All you've done is recite a list of questions that embody the boilerplate talking points from the Heritage Foundation against renewables. None of them have any actual relevance to forming policy.
Since you apparently don't have any research behind your opinion on the issue, here are two points of departure. Check the bibliographies for more reading.
Abstract here:
http://www.rsc.org/publishing/journals/EE/article.asp?doi=b809990cFull article for download here:
http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/revsolglobwarmairpol.htmEnergy Environ. Sci., 2009, 2, 148 - 173, DOI: 10.1039/b809990c
Review of solutions to global warming, air pollution, and energy securityMark Z. Jacobson
Abstract
This paper reviews and ranks major proposed energy-related solutions to global warming, air pollution mortality, and energy security while considering other impacts of the proposed solutions, such as on water supply, land use, wildlife, resource availability, thermal pollution, water chemical pollution, nuclear proliferation, and undernutrition.
Nine electric power sources and two liquid fuel options are considered. The electricity sources include solar-photovoltaics (PV), concentrated solar power (CSP), wind, geothermal, hydroelectric, wave, tidal, nuclear, and coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. The liquid fuel options include corn-ethanol (E85) and cellulosic-E85. To place the electric and liquid fuel sources on an equal footing, we examine their comparative abilities to address the problems mentioned by powering new-technology vehicles, including battery-electric vehicles (BEVs), hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs), and flex-fuel vehicles run on E85.
Twelve combinations of energy source-vehicle type are considered. Upon ranking and weighting each combination with respect to each of 11 impact categories, four clear divisions of ranking, or tiers, emerge.
Tier 1 (highest-ranked) includes wind-BEVs and wind-HFCVs.
Tier 2 includes CSP-BEVs, geothermal-BEVs, PV-BEVs, tidal-BEVs, and wave-BEVs.
Tier 3 includes hydro-BEVs, nuclear-BEVs, and CCS-BEVs.
Tier 4 includes corn- and cellulosic-E85.
Wind-BEVs ranked first in seven out of 11 categories, including the two most important, mortality and climate damage reduction. Although HFCVs are much less efficient than BEVs, wind-HFCVs are still very clean and were ranked second among all combinations.
Tier 2 options provide significant benefits and are recommended.
Tier 3 options are less desirable. However, hydroelectricity, which was ranked ahead of coal-CCS and nuclear with respect to climate and health, is an excellent load balancer, thus recommended.
The Tier 4 combinations (cellulosic- and corn-E85) were ranked lowest overall and with respect to climate, air pollution, land use, wildlife damage, and chemical waste. Cellulosic-E85 ranked lower than corn-E85 overall, primarily due to its potentially larger land footprint based on new data and its higher upstream air pollution emissions than corn-E85.
Whereas cellulosic-E85 may cause the greatest average human mortality, nuclear-BEVs cause the greatest upper-limit mortality risk due to the expansion of plutonium separation and uranium enrichment in nuclear energy facilities worldwide. Wind-BEVs and CSP-BEVs cause the least mortality.
The footprint area of wind-BEVs is 2–6 orders of magnitude less than that of any other option. Because of their low footprint and pollution, wind-BEVs cause the least wildlife loss.
The largest consumer of water is corn-E85. The smallest are wind-, tidal-, and wave-BEVs.
The US could theoretically replace all 2007 onroad vehicles with BEVs powered by 73000–144000 5 MW wind turbines, less than the 300000 airplanes the US produced during World War II, reducing US CO2 by 32.5–32.7% and nearly eliminating 15000/yr vehicle-related air pollution deaths in 2020.
In sum, use of wind, CSP, geothermal, tidal, PV, wave, and hydro to provide electricity for BEVs and HFCVs and, by extension, electricity for the residential, industrial, and commercial sectors, will result in the most benefit among the options considered.
The combination of these technologies should be advanced as a solution to global warming, air pollution, and energy security.
Coal-CCS and nuclear offer less benefit thus represent an opportunity cost loss, and the biofuel options provide no certain benefit and the greatest negative impacts. THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS: RENAISSANCE OR RELAPSE? MARK COOPER SENIOR FELLOW FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
VERMONT LAW SCHOOL
D. CONCLUSION
The 1960s and 1970s may seem like ancient history, but the new proposed cohort of reactors
could easily be afflicted with the same problems of delay and cost overruns. Inherent characteristics
of large complex nuclear reactors make them prone to these problems. Reactor design is complex,
site-specific, and non-standardized. In extremely large, complex projects that are dependent on
sequential and complementary activities, delays tend to turn into interruptions. Inherent cost
escalation afflicts mega projects, a category into which nuclear reactors certainly fall.35
The endemic problems that afflict nuclear reactors take on particular importance in an
industry in which the supply train is stretched thin. Material costs have been rising and skilled labor
is in short supply. These one of a kind, specialized products have few suppliers. In some cases, there
is only one potential supplier for critical parts. Any increase in demand sends prices skyrocketing.
Any interruption or delay in delivery cannot be easily accommodated and ripples through the
implementation of the project.36
The severe difficulties of Finland’s Olkiluoto nuclear reactor being built by Areva SA, the
French state-owned nuclear construction firm, provide a reminder of how these problems unfold.37
Touted as the turnkey project to replace the aging cohort of nuclear reactors, the project has fallen
three years behind schedule and more than 50% over budget.38 The delay has caused the sponsors of
the project to face the problem of purchasing expensive replacement power; the costs of which they
are trying to recover from the reactor builder. The cost overruns and the cost of replacement power
could more than double the cost of the reactor.39
A description of the process by which the U.S. ended up with hundreds of reactors that were
“too expensive to build,” written in 1978, before the accident at Three Mile Island changed the
terrain of nuclear reactors in the U.S., bears an eerie resemblance to the past decade in the U.S.:
At the beginning of 1970, none of the plants ordered during the Great Bandwagon
Market was yet operating in the United States.
This meant that virtually all of the economic information about the status of light
water reactors in the early 1970s was based upon expectation rather than actual
experience. The distinction between cost records and cost estimation may seem
obvious, but apparently it eluded many in government and industry for years...
In the first half of this crucial 10-year period, the buyers of nuclear power plants had
to accept, more or less on faith, the seller’s claims about the economic performance
of their product. Meanwhile, each additional buyer was cited by the reactor
manufacturers as proof of the soundness of their product...The rush to nuclear
power had become a self-sustaining process...
There were few, if any, credible challenges to this natural conclusion. Indeed, quite
the contrary. Government officials regularly cited the nuclear industry’s analyses of
light water plants as proof of the success of their own research and development
policies. The industry, in turn, cited those same government statements as official
confirmation. The result was a circular flow of mutually reinforcing assertion that
apparently intoxicated both parties and inhibited normal commercial skepticism
about advertisements which purported to be analyses. As intoxication with promises
about light water reactors grew during the late 1960s and crossed national and even
ideological boundaries, the distinction between promotional prospectus and critical
evaluation become progressively more obscure.
From the available cost records about changing light water reactor capital costs, it is
possible to show that on average, plants that entered operation in 1975 were about
three times more costly in constant dollars than the early commercial plants
competed five years earlier. 40
The similarities between the great bandwagon market and the nuclear renaissance, and the
fact that utilities not only steadfastly refuse to accept the risk of cost overruns but also are
demanding massive taxpayer and ratepayer subsidies to build the next generation of reactors, should
give policy makers pause. The one major difference between the great bandwagon market and the
nuclear renaissance is that there has been an extensive challenge to the extremely optimistic cost
estimates of the early phase, a challenge from Wall Street and independent analysts. It may be
impossible to escape the uncertainty of cost estimation, but it is possible to avoid past mistakes.
Reflecting the poor track record of the nuclear industry in the U.S., the debate over the
economics of the nuclear renaissance is being carried out before substantial sums of money are spent.
Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, when the vendors and government officials monopolized the
preparation of cost analyses, today Wall Street and independent analysts have come forward with
much higher estimates of the cost of new nuclear reactors. And, because the stranglehold of the
vendors and utilities on analysis has been broken, the current debate includes a much wider range of
options.
As important as bad analysis was, it might have had little impact if it had not been combined
with another critical mistake. The nuclear reactor vendors had delivered a small number of reactors
at fixed prices and eaten massive cost overruns. After a few loss leaders were delivered, they shifted
tactics. Unwilling and unable to sustain those losses, as the Forbes article put it, the
Great Bandwagon Market was impelled by evangelisms, optimism and seemingly
irresistible economics... But the suppliers had learned their lesson. The new
generation of plants would be built under reimbursable-cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
Without that, the nuclear power program would probably have sputtered out in the
mid-Seventies, when cost lurched out of control.41
The contemporary policy debate takes the effort to insulate utilities from the high cost of
nuclear reactors even farther. In addition to a broad range of general subsidies and the cost plus rate
treatment, they are seeking large federal loan guarantees and treatment by state public utility
commissions that would grant preapproval and recovery of construction costs.
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/it/Documents/Cooper%20Report%20on%20Nuclear%20Economics%20FINAL%5B1%5D.pdf You might also want to investigate the potential for tapping into the Gulf Steam in the channel between Bermuda. The technologies for capturing that vast 24/7 resource are just now starting to roll out. Check the website of the Minerals Management Service on Alternative Offshore Energy. Florida has a 10 or 12 mile limit so it is your waters, but MMS has up to date information on the issue.