Three days before the end of his Presidency, on January 17, 1961 President Eisenhower warned us against:
the acquisition of unwarranted influence… by the military-industrial complex: the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power (which) exists and will persist, (which) we must never let … endanger our liberties or democratic processes…
That farewell address has often been characterized as prophetic. However, it may just as well be characterized as a little too little and too late. James Douglass, in “
JFK and the Unspeakable”, says this about it:
Eisenhower himself never used the power of his presidency to challenge this new threat to democracy. He simply identified it in a memorable way when he was about to leave office. He thereby passed on the possibility of resisting it to his successor.
As luck would have it, his successor attempted the most heroic resistance to the Military-Industrial complex of any U.S. President in our history.
In a
previous post I discussed John F. Kennedy’s repeated efforts to keep our country out of a nuclear war by refusing under great pressure from his military and CIA to initiate or increase our military involvement in countries that would have inflamed tensions with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Specifically, I spoke about how he worked out a diplomatic rather than a military solution
for power sharing in Laos; his promotion of an
independent Congo; his four successful attempts to avoid an invasion of Cuba despite the persistent urging of his military to invade, including his refusal to use the U.S. military at the
Bay of Pigs in April 1961; his veto of
Operation Northwoods, a false flag operation devised by his military to serve as an excuse to invade Cuba; his refusal to invade Cuba during the
Cuban Missile Crisis; and his use of his military in the spring of 1963 to
combat CIA sponsored attacks on Cuba; his
plans for withdrawal from Vietnam prior to his untimely death later in 1963; his
refusal to accede to CIA plans to overthrow the leftist government of Indonesia; and his
plans for ending the Cold War.
Beyond that, Kennedy also resisted efforts of his military to draw him into a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union, which undoubtedly would have proved disastrous for both our countries. Americans should know a lot more about this than they do, if for no other reason than for obtaining a better understanding of just how dangerous our Military-Industrial Complex is, and inspiring them to stand less in awe of it, and focus more on resisting it instead.
Douglass discusses these efforts in his book, beginning with the July 21, 1961 National Security Council (NSC) meeting.
July 21, 1961 NSC meetingJames Galbraith, the son of Kennedy’s friend and ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, discussed the implications of the July 1961 NSC meeting in an article he co-authored, titled “
Did the U.S. Military Plan a Nuclear First Strike for 1963? – Recently declassified information shows that the military presented President Kennedy with a plan for a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union in the early 1960s”.
At that meeting, General Hickey, Chairman of the “Net Evaluation Subcommittee”, along with General Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA Director Allan Dulles, presented a plan for a first strike nuclear attack again the Soviet Union. In response, Kennedy raised a series of questions, including what would be the likely damage to the USSR and how long U.S. citizens would have to remain in fallout shelters following the attack.
Roswell Gilpatric, Kennedy’s Deputy Secretary of Defense,
describes how that meeting ended: “Finally Kennedy got up and walked right out in the middle of it, and that was the end of it”. Kennedy also remarked to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “
And we call ourselves the human race.”
Interim between the 1961 and September 1963 NSC meetingsIn August, 1961, East Germany began
building of the Berlin Wall. In October, Kennedy’s personal representative in Berlin, General Lucius Clay, tried to force a military confrontation over the wall, which eventually resulted in a
face off of American and Soviet tanks by October 27th. With both the Soviet and American leaders under intense pressure from their militaries not to back down, Kennedy used back channel negotiations with Khrushchev to
secure a compromise agreement (pp 259-60): If Khrushchev would withdraw his tanks, Kennedy would reciprocate a half hour later. Khrushchev agreed, withdrew his tanks, and Kennedy reciprocated as promised (This series of events foreshadowed a similar crisis resolution in the Cuban Missile Crisis about a year later). The intentions of General Clay were shortly revealed in an angry telegram,
in which he stated:
Today, we have the nuclear strength to assure victory at awful cost. It no longer suffices to consider our strength as a deterrent only and to plan to use it only in retaliation. No ground probes on the highway which would use force should or could be undertaken unless we are prepared instantly to follow them with a nuclear strike. It is certain that within two or more years retaliatory power will be useless…
Following Kennedy’s successful diplomatic resolution of the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962,
Kennedy told Arthur Schlesinger “The Military are mad. They wanted to do this (meaning an invasion of Cuba, possibly accompanied by a preemptive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union).
One month after that, the Joint Chiefs were pushing again for first-strike nuclear capability, sending a memo to Defense Secretary McNamara stating “The Joint Chiefs consider that a first-strike capability is both feasible and desirable”. McNamara
told Kennedy about this, adding that the Air Force was developing specific proposals “based on the objectives of developing a first-strike capability”. He recommended to Kennedy that this “should be rejected as a U.S. policy objective”. More specifically and ominously,
McNamara told Kennedy that what was at issue was whether the U.S. military should:
attempt to achieve a capability to start a thermonuclear war in which the resulting damage to ourselves and our Allies could be considered acceptable on some reasonable definition of the term.
September 12, 1963 NSC meetingAt the September 1963 NSC meeting, Kennedy’s military again tried to push him towards a nuclear first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. But this time, rather than stalking out of the meeting, Kennedy engaged his military in order to get a more exact idea of what they were up to. At least Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was on his side.
Here are some of the relevant excerpts from a summary of the meeting (See Summary Record of the 517th Meeting of the NSC):
PRES. KENNEDY: De Gaulle believes even the small nuclear force he is planning will be big enough to cause unacceptable damage to the USSR… Why do we need to have as much defense as we have if, as it appears, the strategy is based on the assumption that even if we strike first we cannot protect the security of the U.S. in nuclear warfare?
GEN JOHNSON: No matter what we do we can't get below 51 million casualties (to the United States) in the event of a nuclear exchange. We can, however, bring down this number by undertaking additional weapons programs.
PRES. KENNEDY: Doesn’t that get us into the overkill business?
GEN. JOHNSON: No, sir. We can cut down U.S. losses if we knock out more Soviet missiles by having more U.S. missiles and more accurate U.S. missiles. The more Soviet missiles we can destroy the less the loss to us…
Each of the strategies (recommended in the report) used against the USSR results in at least 140 million fatalities in the USSR. Our problem is how to catch more of the Soviet missiles before they are launched and how to destroy more of the missiles in the air over the U.S….
SEC. MCNAMARA: There is no way of launching a no-alert attack against the USSR which would be acceptable. No such attack… could be carried out without 30 million U.S. fatalities – an obviously unacceptable number… The President deserves an answer to his question as to why we have to have so large a force….
PRES. KENNEDY: I understand… Preemption is not possible for us. This is a valuable conclusion growing out of an excellent report…
GEN. JOHNSON: I would be very disturbed if the President considered this report indicated that we could reduce our forces and/or not continue to increase those programmed…
I have concluded from the calculations that we could fight a limited war using nuclear weapons without fear that the Soviets would reply by going to all-out war.
PRES. KENNEDY: I have been told that if I ever released a nuclear weapon on the battlefield, I should start a pre-emptive attack on the Soviet Union as the use of nuclear weapons was bound to escalate and we might as well get the advantage by going first…
The situation facing Kennedy in the fall of 1963Most of President Kennedy’s presidency was spent resisting pressure from his military and CIA to draw him into military confrontations that could easily have escalated into thermonuclear war.
It began very early in his Presidency, when his military and CIA presented him with plans left over from his predecessor’s administration to sponsor a group of Cuban exiles to invade Cuba. Kennedy’s CIA assured him that no direct U.S. military intervention would be required – that in response to the invasion of the Cuban exiles, the Cuban people would rise up and overthrow the Castro government. Kennedy reluctantly went along with the plan, making it clear that there would be no direct U.S. military intervention. The Cuban exiles, with CIA assistance, invaded Cuba on April 15, 1961. The CIA’s predictions or promises did not come to fruition – or more likely they simply lied about them in the first place. The Cuban people did not rise up. The Cuban exiles were quickly defeated and captured or killed. In response, the U.S. military chiefs and CIA strongly urged the President to use his military to rescue the situation. When he refused he earned himself the everlasting hatred of the Cuban exile community and his own military. When he fired his top CIA leaders he earned their hatred as well.
The discussion in this post can be seen in the same light. While not specifically recommending a date for a nuclear first-strike, Kennedy’s military repeatedly pushed for the development of first strike capability for nuclear war, while at the same time repeatedly trying to maneuver the President into military actions that would risk nuclear confrontation. But President Kennedy had learned his lesson from the Bay of Pigs fiasco and never again let his military maneuver him into a similar situation.
The cult of secrecy in the United StatesAll of this occurred without the knowledge of the American people. The false flag operation, “Operation Northwoods”, though planned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 for the purpose of inciting war against Cuba, was classified as “Top Secret”, and it didn’t come to the attention of the American people until approximately four decades later. Even then it received very little attention from our national news media, and consequently, few Americans have heard of it.
Whenever our government wishes to withhold information from the American people, it simply plays the “national security” card. But it is rarely about national security. Rather, the “national security” excuse has been routinely used by our government to avoid embarrassment or criminal liability. Preemptive war is not only a war crime, it has
been defined as the worst war crime of all, in that “It is the supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole”. Yet, whenever our government commits itself to war it plays the “national security” card so that its motives for war cannot be evaluated by its own citizens.
Had President Kennedy allowed his military to dictate policy during the window of time during which they felt that they had the nuclear superiority to conduct a “successful” nuclear war against the Soviet Union, it is very possible that the worst crime in the history of the world would have been perpetrated upon humanity. We’re talking about the deaths of at least 140 million innocent Soviet citizens and 30 million innocent Americans. But it’s a lot worse than it sounds on the surface. Life likely would have been a living hell for many or most of the survivors, with much of our agricultural lands ruined, much of our food, water and air contaminated with nuclear fallout and our economy in shambles. But undoubtedly the perpetrators would have made arrangements for some sort of golden parachute before they went ahead with their scheme.
As citizens of a democracy we should know about these things. One could counter that statement by noting that if a preemptive strike against a foreign nation is made public knowledge, then that would destroy our strategic military advantage. But why should we have to wait several decades to hear about it? And in any event, this would have been an atrocity of the first magnitude and resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of Americans. We the American people have a right to weigh in on such matters.
Lessons for todayThe Neoconservative elites of today are the equivalent of the military/CIA cabal in the Kennedy administration that repeatedly tried to maneuver him into war. What if Seymour Hersh hadn’t
exposed the Bush/Cheney administration’s plans to start a war with Iran? That exposure angered large portions of the American public, and in so doing may have prevented another catastrophic war. Certainly Bush or Cheney weren’t about to tell us about their plans until they had their ducks lined up and ready to go.
The American people need to know about the policies and actions of their government – past and present. Without such knowledge we lack that ability to assess or have meaningful input into what our government does in our name, and we lack the ability to learn from past mistakes. James Galbraith and Heather Purcell sum up their article with:
In any event, the fact that first-strike planning got as far as it did raises grave questions about the history of the Cold War. Much more needs to be known: about nuclear decision-making… about the events of late 1963, about later technical developments… Surely it is now time to declassify all records on this and related history.
If that recommendation is valid with regard to the events of 1960 – and it is – then it is all the more relevant to later events, and especially to current events of great national and international importance.
The “national security” excuse for withholding crucial information from the American public on the sole decision of the President of the United States is a recipe for tyranny. Furthermore, historically it has cost us far more than it has helped us – resulting in the creation of enemies around the world through the assassination of leaders considered unfriendly to corporate interests, the
overthrow of foreign governments, and the
invasion of sovereign nations under false pretenses. If not for a multitude of illegal and immoral acts performed by the U.S. government in secrecy or hidden under cover of secret machinations, we would by now have much less need for wasting nearly a trillion dollars annually on military expenditures, having progressed much further towards the
goals of the United Nations:
To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war… to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life…