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Edited on Thu Dec-24-09 05:01 PM by Jeffersons Ghost
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMEAfghan Opium Survey: export value of Afghan opium is falling17 December 2009 - The potential gross export value of Afghanistan's opiates is down 18 per cent, from US$ 3.4 billion in 2008 to US$ 2.8 billion in 2009 - an equivalent of around a quarter of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). This is the main finding of the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009 issued today by UNODC. The decline can be attributed to less cultivation, lower production, lower prices and relatively higher GDP. In the survey, UNODC confirms that market forces are moving against the Afghan drugs trade as lower revenues and excess production have put a damper on supply. As already reported in September in the Summary Findings of the survey, in 2009 opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan decreased by 22 per cent, and production fell by 10 per cent (to 6,900 tons). The number of people involved in opium poppy cultivation (1.6 million) has dropped by one third, and the number of poppy-free provinces is up from 18 to 20. The information in the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009 is considerably more detailed than that in the Summary Findings . It includes new data, for example on heroin prices and counter-narcotics operations. Furthermore, the survey contains information on the methodology used, explaining how the information was derived. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/December/export-value-of-afghan-opium-is-falling.htmlThis is also a fascinating read:Afghan Opium Production Timeline1982-1991: Afghan Opium Production SkyrocketsAfghan opium production rises from 250 tons in 1982 to 2,000 tons in 1991, coinciding with CIA support and funding of the mujaheddin. Alfred McCoy, a professor of Southeast Asian history at the University of Wisconsin, says US and Pakistani intelligence officials sanctioned the rebels’ drug trafficking because of their fierce opposition to the Soviets: “If their local allies were involved in narcotics trafficking, it didn’t trouble CIA. They were willing to keep working with people who were heavily involved in narcotics.” For instance, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a rebel leader who received about half of all the CIA’s covert weapons, was known to be a major heroin trafficker. Charles Cogan, who directs the CIA’s operation in Afghanistan, later claims he was unaware of the drug trade: “We found out about it later on.” (Weaver 5/1996; Rosen 9/30/2001)
1984: Bin Laden Develops Ties with Pakistani ISI and Afghan Warlord
Bin Laden moves to Peshawar, a Pakistani town bordering Afghanistan, and helps run a front organization for the mujaheddin known as Maktab al-Khidamar (MAK), which funnels money, arms, and fighters from the outside world into the Afghan war. (Weaver 1/24/2000) “MAK nurtured by Pakistan’s state security services, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, the CIA’s primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Moscow’s occupation.” (Moran 8/24/1998) Bin Laden becomes closely tied to the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and greatly strengthens Hekmatyar’s opium smuggling operations. (Maurus and Rock 9/14/2001) Hekmatyar, who also has ties with bin Laden, the CIA, and drug running, has been called “an ISI stooge and creation.” (Erikson 11/15/2001)
Mid-1980s: ISI Head Regularly Meets with Bin Laden
According to controversial author Gerald Posner, ex-CIA officials claim that Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rahman, Pakistani ISI’s head from 1980 to 1987, regularly meets bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan. The ISI and bin Laden form a partnership that forces Afghan tribal warlords to pay a “tax” on the opium trade. By 1985, bin Laden and the ISI are splitting annual profits of up to $100 million a year. (Posner 2003, pp. 29)
Mid-1996-October 2001: Ariana Airlines Becomes Transport Arm of Al-Qaeda
In 1996, al-Qaeda assumes control of Ariana Airlines, Afghanistan’s national airline, for use in its illegal trade network. Passenger flights become few and erratic, as planes are used to fly drugs, weapons, gold, and personnel, primarily between Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Pakistan. The Emirate of Sharjah, in the UAE, becomes a hub for al-Qaeda drug and arms smuggling. Typically, “large quantities of drugs” are flown from Kandahar, Afghanistan, to Sharjah, and large quantities of weapons are flown back to Afghanistan. (Williams 11/18/2001) About three to four flights run the route each day. Many weapons come from Victor Bout, a notorious Russian arms dealer based in Sharjah. (Pasternak and Braun 1/20/2002) Afghan taxes on opium production are paid in gold, and then the gold bullion is flown to Dubai, UAE, and laundered into cash. (Farah 2/17/2002) Taliban officials regularly provide militants with false papers identifying them as Ariana Airlines employees so they can move freely around the world. A former National Security Council official later claims the US is well aware at the time that al-Qaeda agents regularly fly on Ariana Airlines, but the US fails to act for several years. The US does press the UAE for tighter banking controls, but moves “delicately, not wanting to offend an ally in an already complicated relationship,” and little changes by 9/11. (Williams 11/18/2001) Much of the money for the 9/11 hijackers flows though these Sharjah, UAE, channels. There also are reports suggesting that Ariana Airlines might have been used to train Islamic militants as pilots. The illegal use of Ariana Airlines helps convince the United Nations to impose sanctions against Afghanistan in 1999, but the sanctions lack teeth and do not stop the airline. A second round of sanctions finally stops foreign Ariana Airlines flights, but its charter flights and other charter services keep the illegal network running. (Williams 11/18/2001)
http://pressthat.wordpress.com/2007/06/10/afghan-opium-production-timeline/
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