%2C000 men.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AFrom the Koshen region Gen. Ma Chun-shen sent troops east to reinforce Gen. Ting Chao%92s men on the Sungari against an on-going Japanese thrust down that river%2C and struck on his own account first southeast toward Harbin and then%2C when he was balked there%2C southwest towards Tsitsihar. As he did so%2C Josef Franz was reporting from Changchun at the end of April that %22the war activities%2C developing now in the North-West of Harbin%2C have started their ruinous work in the agricultural areas in this part of Manchuria%2C%22 while irregular war began to flare up at last in significant strength in Heilungkiang province. Heilungkiang Manchukuo troops mutinied%2C holding centers of the Tsitsihar-Koshen and Harbin-Hailun railways%2C or departing into the prairie to join the now revived %22Hero of the Nonni River%2C%22 while mounted bandits appeared by the hundreds to loot towns on the Chinese Eastern Railway mainline west of Harbin%2C and partisan bodies rose up to the south in the Taonan region%2C disrupting service on the Taonan-Tsitsihar railway. As the Japanese struck northwards up the Harbin-Hailun and Tsitsihar-Koshen railways in reply to Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s attacks%2C driving back his forces and setting out from the railheads in powerful pincers%2C Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s official dispatch reported on June 8 %22It was decided that in order to reap the best results%2C guerrilla tactics will be adopted hereafter by the Heilungkiang units.%22 Although before the end of June Kwantung Army H.Q. could boast accurately%2C according to E. U. Barung%92s report%2C %22that only one detachment of 1%2C000 soldiers%2C commanded by Gen. Ma in person%2C remained the only force at the disposal of the general%2C all the other units being broken up and scattered about the country%2C%22 each dispersed fragment of Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s regulars or the %22Manchukuo%22 mutineers became nucleus for a similar or smaller sized gaggle of partisans%2C roving the tree-less grassland on horseback. Massive floods along the Nonni and Sungari Rivers inundated some 10%2C000 square miles round Harbin throughout August%2C providing a crucial breathing spell to these bands %28as well as to the hard-pressed partisans on the lower Sungari%29%2C for Japanese operations in the area had to halt until the waters subsided.%0D%0A%0D%0A|0
2|2|Part II|The Magistrate||19:40:17|06/28/2003|While the Japanese turned their attentions south to restore the security of vital industrial facilities in the %22S. M. R. Zone%22%2C and to gain lodgments in southwest Fengtien needed for the invasion of Jehol province%2C autumn brought a wholly fresh force into the fray. Gen. Su Ping-wen%2C commanding the Heilungkiang %22Manchukuo%22 garrisons of the %22Barga District%22 at the extreme west of Heilungkiang on the Soviet frontier%2C had so far kept his isolated fiefdom beyond the Hsingan Mts. free of both fighting and bodies of Japanese troops%2C while doing nothing of importance in support of either Manchukuo or Gen. Ma Chun-shen. In consequence the farmers settled along the Chinese Eastern Railway mainline west of Tsitsihar had remained little disturbed by the upheaval gripping the land. On September 27%2C Gen. Su Ping-wen%92s soldiers staged a spectacular mutiny seizing hundreds of Japanese civilians and isolated military personnel as hostages. Many of the mutineers sped helter-skelter eastwards aboard commandeered trains towards Tsitsihar%2C calling themselves the Heilungkiang National Salvation Army%2C and hoping to join the now-legendary Gen. Ma Chun-shen in re-capturing the provincial capital%2C as that worthy was emerged himself onto the plains again from his shelter in the Little Hsingan range along the Amur River.%0D%0A%0D%0AThis geographic apogee of partisan activity marked also their greatest numerical strength%2C at least so far as this %28and its previous development%29 can be determined from the scanty reports available. The Lytton commissioners%2C presented with evidence from both sides during the summer of 1932%2C declined to attempt an authoritative enumeration of Chinese forces in the Northeastern Provinces%2C contenting themselves with the statement that %22it is extremely difficult to estimate%22 their strength%2C noting that %22the commission was not able to meet with any of the Chinese generals still in the field%2C%22 and pointing out that %22Chinese authorities are understandably reluctant to give away exact information about such troops as are still offering resistance to the Japanese in Manchuria. Japanese authorities%2C on the other hand%2C are disposed to minimize the numbers and fighting value of the forces still opposed to them.%22 Little more than a month after the %22Mukden Incident%22%2C Kwantung Army H.Q. claimed on October 22%2C 1931%2C that there were 17%2C000 %22bandit and refugee troops%22 in an area roughly bounded by Taonan at the west%2C Wuchanghsien at the north%2C Tunghwa at the east and Antung at the south%2C operating in 46 distinct bands with strengths ranging from 60 to 1%2C000 each. In southwestern Fengtien%2C %22only four route armies had been organized%22 prior to the invasion of Chinchow at the end of that year%2C C. Y. W. Meng was told by the delegate from the Courageous Citizens Militia%3A these probably totaled several thousand fighters%2C roughly similar to the size of the force initially adhering to Lao Pie-Feng in southeastern Fengtien. The delegate%92s claim that by mid-April 1932 the Courageous Citizens Militia had a strength of 200%2C000 %22west of Chinchow%22 alone is certainly a considerable exaggeration%3A 20%2C000 would be a generous estimate of actual partisan strength in this area at that time%2C for P. S. Yin ascribes %2220%2C000 militia%22 to southwestern Fengtien%2C and credits Tang Chu-wu with %22six thousand volunteer forces%22 east of Mukden. Wang Teh-lin%92s strength %22originally consisted of 7%2C000 men%2C%22 reported J. B. Powell %28citing in mid-May %22a recent interview%22 given by his representative Mr. Chu Chi%29%2C and added that %22since the occupation of Suifehno and the neighboring region more than 10%2C000 volunteers and militia troops had joined up%2C%22 while P. S. Yin put the forces under both Wang The-kin and Feng Chan-hai together in Kirin as %2235%2C000 militia.%22 The Lytton commissioners wrote that %22Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu control six old brigades of Chang Hseuh-liang%92s army and have since raised three additional brigades%2C%22 citing Japanese estimates that this force numbered roughly 30%2C000 men in early April%2C 1932. Their estimate of Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s strength at that time as 8%2C000 regulars %28also based on Japanese estimates%29 has been given above%2C but is almost certainly an under-estimate of the total strength of Chinese forces operating in the Koshen region and between Harbin and Tsitsihar%3A J. B. Powell writes that there were %2225%2C000 troops along the Tsitsihar-Keshan railway%22 in early May%2C and reports that by the end of that month %22General Ma is estimated to have at his disposal at present something like 40%2C000 troops.%22 Kwantung Army H.Q. claimed their opponents in the spring of 1932 totaled 130%2C000%2C then %22swelled to 200%2C000 in summer and to a peak of 360%2C000 in autumn%2C%22 according to Alvin Coox%2C the eminent modern historian of the Kwantung Army. These figures are at least consonant with the foregoing%2C and with a statement %22that the total number of the North-eastern Volunteers is 300%2C000%22 attributed early in July 1932 by The China Weekly Review to %22Chu Chi-ching%2C reserve member of the Central executive Committee %5Bof the Nationalist Party%5D%2C who has been traveling incognito in Manchuria.%22 The late-erupting Heilungkiang National Salvation army%2C based on an under-strength division and driving through the most sparsely settled area of the region %28all Heilungkiang had barely four million inhabitants%29%2C added only a small proportion of the steadily increasing partisan numbers reported by the Japanese%2C who attributed most of this increase to areas already long embroiled in the conflict. J. B. Powell reported in mid-October that in 14 counties of south and eastern Fengtien%2C centered on the operational area of Gen. Tang Chu-wu %28who P. S. Yin had credited with six thousands in early summer%29%2C %22according to the Japanese the total number of bandits and troop bandits infesting the district is estimated at about 30%2C000.%22%0D%0A%0D%0ADefending the Country%0D%0A%0D%0AWhile the extent of partisan operations and their apparent numerical strength %28roughly equivalent to every twentieth able-bodied adult male in the region%29 suggests something of the formidable proportion of local Chinese resistance to Japan%92s designs on the Northeastern provinces%2C they indicate little about the military effectiveness of the partisan forces. Citizen militias mustered into being bearing what weapons could be found in their communities. Although many owned fire-arms in this bandit-ridden region%2C few of the weapons in private hands were really suitable for military use%2C many being frankly medieval%2C and as the partisan bands swelled so greatly in the spring and summer of 1932%2C these sorts of weapons came to predominate among their equipment. Police stores and military equipment were sometimes available to the %22plain-clothes%22 men%2C and while the frontier and railway garrison troops of the Kirin Army and Heilungkiang Army which constituted the backbone of Chinese resistance in these provinces possessed little in excess of their own requirements by way of weaponry%2C the provincial armies of the Northeastern provinces were well equipped by contemporaneous Chinese standards%2C particularly in artillery. Especially suitable for guerrilla operations were many light small-bore carriage pieces%2C and the widely issued and easily portable 3%22 Stokes mortar %28put into production at the Mukden Arsenal in 1925 by the notorious English mercenary and promoter%2C Col. %22One-Arm%22 Sutton%29. Japan%2C however%2C possessed in abundance the full panoply of early mid-20th century war%2C particularly air power%2C to which the partisans possessed no effective counter. Conditions demanded the partisans develop an elusive and opportunistic battle-craft and organization%2C seeking to blunt the conventional military advantages of the Japanese by exploiting the frequently penny-packet dispersal forced upon their foe by the vastness of the region Japan sought to conquer %28with forces never numbering more than 60%2C000 Japanese soldiers%29%2C and taking advantage of the abundant covers offered by its rugged hinterlands and %28for at least much of the year%29 by the crops grown in its agricultural heartlands. Most damaging to the partisan forces was their lack of any reliable means of obtaining supplies. As the conflict continued%2C the difficulties encountered by the partisans in acquiring not just munitions but supply of all sorts considerably degraded partisan combat capabilities%2C finally turning against them many of the features of the country and its climate that had previously tended to operate in their favor.%0D%0A%0D%0AThe typical weaponry of a village %22peace protection%22 militia was on display already some weeks before the %22Mukden Incident%22 at Wanpaoshan%2C some 20 miles north of Changchun. There%2C on July 1%2C 1931%2C Chinese farmers %22armed with agricultural implements and pikes%2C%22 according to the Lytton Report%2C attacked Korean subjects of Japan who were trespassing on their fields to dig an irrigation canal%2C and when Japanese Consular Police opened fire to protect the Koreans%2C journalist S. C. Yang at Harbin %28citing %22the special correspondent of the leading Chinese daily%22%29 wrote that many of the Chinese %22ran back to the village to get their rifles.%92 Josef Franz describes a village in the region as typically %22possessing a formidable%2C crude armory%22 built up over the tumultuous frontier years of its establishment%2C while the delegate from the from the Courageous Citizens Militia acknowledged to C. Y. W. Meng %22the primitive weapons%92 which he and his comrades wielded. When the journalist inquired how they came to possess any fire-arms and ammunition at all%2C %22the delegate answered that in the North-Eastern Provinces%2C each family practically has one or two guns and a few rounds of bullets for hunting and protection purposes. But now the people have taken up whatever they have to present them to the headquarters of the militia.%22 Similar gatherings up of private arms%2C and disbursements of the village store of spears and blunderbusses%2C may safely be assumed to have marked the police-stiffened militias raised by district commissioners in west Kirin%2C and the %22policemen and militia%22 Mr. P. S. Yin reports in %22combination with Tang Teng-mie%22 in southeast Fengtien alongside Lao Pie-feng%92s adherents. Feng Chan-hai of the Kirin Guards%2C according to Hoh Chih-hsiang%2C arrived in Wuchang district %22carrying with him a large quantity of arms and ammunition%2C%22 greatly benefiting the initial %22plain-clothes%22 men of west Kirin%2C while in southeast Kirin%2C where insurrection had greeted the proclamation of Manchukuo %28and drawn Wang Teh-lin to Tunhua%29%2C J. B. Powell reported that %22a party of %91outlaws%92 in an attempt at Patungkuo%2C occupied a branch of the Chinese Public Safety Bureau in that neighborhood March 26 %5B1932%5D and seized all arms and ammunition there.%22 But not even forces raised in the most orderly manner around a sizeable regular cadre could avoid having a sizeable proportion of medieval equipage in their ranks by the end%3A when at Suifehno on the Soviet frontier %28the eastern terminus of the C. E. R. mainline%29 %22the Volunteers under Gen. Kuan Chang-ching had surrendered%22 on January 5%2C 1933%2C %22The Japanese seized four mountain guns%2C two howitzers%2C 3%2C000 rifles and 2%2C000 spears%2C%22 according to their own report retailed in The China Weekly Review. In the spring of 1932%2C %22common peasant youths who have volunteered for service%2C%22 reported E. U. Barung%2C found %22there are few rifles%22 for them%2C but %22the lack or absence of arms or munitions does not stop them. They forge swords and spears%2C form themselves into military units%2C elect a leader from among themselves%2C and go to battle%2C%22 Travelling from Changchun to Pieping at the end of August%2C Josef Franz made inquiries after the operations of the local %22Volunteers%22 while passing through the Jehol borderlands %28scene of considerable fighting%2C and increased partisan numbers%2C since mid-July%29%3B he was told that %22most of them are armed only with knives and reaping hooks.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AThe equipment of Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s Heilungkiang Army regulars in their initial actions south of Tsitsihar illustrates the resources of the region%92s provincial forces. Col. Hamamoto%2C who%92s battalion were the first Japanese troops to engage the %22Hero of the Nonni River%22%2C clashing with half a brigade%2C told the Lytton commissioners he had fought a force equipped %22with about 70 automatic and machine guns %5Bthe former indicating a light machine-gun in the still imprecise nomenclature for this relatively new class of weapon%5D.%22 By comparison%2C his battalion possessed 24 machine-guns. J. B. Powell%2C who arrived in Tsitsihar within the hour of Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s flight from the place on the night of November 18%2C 1931%2C reported that %22the motor road across the prairie between Anganchi station and Tsitsihar was strewn with military equipment%22 among which he personally observed%2C lay %22cases of ammunition including trench-mortar shells.%22 Such weapons%2C along with rifles and cartridges%2C may be taken as accompanying Feng Chan-hai and his Kirin Guards into Wuchang district in the western corner of the province%2C as well as the ardent spirits of Wang Teh-lin%92s battalion arriving at Tunhua in its southeast. Certainly Gen. Ting Chao%2C drawing on the depot of his railway garrison regulars%2C was able to provide such weapons to the citizens volunteering to join his defense of Harbin%3A Josef Franz%92s north Kirin informant recalled%2C %22We were hurriedly equipped%2C trained and divided into small units of fifty or sixty men. In some instances we were given a light machine-gun and a trench mortar %5Bthe latter reference may indicate a grenade-thrower%5D.%22 E. U. Barung%2C watching the departure of Gen. Ting Chao%92s men from Harbin as their retirement down the Sungari River commenced%2C witnessed passage of %22a string of carts bearing cannon and heavy shells.%22 The presence of ordnance in east Kirin has been referenced above%3A this was in use already on the eastern branch of the C. E. R. mainline in an attack on Impienpo at dawn on April 23%2C 1932%2C by %22a strong force of old Kirin troops%22 J. B. Powell reported %22had been reinforced by ten heavy guns.%22 Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s tiny %22air force%92 in the spring of 1932 J. B. Powell reports managed only one raid%2C having %22despatched three airplanes to bomb the Heilungkiang provincial capital on the morning of May 10%2C%22 and soon afterwards these lost their improvised aerodrome at the Hailun railhead. Reuters reported that on May 24%2C when Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s men were driven from Hulan just north of Harbin%2C %22three armored cars and several field guns%22 were captured by the Japanese. Some portion of Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s cannon were successfully salved by the scattered bands of his men operating guerrilla-wise before the August floods%3B it was reported in The China Weekly Review that when Laha %28a much fought over town 70 miles north of Tsitsihar%29 was attacked on October 26%2C its Japanese garrison was subjected to %22a long bombardment by artillery%2C the fire being intensive and well directed.%22 The copious equipment of the Fengtien Army reached partisan bands only in small quantities and by the most irregular of channels. J. B. Powell wrote of the Fengtien Army remnants in Chinchow in December 1931 that %22their chief object in life was to get back to their homes in the villages%2C%22 and the purchase of weapons from deserters and bandit was an immemorial tool of village authorities%2C with which those assisting formation of militias in the area with financial aid from local landowners were doubtless familiar. Fengtien Army men who took up banditry between Mukden and Chinchow possessed of course their rifles%2C and may also possessed %28or abandoned to discovery by other %22men of enterprise%22%29 even heavier equipment%3A Rengo%2C the semi-official Japanese wire service%2C reported on March 28%2C 1932%2C %22Some 400 bandits on horseback gathered in the Kanwangtsai district%2C 25 Chinese miles %5B12 statute%5D west of Taschao station on the trunk line of the South Manchuria Railway%2C and came into collision with the Public safety Forces yesterday in their attempt to invade the railway zone. The insurgents were in possession of two guns.%22%0D%0A|1
4|3|Part III|The Magistrate||19:41:44|06/28/2003|Japan%92s campaign of conquest in the Northeastern Provinces was backed by %22a formidable mobilization of modern weapons%2C%22 wrote Associated Press correspondent Morris Harris from Changchun. %22It is in its modern mechanical equipment that the Japanese army is overwhelmingly superior to its poorly equipped and loosely organized foe.%22 Operating from major aerodromes at Mukden%2C Tsitsihar%2C and the capital of Kirin%2C as well as Harbin%2C Changchun%2C and Chinchow%2C Japanese reconnaissance planes maintained an aerial vedette to detect partisan activity%2C while bombers raided towns in partisan districts when not operating in direct support of ground forces%2C and fighters %28still armed to the Great War standard of but two synchronized rifle-caliber machine-guns%29 roved every quarter of the region%2C seeking opportunities to strafe. %22The Japanese airmen let off their guns at every shrub%2C%22 Josef Franz was told by his north Kirin informant. %22They explain as a stampede of terror-stricken bandits%2C%22 he said%2C %22the sight our running to cover%2C%22 but it was the opinion of the Lytton commissioners that %22the greater part%22 of Chinese losses were due to %22the use of aircraft on the Japanese side.%22 Japanese air bombs were %22five feet tall and weighed some 200 pounds%2C%22 blasting out craters %22twelve feet deep and eighteen feet across at the top%2C%22 J. B. Powell was told by %22one of the foreign military observers who inspected some of these bomb-holes.%22 Even when a cascade of such missiles achieved little materially %28as was not infrequently the case%29%2C their moral effect was tremendous%2C and sometimes sufficient in itself to force a Chinese retirement. J. B. Powell reports that when at the end of March%2C 1932%2C forces under gen. Ting Chao routed the Manchukuo garrison at Nungan%2C 35 miles northwest of Changchun%2C the Japanese %22succeeded in driving the Kirin Self-Defence forces out of the town in less than 24 hours mainly as a result of airplane bombing.%22 Japanese artillery%2C plentiful and well supplied with shells and communications gear%2C struck similarly powerful blows. E. U. Barung reports that when a large force of National Salvation Army partisans seized Hengtaohotse on the Eastern branch of the C. E. R. mainline early in June 1932%2C and %22held it under their control for about a week%2C repulsing several attacks%2C%22 their resistance was broken once the Japanese counter-attacks reached a climax in which %22reports state that more than a thousand shells fell within the town%2C destroying many houses and also causing a fire.%22 Ed Hunter of International News service was able to witness the Japanese attack %22a few Chinese huts on a slight slope%2C and about twenty Chinese%22 at nearby Erho%3A %22Mounted Japanese officers rode to another hill%2C where long lines of telephone wires were strung%2C and field wireless set up. There was a hustle and a bustle for an hour. Then a barrage. Thousands of dollars worth of ammunition went sizzling through the air. Under this barrage the Japanese troops advanced. Once in a long interval one of the Chinese on that little slope would fire a bullet%2C%22 Mr. Hunter reported%2C and by the time the Japanese troops had reached their objective %22all that was left of the Chinese was their footprints. They had fled long before%21%22 While Japanese use of tanks and armored cars in the Northeastern province drew much comment from visiting western newspapermen%2C at the time of the %22Mukden Incident%22 the development and use of such weapons by the Imperial Japanese Army remained in its infancy%3B their scarcity prevented their playing a decisive role on any grand scale%2C although they proved irresistible where they appeared. Josef Franz was told by his north Kirin informant a Japanese attack spearheaded by two armored cars against the defenders of Harbin produced such consternation that %22We came to our senses only after the retreat%2C%22 and evidently not one Japanese armor vehicle was ever destroyed in combat by the Chinese in the Northeastern Provinces. Japan%92s %22land-cruisers%22 saw their principal usage on the prairies of Heilungkiang%2C where two cavalry brigades operating in late spring of 1932 each contained am %22armored company%22 of seven armored cars%2C and during the March 1933 invasion of Jehol province%2C which incorporated an independent tank company. Japanese Army Railway Engineers also possessed armored cars%2C able to operate on both rail and road%2C and these%2C though intended for security duties%2C were often pressed into more vigorous operations. J. B. Powell reports the National Salvation Army partisans in the April 23 attack against Imienpo on the eastern branch of the C. E. R. mainline referred to above%2C were driven off when %22the Japanese%2C supported by an armored train and several armored cars%2C made a successful counter-attack. The Chinese%2C after holding on a while%2C began to retreat%2C pursued by the Japanese.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AIn the face of such commanding advantages as their well equipped foes enjoyed on the battlefield%2C the partisans waging %22a continued guerrilla warfare%22 to defend China%92s Northeastern Provinces%2C writes P. S. Yin%2C %22would avoid open clashes. When a greatly superior force is facing them%2C they would scatter away like sands among the adjacent regions%2C whom the Japanese could not find out. And they would attack only those Japanese troops which are vulnerable.%22 C. Y. W. Meng reports %22the strong words from the lips%22 of one delegate from the Courageous Citizens Militia%2C describing how he and his comrades went into battle%3A %22We attack the invader when we see his forces are not strong enough. When the reinforcements arrive%2C we immediately scatter about in the field and ourselves%2C%22 he said. %22When the reinforcements withdraw%2C we attack them again.%22 Well aware that the superior firepower of Japanese %28and Manchukuo%29 troops was dependent on their maintenance of an adequate supply of ammunition%2C partisan forces frequently maneuvered against the communications of enemy units which were isolated or involved already in prolonged combat. The Rengo service reported on March 28%2C 1932%2C that during the defense of Nungan against Gen. Ting Chao%92s forces referred to above%2C %22a party of 100 policemen from the Kirin Police Station was surrounded by the bandit troops this afternoon when they were proceeding to Nungan by 6 trucks. All of them were either taken prisoner or surrendered to the bandits.%22 Deprived of %22200%2C000 rounds of rifle ammunition and 50%2C000 trench mortar shells%22 from the Kirin City Arsenal being carried by the captured convoy%2C the resistance of Manchukuo forces in Nungan dissolved next day. Josef Franz%92s north Kirin informant describes another such ambuscade%2C executed with considerable craft between the eastern mainline of the C. E. R. and Ninguta%2C a large town south of the tracks where Japanese and Manchukuo troops struggled to maintain a garrison throughout the spring and summer of 1932. %22Since the town is far away from the railway and can be gained only by a road winding across the hilly country%2C the communication was at our mercy%2C%22 he said. %22We knew that the reinforcement would be rushed from the railway to the town%2C so we arranged to waylay it in close formation on the top of a brush covered hill%2C overlooking the road. Next day%2C about noon%2C three truck loads came into view and were allowed to pass along unmolested. But a column of about fifteen trucks and motor busses that followed were captured. The drivers of the trucks and guards were greeted with a shower of rifle and machine-gun fire and with bangs of trench mortars. This dumbfounded the enemy. The stampede was almost indescribable.%22 C. Y. W. Meng at Nanking %28citing %22eye-witnesses%2C war writers%2C and other reliable sources%22%29 describes how men with %22big swords%22 and a watchword of %22rush forward to behead the enemy%22 sought to use their medieval equipment on an early mid-20th century battlefield%3A %22They cried as loud as they could %91Sah %5Bkill%5D%21%92%22 and accompanied their cry with a great %22rattle of swords%22 while they %22rushed to the Japanese positions to engage in a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy.%22 When the Japanese advanced against them%2C %22the Chinese were silent%2C%22 waiting till %22the Japanese came as near as about 200 meters%22 before swarming out %22to have another hand-to-hand fight to kill the enemy with %91big swords%92%21%22 While the firepower of small Japanese detachments might be overwhelmed by fanatic numbers%2C and that of larger Japanese formations evaded by timely withdrawal Japanese aircraft might appear overhead at any moment. Josef Franz%92s north Kirin informant put the best possible face on the considerable disruption that even successful evasion of Japanese air power entailed. %22From long experience we know now what to do in case of air attacks --- we disperse and then continue our march%2C%22 he said%2C adding%2C %22Of course there are casualties which can%92t be helped%2C since it is war%2C and not child%92s play.%22 He dignified as %22volley fire%22 the irregular fusillades which often broke out among the partisans when Japanese aircraft were sighted%2C and these prodigal expenditures of scarce bullets were not always ineffectual%3A Kwantung Army H.Q. acknowledged the loss of at least 6 aircraft on operations during 1932%2C one crashing when its pilot was shot in the thigh within ten miles of Mukden on November 24%2C and fainted from his wound while attempting to land at a Mukden airfield.%0D%0A%0D%0AThe pattern of partisan organization was already clear by early April 1932%2C when on the eve of Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s volte face against Manchukuo%2C J. B. Powell reported %22All the organized Chinese armies have been broken%2C but scores of bands%2C ranging from 200 to 1%2C000 or more men%2C are operating --- attacking the Japanese in rapid raids and then retreating%2C looting towns and villages as they go.%22 According to P. S. Yin%92s account of partisan practice%2C %22These defenders of their soil are formed into groups comprising fifties or hundreds at most%2C%22 while the Lytton commissioners accepted %22an official Japanese document%22 provided to them as authentic in its %22enumerating a large number of so-called route armies and other Chinese units%2C each containing not more than 200 to 400 men%2C which form the subdivisions of the volunteer armies.%22 Since partisan forces had to rely on %22communication being maintained by messenger%2C in the face of the absence of the telegraphic or radio communication%2C%22 E. U. Barung reports%2C leaders of these dispersed bands necessarily enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. Josef Franz was told by his informant among the north Kirin guerrillas %28%22a stalwart Chinese%2C some thirty years old and seemingly in command of some sixty plain-clothes men%22%29 that each such detachment %22operates quite independently of others%2C%22 and that %22each commander has been given what you call carte blanche%22 to direct his unit as he saw fit. A highly elaborated military structure was erected on paper above these practically independent band leaders %28Chu Chi-ching%2C the Nationalist Party emissary%2C describes the organization of %22the North-Eastern Volunteers%22 in early July 1932 as %22at present five route armies%2C two independent detachments%2C nine independent divisions%2C and several independent cavalry regiments and one training regiment%22%29%2C but commanders of these putative higher echelon formations were able to provide little more direction to their subordinates than a summons to concentrate on a particular locale or loose a wave of assaults on a particular date. Their attempts at strategic coordination throughout the Northeastern Provinces faced even greater obstacles%2C wrote E. U. Barung. For %22all the railways and water routes were in the hands of the enemy%2C so that there existed no effective inter-communication between them.%22 Nonetheless%2C this fractionated structure with its dispersed command%2C each constituent element of it acting in accordance with the same qualities of opportunism and self-preservation which informed their battle-craft%2C not infrequently managed to perform with at least an appearance of strategic coordination %28and effectiveness%29 in far-flung response to Japanese operations. Japanese concentration northwest of Harbin against Gen. Ma Chun-shen in spring and summer of 1932 was answered by escalating partisan activity in Kirin and Fengtien%2C which culminated in simultaneous attacks on cities throughout the %22S. M. R. Zone%22 as the August floods both halted Japanese operations based on Harbin%2C and isolated the troops engaged on them. Japanese preparations for invading Jehol province later that year evidently were halted by the need to subdue the unexpected recrudescence of widespread partisan activity in Heilungkiang%2C and with Japanese forces concentrated to the west%2C the forces of Feng Chan-hai and Wang Teh-lin managed the extraordinary coup of briefly occupying the capital of Kirin province.%0D%0A%0D%0A%22The Japanese troops in Manchuria have had not a little difficulty in the suppression of bandits in view of the large expanse of land%2C its geographical and climatic conditions%2C%22 Lt. Gen. Araki%2C Japan%92s Minister of War%2C told the Tokyo Diet on September 1%2C 1932. The region%92s size meant that%2C as J. B. Powell noted dryly from Shanghai%2C %22whenever the Japanese begin to spread out they find their troops spread out very thin indeed.%22 Small garrisons and independent detachments operated at considerable risks from the very outset of widespread partisan activity. Hsinmintun on the Mukden-Pieping railway was garrisoned by a company of Japanese infantry at the start of 1932%2C and according to %22a dispatch from Mukden January 12%22 reported in The China Weekly Review%2C this force was %22engaged by a horde of bandits%22 at dusk outside the town walls%2C finding itself fighting %22a desperate action%22 in which %22four Japanese officers were killed%2C over 30 men were killed and all but 10 of the remaining men were wounded%2C%22 while a week later as Lao Pie-feng%92s adherents invaded the southern reaches of the %22S. M. R. Zone%22%2C Kwantung Army H.Q. announced on January 19 %22Near Haicheng yesterday Lieutenant Kawano%2C commanding a company of Japanese infantry%2C was killed and three of his soldiers were seriously wounded in a clash with Lao Pie-feng%3Bs bandits. Lieutenant Kawano was killed while en route with his men to Pakiatze to fight bandits.%22 As the conflict widened%2C with the Japanese faced with the need not only for expeditions into the hinterlands but maintaining the security of vital rail lines and populous centers%2C it remained frequently impossible to garrison even principal towns in greater than company strength%2C though this was wholly insufficient to dominate the countryside around them%2C and often barely adequate for self defense in the absence of prompt reinforcement. A Japanese garrison commanded by Capt. Hayashi at Taian on the Tsitsihar-Koshen railway was for eight days %22encircled by some 4%2C000 Volunteers%2C%22 according to a Rengo telegram%2C before it finally %22succeeded in repulsing them on October 28 %5B1932%5D following severe fighting%22 in which fourteen Japanese %28including Capt. Hayashi%29 were killed and an equal number wounded. The danger faced still by independent detachments was typified most spectacularly the fate of the Kawase detachment of cavalry%2C 59 horsemen sent out that very day toward embattled Taian%2C who seemingly disappeared on the frosted prairie within 24 hours%3A Rengo reported on November 8 %22As a result of search by the Japanese air-force the bodies of 8 Japanese soldiers and 27 horses have been discovered but the remaining 51 are still missing.%22 Two days later the sole survivor%2C a Sgt. Iwakami%2C arrived in Tsitsihar to tell how the detachment %22encountered heavy odds in the vicinity of Taianchen and was annihilated.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AWhile the prairies of Heilungkiang offered partisan bands %22plenty of room to run about in%2C%22 wrote A. P. correspondent Morris Harris%2C Lt. Gen. Araki%92s %22geographical and climatic conditions%22 told most strongly against the Japanese in such mountainous regions as the Jehol borderlands%2C southeastern Fengtien%2C and the timbered crags of Kirin province. Mr. H. Y. McCartney%2C a Standard Oil geologist%2C wrote an account of departing the capital of Kirin early in February 1925 to drive into the province%92s eastern interior %28where %22according to an old missionary doctor no motor car had ever gone%22%29%3A in the region of the capital%2C he reports that %22there is much underbrush in the valleys and on the sides of the mountains but the large trees have all been taken out.%22 Before long%2C he and his party were passing %22through the wildest country we have ever seen%22 on a road%2C already %22little more than a beaten path%2C%22 which devolved into %22the rocky trail cut through the forest%22 cloaking a steep mountainside%2C and which even on level ground %22lay through the woods with many twists and turns.%22  Despite the temperature %22never rising above zero %5BFahrenheit%5D%2C%22 while trying to cross %22a low flat frozen marsh%22 Mr. McCartney found his overloaded Dodge %22wedged in a foot of ice and water%22 when the surface gave way%2C and after becoming stuck %22into a snowbank three feet deep%22 on a mountain slope while %22the heavy snowstorm was fast making the road impassable for us to proceed either way%2C%22 he turned back defeated while still 40 miles short of his journey%92s goal of Tung Hwa Hsien. %22Winter in this part of the world is a reality%2C%22 the Reverend Leonard wrote from Harbin. %22The thermometer usually ranges around thirty-five degrees below zero %5BFahrenheit%5D during much of the three severe months of winter.%22 He was himself sufficiently inured to the climate to describe the daylight temperatures of twenty below zero encountered by the Japanese around Tsitsihar in November and December of 1931 as %22still ideal and not extremely cold%2C%22 but such temperatures froze the lubricant of Japanese light machine-guns and the recoil cylinders of Japanese fieldpieces. J. B. Powell reported that when the Japanese drove Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s men from before Tsitsihar in mid-November %22the armor car section could not assist%2C as it was entirely frozen up. The airplanes had been kept running steadily for two days before the battle so as to prevent them also from being frozen up.%22 Japanese soldiers could stand the cold no better than their weapons%3B even once they were provided winter garments for operations up the Nonni valley%2C Reverend Leonard reported from the Tsitsihar hospital %22more than a hundred Japanese soldiers have been brought in from the north the past few days with frozen feet and legs%2C and they continue to come.%22 Snow on the prairie hampered operations as greatly as in the mountains. In early January 1932 the drifts formed by %22the heavy snowfall%2C the first real one of the season%2C%22 reports reverend Vos from Tsitsihar%2C were thick enough to halt %22the little shuttle train from Angangki%22 on its narrow gauge rails. Even in southern Fengtien the broad Liao River had frozen clear to its mouth at Yinkow by late December 1931%2C nor did the grip of winter soon ease upon a land subjected to 260 days of frost in a typical year%3B in east Kirin at the end of March in 1932%2C the Reverend Leonard traveling in his horse-drawn wagon between Tungking and Suifenho passed %22where the road runs through the Crooked Gorge%22 during a heavy snowstorm %28for the hun-hutze %22were said to be adverse to leaving their shelters in rough weather%22%29%2C while in the scrub and scree mountains of southwest Fengtien on the Jehol border in that same month%2C %22the snow is still as high as a man%2C%22 C. Y. W. Meng was told by the delegate from the Courageous Citizens Militia. %22But this gives advantages to the Chinese militia%2C%22 the delegate added%2C since %22the invaders are not familiar with the trails which are now covered completely with snow.%22 Such unfamiliarity added to the dangers posed by the winter treacherous going in east Kirin particularly%3B according to %22Chinese messages received from Pieping%22 during operations against Gen. Wang The-lin%92s forces in December 1932 %22 a number of Japanese armored cars%2C tanks and field guns were submerged in an ice-field at Chuho. Three Japanese soldiers are stated to have been drowned.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AThe coming of spring only altered the nature of the obstacles faced by Japanese operations. E. U. Barung at Harbin predicted accurately that great difficulties would attend a projected resumption in mid-April 1932 of the Japanese drive down the Sungari River towards the %22Old Kirin%22 seat at Sahnsing%3A %22In about two weeks the ground will be covered with grass%2C making a splendid fodder for the horses of the Chinese partisans%2C whose movements from place to place then becoming unimpeded by the burdens of forage%2C will be swift. The woods will be clothed with foliage%2C which will hide Chinese soldiers from the eyes of Japanese aerial scouts%2C and afford places of ambush.%22 J. B. Powell reports that on operations into Kirin during spring and summer%2C %22Owing to the mountainous and timbered nature of the country that Japanese could not use their artillery or tanks%2C while the airbombing raids proved futile due to the impossibility of the aviators scattering the Chinese forces. The Japanese troops were subjected to continuous guerrilla warfare at the hands of the Chinese troops which were familiar with the terrain.%22 The country folk of the Northeastern Provinces%2C growing soybeans and wheat as cash crops%2C derived most of their own sustenance from kiaoliang%2C utilizing its coarse%2C pea-sized grains as food and a source of brewed liquor while stoking their fires with its stalks%3B where-ever there existed settled habitation in the region%2C summer raised up thick fields of this %22species of millet or broom-corn with the seed at the top which grows to a height of eight or ten feet%2C sufficient to hide a small army%2C%22 J. B. Powell wrote%2C reporting that Lt. Gen. Honjo%2C commander of the Kwantung Army %22forbade the Chinese farmers from planting kiaoliang within a certain distance of the tracks of the various Manchurian railways%2C the Japanese war-lords apparently realizing that the kiaoliang crop would facilitate the activities of the Chinese loyalists and in this regard they were entirely correct for the activities of the Chinese loyalists did increase during the summer and has kept on increasing in geometric progression since.%22 Even where the immediate vicinity of railway stations and track was laid bare by execution of these orders%2C kiaoliang fields enabled substantial partisan bodies to operate in the very heart of the %22S. M. R. Zone%22 itself during summer. Josef Franz reported from Changchun that after an attack against that city on August 1%2C 1932%2C %22the aerial scouting%2C carried out the next day%2C could not reveal much%2C since the rebels appeared to be hiding in the kiaoliang now in full growth.%22 And P. S. Yin exulted that %22Japanese aeroplanes and cannon are of very little use%22 against partisan forces concealed in the grain%2C who themselves %22could attack the Japanese forces unseen.%22 Nor were significant operational difficulties owing purely to climate confined to the bitter cold and snow of winter. When Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s bands managed near the start of July 1932 to evade %22a large-scale enveloping movement%22 by Japanese forces%2C The China Weekly Review reported%2C %22The failure of General Honjo%92s plan is attributed the fact that the tanks %5Bactually armor cars%5D and aeroplanes upon which he depended were rendered ineffective by the heavy rain during the last few days%2C%22 even prior to the August inundations%2C which soon would halt all military operations in the area%2C and cause a loss %22due to crumbling of Chinese mud houses%2C loss of standing crops and washing away of farmlands%22 that reverend Leonard reported %22runs into many millions of dollars.%22%0D%0A%0D%0AWhile their flexible structure and command%2C and the myriad covers provided by the country%2C enabled the partisan bands to operate effectively%2C obtaining supplies needed to maintain their combat effectiveness proved extremely difficult. Not infrequently partisan supplies of ammunition gave out entirely in the heat of battle. C. Y. W. Meng was told by one delegate from the Courageous Citizens Militia that %22having exhausted our ammunition%2C we resorted to a hand-to-hand fight with the invaders%22 when Japanese troops drove into the hills west of Chinchow at the end of February 1932. The endemic shortage of ammunition afflicting the partisan forces greatly aggravated the disparity in firepower between them and the Japanese%3A %22Although our enemies are profuse in shooting%2C%22 said Josef Franz%92s north Kirin informant%2C %22we now shoot only occasionally%2C with good aim%2C counting the bullets.%22 E. U. Barung considered it the supreme obstacle facing the partisans of the Northeastern Provinces that %22they have no arsenals which would have supplied them with the continuous flow of arms and ammunition%3B in this respect they had to depend upon the supplies coming from China Proper --- a hazardous and unreliable mode of supply.%22 According to the Lytton report%2C %22the main lines of communication which still exist between China Proper and the Chinese forces in Manchuria run through Jehol%2C%22 while it was the commissioners%92 opinion that %22old Kirin%22 forces on the Lower Sungari%2C at least in the early part of 1932 %22seemed to have maintained some contact with headquarters at Pieping%2C whence they received some support from time to time.%22 These tenuous connections hardly constituted a national or even military mode of supply%3B they in fact amounted to a thriving black market of cut-throat smugglers and unscrupulous merchants in which%2C Josef Franz was told by his guerrilla leader informant in north Kirin%2C %22Nobody gives arms%2C ammunition%2C clothing%2C food%2C to poor volunteers.%22 Though denouncing %22simple and pure banditry%2C%22 and claiming himself to have been a shop-keeper in more peaceful days%2C he stated emphatically the kidnappings he carried out while wrecking trains on the Chinese Eastern Railway %22can%92t be helped --- we must have rich prisoners and we must have big ransoms for them. War requires funds%2C you know.%22 The exigencies experienced by partisan bands in obtaining supplies produced such a tangling of patriotism and outlawry that%2C even as China was being swept over amid violent enthusiasm to a boycott of Japanese and Manchukuo goods%2C enforced by wildly popular vigilantism against the %22traitor%22 who sought to import or sell them%2C Josef Franz was told by a fur-trader on the Jehol border that %22For a few pistols or bullets a Volunteer group will deliver a nice lot of goods from up here%2C and it really doesn%92t cost much more than the old transportation plus border %91squeeze.%92%22 When partisan forces seized a town%2C the force which had initially been capable of ejecting the garrison frequently became vulnerable to even an unsupported counter-attack by them%2C due to the band%92s having dissolved into riotous plundering in the interim%2C as at Yaomin on the C. E. R. spur-line between Changchun and Harbin%2C where on September 10%2C 1932%2C %221%2C000 %91bandits%92 surprised the %91Manchukuo%92 garrison%2C%22 J. B. reported%3A %22They drove out the garrison and for two hours the looting and fighting went on. The garrison answered the attack and eventually repulsed the marauders.%22 Nevertheless%2C partisan leaders had little choice but to conduct their operations with an eye towards acquisition of loot as much as military utility%2C regardless of the extra dangers this might subject their forces to%2C or the possible harm to the popular support so necessary for successful guerrilla operations which might result. P. S. Yin lamented that %22many must be led into the belief that the Volunteers must be composed of bandits%2C beggars%2C and other undesirable characters%2C%22 but as the summer of 1932 drew to a close%2C it was becoming nearly impossible to draw a meaningful distinction between patriot and outlaw in the Northeastern provinces%3A J. B. Powell reports of a raid on September 11 by %22Chinese Volunteers %28or %91bandits%92%29%22 on the C. E. R. tracks between Changchun and Harbin that %22After the derailing the bandits fell upon the train and robbed the survivors%2C kidnapping some of them%2C including five Japanese%2C presumably for ransom%2C%22 and cites %22the Japanese press%22 to the effect that%2C in mid-October%2C %22Before leaving Antachen %5Bwest of Harbin on the C. E. R. mainline%5D the anti-Manchukuo forces are said top have forced the merchants of the city to give half a million dollars %5B%24U.S. 100%2C000%5D to them%2C while they confiscated every horse in sight.%22%0D%0A%0D%0ANecessities of life%2C not just of combat%2C became increasingly difficult for the partisans to obtain as the conflict wore on. %22They eat the grain of the peasants that can%92t be sold now anyhow%2C%22 Josef Franz was told of the partisans in the Jehol borderlands%2C %22and%2C since where they operate there are no tax collectors%2C the peasants are not much worse off%2C%22 but there remained little stored food to be commandeered in the villages after the wholesale exactions levied on them during spring and summer of 1932%2C while the many fields left unplanted due to economic dislocation and farmer%92s resort to war or banditry%2C combined with the destruction of standing crops to clear fields of fire or in the course of battle where they served as shelter%2C greatly reduced the harvest to be gathered come autumn. Shortages were particularly acute on the lower Sungari and in Heilungkiang after the devastation wrought by the August flooding. When Gen. Ma Chun-shen%92s bands emerged from their fastnesses in the wooded Little Hsingan Mts. On the Amur River%2C venturing south again onto the sodden plain in early September%2C while J. B. Powell relates that %22Reports reaching Pieping during the week indicated that the Heilungkiang troops and the Volunteers are being supplied with provisions by the people%2C%22 it is hardly to be imagined this was done willingly%2C and soon enough there simply was nothing left to seize. %22Gen. Ma%92s men are now subsisting on horse-flesh and are using the bones for fuel%2C%22 according to %22a Chinese dispatch received at Nanking%22 in mid-November. While during the previous winter the partisans had enjoyed advantages of acclimatization and in many cases superior winter garb over the Japanese%2C this was now no longer true. Chiang Chou-shan%2C an emissary from the Heilungkiang guerrillas%2C told students and faculty at the National Normal University in Pieping on October 27 %22that at first they were well clothed%2C but as they frequently crossed the forests%2C their uniforms were soon torn. Their leather boots fared worst and had to be discarded for those made of horse-skins or pig-skins%2C%22 while J. B. Powell writes at the end of October with evident belief %22The Japanese reports say that many of the Volunteers are in a sorry plight owing to the shortage of winter clothing and food.%22 Widespread destruction of shelter by flood and battle exacerbated the bitter bite of winter%2C and just as privation and long exertion rendered the bodies of the partisan fighters more vulnerable to its extremities%2C so did hard usage without supplies for maintenance affect their equipment%3A according to a courier from Taheiho arrived at Nanking in December%2C %22The weather there is so cold that the rifles often fail to function%2C%22 requiring that they be discarded in favor of %22long spears.%22%0D%0A|2
3|2|Hey...I can%27t wait for part 2. N%2FT|drdon326||19:41:33|06/28/2003|[font size="1" color="#FF0000"]LAST EDITED ON Jun-28-03 AT 07:43 PM (ET)[/font][p]UHHH...Make that part 4|1
5|1|Thanks%2C Martin.|NYC||20:31:56|06/28/2003|I%27ve copied to read later.|0
6|1|Interesting|Lithos||21:46:55|06/28/2003|Thank you for posting this. %0D%0A%0D%0AYes%2C a lot of resemblance to Iraq.  The multiple nationalities%2C rampant regionalism%2C history of armed factionalism%2C xenophobia%2C the extreme disrespect and disdain to authority - especially outside authority%2C the presence of weapons%2C albeit small and medium arms%2C the lack of outside support %28though Syria seems to be under the charge of supplying aid and succor to the partisan movement in Iraq%29.%0D%0A%0D%0ASome differences to be sure.  This includes the lack of international support and recognition given the Manchukuo regime versus what will happen to the US installed puppet state.  Another is that in the case of China%2C the Japanese had to contend with the presence%2C though extremely impotent%2C of the Kuomingtang Armies operating from Hebei and Beijing.  There are no immediate external threats to the US forces in Iraq. %0D%0A%0D%0AIn the end%2C the partisan experience in the Manchukuo area proved only a nuisance to the Japanese garrison. The strategic effects came later during the vacuum created by the Japanese departure following WWII.  The CCP was able to effectively reachout to the partisans and thus outflanked the KMT%27s entrance back into the Man-Mon provinces. %0D%0A%0D%0AL-|0
11|2|Thank You%2C Mr. Lithos|The Magistrate||14:33:26|06/30/2003|[font size="1" color="#FF0000"]LAST EDITED ON Jun-30-03 AT 02:36 PM (ET)[/font][p]Your comments are%2C as always%2C very well informed. It is certainly true the partisan resistance in Manchuria proved%2C in the end%2C no more than a niusance. But this was not clear in the early period of it%3B particularly in the spring of 1932%2C many well informed observers felt the Kwantung Army faced a real prospect of defeat. Nor did it have to be no more than a nuisance%3B different actions by the Nationalist leadership could have produced a different result. Indeed%2C beyond that charming rogue Gen. Ma Chun-shen%2C what drew me to fascination with this matter was my wonder at the odd queiscence of Chiang Kai-shek in response to it.%0D%0A%0D%0AWhile there were sound military reasons for Chiang Kai-shek refraining from an open contest with Imperial Japan at that time%2C there were also things it would have been well within his power to do that might have greatly strengthened the partisan resistance. Neither of these are worth any discussion here in detail%2C because it does not seem to me Chiang Kai-shek%27s decision was based on any balancing of these different options. It is my conclusion Chiang Kai-shek rather welcomed the Kwantung Army%27s action%2C at least in so much as it destroyed the independent power of the %22Young Marshall%22 Chang Hseuh-liang.%0D%0A%0D%0AChiang Kai-shek%27s Northern Expedition%2C which established his Nationalist Party rule in Nanking%2C did not achieve the overthrow of war lords solely by open battle. Many were co-opted into his National Revolutionary Army. Once it was safe to do so%2C Chiang Kai-shek then crushed the independent power of these ally-subordinates. There was one%2C however%2C immune from this treatment%3A Chang Hseuh-liang in Manchuria. Neither political nor economic pressure could be effectively brought against him%2C and the great Japanese interests and garrison there rendered him immune from any military action by Chiang Kai-shek%2C for a Nationalist invasion of Manchuria before the %22Mukden Incident%22 would certainly have brought about violent collission with the Kwantung Army.%0D%0A%0D%0AThe Kwantung Army%27s attack on Manchuria immediately rendered Chang Hseuh-liang a powerless supplicant in relation to Chiang Kai-shek. Chang Hseuh-liang%2C although possessed of some quarter million soldiers at Peiping%2C had no means to maintain or pay them without assistance from Chiang Kai-shek%27s Nanking government%2C and ceased to be an independent power who could effectively challenge Chiang Kai-shek from any portion of Chinese soil. For this gain%2C Chiang Kai-shek would have been willing to endure much%2C for he attached the highest value to unifying all power in the nation under his personal leadership%2C feeling this an absolute pre-requisite for any action to restore China%27s greatness. The %22recovery%22 of Manchuria would have been a wildly popular goal for an initial crusade by a unified China.%0D%0A%0D%0AThis determination%2C of course%2C rather badly back-fire on him%2C over time. His inaction against Japan at this time allowed the Communist revolutionaries to raise the banner of patriotism and resistance to invasion%2C not just that of social revolution. This rendered them much more appealing to broad segments of the Chinese populace than they could otherwise have been. Chiang Kai-shek%27s continued insistence on destroying the Communist %22patriot rebels%22 during the ensuing years of Japanese expansion into northwest and northern China only exacerbated these feelings. When Chang Hseuh-liang and the remnant of his Northeastern Army were put to use against the Communists in northwest China after several years of exile%2C they proved unwilling to fight other Chinese for Chiang Kai-shek%2C and in the Sian Incident of late 1936%2C Chang Hseuh-liang managed by imprisoning Chiang Kai-shek while the later was on a poorly-judged inspection tour%2C to force him to an armistice with the Communists%2C and at least to declarations of a united front against the Japanese.|6
7|1|%22viscerally xenophobic patriotism%22|bemildred||00:32:15|06/29/2003|Please continue.|0
8|1|Well done%2C my learned friend|Jack Rabbit||13:36:27|06/29/2003|[font size="1" color="#FF0000"]LAST EDITED ON Jun-29-03 AT 01:38 PM (ET)[/font][p]It indeed resembles Iraq and will most likely bear an even more striking resemblence to Iraq in the coming months.  It also bears some similarities to that conflict that most occupies attention on this board.  Popular resistence and guerrilla warfare is something an occupying force should expect%2C anywhere.  It is almost the Newtonian reaction to the action of occupation.%0D%0A%0D%0AI would like to supplement your remarks with a theoretical work of historical importance%2C for those who may wish to view it.%0D%0A%5Bi%5D%0D%0A%5Blink%3Awww.marxists.org%2Freference%2Farchive%2Fmao%2Fworks%2F1937%2Fguerrilla-warfare%2F%7COn Guerrilla Warfare%5D%5B%2Fi%5D by Mao Tse-tung.%0D%0A|0
9|1|Thanks go to The Magistrate for this.|GrandmaBear||22:27:52|06/29/2003|I%27ve bookmarked it.%0D%0A%0D%0ADo you enjoy root beer%3F %0D%0A       %0D%0A%3Abeer%3A   You deserve one%2C after this effort.|0
10|2|Root Beer Is A Favorite Tipple%2C Ma%27am%2C Thank You|The Magistrate||23:36:59|06/29/2003|Dad%27s%2C or A%26W%2C are old favorites.%0D%0A%0D%0AThis was written several years ago%3B the effort was mostly a day%27s typing%2C for the thing resides on an elderly word-processor whose disc is unreadable by modern equipment. A sort of Edison cylinder....|9
12|3|The thing also resides on 23 pages that I just printed out...|R Hickey||09:26:37|07/01/2003|to read later on today.|10
13|1|An Excellent Treatise%2C My Friend|DoveTurnedHawk||14:44:38|07/01/2003|General Ma remains a fascinating individual.  I remember well your account of one of his battles some months ago.%0D%0A%0D%0AI am curious about your opinions regarding the current occupation of Iraq.  My feeling is that unless the criminal cabal enacts measures much harsher than could possibly be acceptable to morality and the global community%2C a steady flow of American deaths is inevitable due to the widespread dispersion of arms and munitions within the Iraqi community%2C many of whom will remain implacably hostile to any foreign power.%0D%0A%0D%0ADTH|0
26|2|Thank You%2C Mr. Hawk|The Magistrate||13:36:26|07/03/2003|[font size="1" color="#FF0000"]LAST EDITED ON Jul-03-03 AT 01:38 PM (ET)[/font][p]The prospects for a prolonged Iraqi resistance are excellent. Not only are small arms and light support weapons well dispersed among the populace%2C there are several organizations to give leadership and form to such activities. These extend beyond the Ba%27athist organization%2C and the Shia parties centered on the mosques. The tribal and clan structure of the culture is itself%2C in effect%2C a dispersed organization for resistance%2C and one which can rely on deep loyalties and mutual sacrifices in operations.%0D%0A%0D%0AThe most likely limiting factor is supply of munitions. Over time%2C bullets and grenades become much more critical a factor than the weapons themselves. Cartridges and rocket-propelled grenades cannot be manufacted easily and reliably under clandestine conditions. Supply will depend upon smuggling. This has long been an industry in its own right in Iraq%2C greatly expanded under the sanctions%2C Its existing pattern will tend to favor the Ba%27athists%2C as their territtory abuts Syria. Smuggling in the south%2C where the Shia are strongest%2C was mostly maritime%3A the border with Iran has long been militarized. However%2C it will not be difficult for the Iranians to open it from their side%2C and it is likely to be the policy of that government to do so for their Sia brothers.%0D%0A%0D%0AYou are correct that extremities of brutality in suppressing this resistance would quickly undermine any U.S. support for the venture. Given the degree of brutality exercised by Hussein%2C without ever succeeding in completely stamping out underground Shia organizations%2C it is hard to see such a policy succeeding with any speed%2C even if it were attempted. Military efforts at breaking the resistance will have to concentrate of choking off the smuggling of munitions into Iraq%2C and at protecting civil reconstruction efforts to restore and maintain electrical power. Both will prove difficult.|13
14|1|Well done - well researched |papau||15:02:23|07/01/2003|and a good read.%0D%0A%0D%0ANow for this old brain to absorb it all%21%0D%0A%0D%0Abut your point is well taken - the Bush folks - and our media - are counting a victory a bit early.|0
15|2|I%27d say they counted a victory in Iraq on|blm||20:34:48|07/01/2003|Sept. 11%2C 2001.|14
16|3|Yeah%2C If Not Before%21|DoveTurnedHawk||20:36:19|07/01/2003|Shrub has had a hard-on for Saddam ever since he tried to kill Shrub%27s daddy.%0D%0A%0D%0A%3Aeyes%3A%0D%0A%0D%0ADTH|15
25|3|Or maybe Dec. 12%2C 2000.|Jim Sagle||17:50:40|07/02/2003| |15
17|1|Yu skipped how to defeat a Guerilla War.|happyslug||22:28:05|07/01/2003|I read your piece and it was find and I notice you skipped how the Guerillas weere defeated.  That is understandable the defeat of every such war is unique but as that same time How to defeat guerillas is simple%2C you must deny them supplies.  %0D%0A%0D%0AFor Example we killed off the American Bison so that the Plain Indians had to surrender %28they had no food%29.  We also shut off their supply of guns and ammunition %28Which came from white settlements%29.   We went to War in 1812 to cut off the Supply of Guns and Ammunition to the Indians of the old Northwest.  i.e. no guns no ammo%2C no ability to fight.%0D%0A%0D%0AWe followed that pattern in the Philippines %28and the British did the same against the Boars%29 i.e. cut off supply and watch the guerillas die from want of food and ammo.%0D%0A%0D%0AIn Vietnam our biggest fights in Vietnam was to cut off the supply line from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.  We had out fleet cut of the shipments by boats in the early 1960s and when the North Vietnamese than went to the Mekong River valley for their Ho Chi Minh Trail %28The trail was more than the Mekong River%2C but that Valley was the key to its success%29 the fight shifted to the Mekong River and the roads from the Mekong to South Vietnam.%0D%0A%0D%0AGiven that the Mekong travels from China%2C than Laos%2C than Cambodia and only than into Vietnam%2C the Mekong opened a lot of possibilities to the North Vietnamese.   The western Border of Vietnam stopped at the mountainside that starts the Mekong Valley and as such the Mekong ran the whole length of Vietnam.  The North Vietnam could take any trail along the River to any point and than walk over the valley top into South Vietnam.   %0D%0A%0D%0AStopping this movement became the number one goal of the US Military%2C a goal it failed to achieve.  The US defeated every attempt to drive the US out Vietnam militarily BUT with the US%27s failure to cut off the supply the Guerillas kept on fighting.   The guerillas thus were %22Winning%22 as long as they had a source of supply.  The US refused to cut off the supply in Laos %28on the very real fear that it would bring in the Red Chinese%29 meant that the US was in a situation where it could not win %28for it could not cut off supply to the Guerillas%29 AND it could not be driven out %28We had the strength to defeat any such attempt%29.  Thus we bleed%2C fought a guerilla war%2C and waited for the time when the cost to stay in Vietnam exceeded our cost of leaving.   That happened in 1975 and the Conservatives in the US have never forgiven the US Congress for preferring to reduce US unemployment %28By shifting funds from the Military to peacetime work programs%29 over keeping the South Vietnam Government in power.%0D%0A%0D%0AThe same fate awaits the US in Iraq.   While Kuwait will not permit supplies from getting to the Iraqi Guerillas%2C I have much less faith in Saudi Arabia.   Syria may NOT give supplies %28and Turkey will NOT for it opposes the Kurds having any say in their own government least the Kurds in Turkey claim the same right%29.  %0D%0A%0D%0AThat leaves Iran%2C whose Western Rivers all flow into the Tigris %28Most of these rivers are dry part of the year%2C but the valleys can be used as roads%29.  Thus it is easy for Iran to supply Iraqi with arms the real issue is will Iran do so%3F%0D%0A%0D%0AIran has several good reason to do so%2C first it would keep the US troops occupied with fighting the Guerillas%2C second it would mean that the Iraqi oil could not get to market %28or at least reduce the amount of Iraqi oil that will get to market%29%2C third they can be helping their fellow Shiite Moslems.   All are good reasons%2C the only draw back is what will Bush do to stop the supplies from getting to the Iraqi guerillas%3F  %0D%0A%0D%0AUnlike North Vietnam%2C Iran does not have nuclear armed world power %28In Vietnam%27s case Red China%29 backing it.   No Country is saying that if the US invades Iran that Country will attack the US forces %28as Red China said during the Vietnam War%29.%0D%0A%0D%0AThus Iran%27s only defense is that it is the most heavily populated country on the Persian Gulf.  It may not be able to defeat a US invasion but can commit guerrilla activity in its own against our forces.  During WWII we had control of the southern Half of Iran%2C while the Old USSR controlled the Northern Half. We earned a lot of support by making sure the existing Government was kept on with some popular improvements.  For example we replaced the old Shah with his son%2C the Shah of Iran 1944-1979.   During this time period the US%2C the UK and the USSR made all the important decisions in Iran%2C but none of them wanted to fight a Guerilla war in Iran.  Thus all three left the country alone except to transport war goods through Iran%29.  In 1945 neither the USSR nor the US wanted the other to have Iran so both agree to pull out and leave the Shah and his ministers in charge %28It was these ministers we overthrow and made the Shah the absolute Ruler of Iran in 1954%29.%0D%0A%0D%0AWe made many improvements in Iran%2C for example we updated the Railroad system and the Road system %28to get supplies to the USSR during WWII%29.   Even with these benevolent acts %28and their were more for the benefit of the US and USSR than Iran%29 the Iranian people were slowly turning away from us during this time period %28i.e. WWII%29.   It was as much fear of getting caught in a Guerilla War in Iran as fear of the USSR that we agree to pull out of Iran %28The Former USSR probably thought along the same lines when they withdrew from northern Iran%29.  The situation was getting dicey in 1945.%0D%0A%0D%0ACould we fight a guerilla war in Iraq AND Iran%3F  Will Russia stand aside and leave us do it%3F While the Northern Border of modern Iran is Turkmenistan not the old USSR%2C Modern Russia can still get supplies to the Guerillas via Turkmenistan %28which it has a joint border treaty with%29 or even directly over the Caspian Sea %28which Russia borders%2C as does Turkmenistan and Iran%29.%0D%0A%0D%0AI do not see Russia going to war to stop an American Invasion of Iran%2C but I do seen them suppling guns and ammunition to Iran in such a scenario.  The US Military is already stretched to its limit%2C a guerilla war in IRan would be to much.   Thus an invasion of Iran is only possible if Russia decides NOT to permit any supply over its borders %28something I do not think Putin can do even if he wants to given the level of corruption in the former USSR today%29.  Thus Iran can rely on Russia for supplies if Iran is invaded by Bush.%0D%0A%0D%0AThus the dilemma for Iran%2C does it risk a US Invasion by supplying weapons to Iraqi guerillas%3F   Will the US invade anyway%3F %28I think yes%29.  Would it be better to supply the Iraqis just to keep the US occupied%3F   Given the above I see little risk for Iran %28and a lot of benefits%29 for them to support the Iraqi Guerillas .  It will NOT be open support%2C but supplies will continue to pour into Iraq%0D%0A%0D%0AFor a map of Iran%3A%0D%0Ahttp%3A%2F%2Feducation.yahoo.com%2Freference%2Fencyclopedia%2Fillus%2F1056520.htm|0
18|2|That Is How They Were Defeated%2C Sir|The Magistrate||22:44:40|07/01/2003|Lack of supply. This was compounded by a particularly brutal mopping-up%2C and the withdrawl of popular support in the face of both reprisal%2C and a desire for order as the lack of any hope for victory became apparent to the people.%0D%0A%0D%0AIn the end%2C in the current situation in Iraq%2C it will be lack of supply that most likely will come to cripple the resistance%3A the question is when. It may be some degree of supply can be maintained to Ba%27athist elements from Syria%2C and to Shi%27ite elements from Iran.%0D%0A%0D%0AWe probably do not have the forces in uniform to conduct a campaign on these lines in both Iraq and Iran. It would be arrant foolishness to attempt it%3A unfortunately%2C no foolishness can be put past the persons currently in office and directing policy.|17
19|3|The only modern guerilla war which was won militarily|Lithos||23:28:06|07/01/2003|Was I think Turkey over the Kurdish groups in the 1990%27s.  How it was done was how you said%2C the supply bases were cut off and the population cordoned off and isolated as part of a very ruthless campaign that did not respect human rights nor international treaty.  The Turkish Army also crossed frequently over the border into Northern Syria and Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish guerillas.  %0D%0A%0D%0ABut then it also didn%27t hurt the Turks that all of the neighbors in the affected region also were against Kurdish national groups and highly sympathetic to the Turkish maneuvers. They provided very little succor to the Kurdish guerillas. %0D%0A%0D%0AAnother analogy which might prove useful to Iraq would be the fall of the British Empire where the British were increasingly being fought by home grown national groups.  In the end%2C it was the drain of manpower and the budgetary concerns and not military defeat which caused the British government to relinquish many former colonies.  Aden%2C Malaysia both come to mind though there was some Soviet involvement in both cases. %0D%0A%0D%0AL-|18
20|4|Another Factor%2C Mr. Lithos|The Magistrate||01:44:23|07/02/2003|Is the degree to which the government suppressing guerrillas must take heed of domestic opinion among its own citizenry. This may well grow disinclined to support either casualties to the government forces%2C or great brutality by them.%0D%0A%0D%0AThis was certainly not a factor for the Japanese in Manchuria%3A the people%27s opinion mattered not at all%3B the Emperor%27s might have%2C but he learned little the Army did not tell him%2C and the Army cared nothing for its soldiers%27 lives%2C and did not scruple in the slightest at brutality.%0D%0A%0D%0AIn the Turkish case%2C the Turkic populace was inclined to despise and hate Kurds%2C and was not too free to express itself politically%2C if it had come to oppose the policy. In the English case%2C as in that of the U.S. in Viet Nam%2C popular unwillingness to support costs in blood and treasure%2C as well as disenchantment with brutality%2C played a real role in forcing disengagement.%0D%0A%0D%0AIn short%2C the thing is work for totalitarians%2C not democracies. These can manage it only if the population is sunk invincibly into rage.%0D%0A%0D%0AIt is an appalling sin against the principles of strategy to attempt what your tools cannot perform.|19
21|5|In short%2C to %22succeed%22 one must hide the stupidity of what one is doing. nt|bemildred||02:10:20|07/02/2003|.|20
22|6|Yes|Lithos||08:00:20|07/02/2003|Control over the media is essential.   This is why a free media is essential to a democracy.%0D%0A%0D%0AL-|21
23|5|Absolutely|Lithos||08:06:19|07/02/2003|The Japanese people were very supportive of the economic aspects of this war. As I recall they floated a very large bond to finance the operations of the Army in Manchuria. But they of course knew nothing of what was going on.  Even the 20%2C000 or so Japanese colonists who moved in during the 1930%27s were isolated from the events.%0D%0A%0D%0AThe main difference of course is the freedom of the media to report what is going on.  The Shinbun%27s of the 1930%27s%2C while extremely active in the reporting of events and who went so far as to fly private aircraft full of reporters over to Manchuria during the invasion%2C  of course only highlighted the bravery and nobleness of the Japanese Army.  There was no editorial opposition.%0D%0A%0D%0AL-|20
24|2|I highly doubt...|Darranar||17:30:46|07/02/2003|that Russia would supply weapons to the Iranians in the case of an American invasion.  No mainstream country like Russia would risk angering the US so badly.  Look at what happened to France and Germany%2C and they were only against war%2C they didn%27t help the USA%27s opponents.|17
27|3|off-topic followup -- what did happen to France%3F|qandnotq||15:37:44|07/03/2003|serious question.  i know that they got called all kinds of names.  and there was certainly a lot of bluster coming out of Washington.  but were there any true substantive penalties%3F%0D%0A|24