violated Montejo's rights, they sent it back so that a hearing could be had on whether Edwards applies.
Gee, Stevens was upset that the legal precedent he established in Michigan v. Jackson has been rejected, guess no one is above getting their ego bruised.
Again, stop with relying on another's interpretations of the case and read the case and use it to support your position. If you do that, you may better understand what was held.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-1529.pdfA
It is worth emphasizing first what is not in dispute or at stake here. Under our precedents, once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all “critical” stages of the criminal proceedings. United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 227–228 (1967) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 57 (1932) . Interrogation by the State is such a stage. Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 204–205 (1964) ; see also United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, 274 (1980) .
Our precedents also place beyond doubt that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285 , n. 4 (1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 404 (1977) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938) . The defendant may waive the right whether or not he is already represented by counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be counseled. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 352–353 (1990) . And when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick, even though the Miranda rights purportedly have their source in the Fifth Amendment:
“As a general matter … an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in Miranda … has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.” Patterson, supra, at 296.
The only question raised by this case, and the only one addressed by the Jackson rule, is whether courts must presume that such a waiver is invalid under certain circumstances. 475 U. S., at 630, 633. We created such a presumption in Jackson by analogy to a similar prophylactic rule established to protect the Fifth Amendment based Miranda right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981) , decided that once “an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation … is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available,” unless he initiates the contact. Id., at 484–485.
The Edwards rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,” Harvey, supra, at 350. It does this by presuming his postassertion statements to be involuntary, “even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 177 (1991) . This prophylactic rule thus “protect(s) a suspect’s voluntary choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s presence.” Texas v. Cobb, 532 U. S. 162, 175 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
~snip~
Montejo understandably did not pursue an Edwards objection, because Jackson served as the Sixth Amendment analogy to Edwards and offered broader protections. Our decision today, overruling Jackson, changes the legal landscape and does so in part based on the protections already provided by Edwards. Thus we think that a remand is appropriate so that Montejo can pursue this alternative avenue for relief. Montejo may also seek on remand to press any claim he might have that his Sixth Amendment waiver was not knowing and voluntary, e.g., his argument that the waiver was invalid because it was based on misrepresentations by police as to whether he had been appointed a lawyer, cf. Moran, 475 U. S., at 428–429. These matters have heightened importance in light of our opinion today.
We do not venture to resolve these issues ourselves, not only because we are a court of final review, “not of first view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709 , n. 7 (2005), but also because the relevant facts remain unclear. Montejo and the police gave inconsistent testimony about exactly what took place on the afternoon of September 10, 2002, and the Louisiana Supreme Court did not make an explicit credibility determination. Moreover, Montejo’s testimony came not at the suppression hearing, but rather only at trial, and we are unsure whether under state law that testimony came too late to affect the propriety of the admission of the evidence. These matters are best left for resolution on remand.
We do reject, however, the dissent’s revisionist legal analysis of the “knowing and voluntary” issue. Post, at 10–14. In determining whether a Sixth Amendment waiver was knowing and voluntary, there is no reason categorically to distinguish an unrepresented defendant from a represented one. It is equally true for each that, as we held in Patterson, the Miranda warnings adequately inform him “of his right to have counsel present during the questioning,” and make him “aware of the consequences of a decision by him to waive his Sixth Amendment rights,” 487 U. S., at 293. Somewhat surprisingly for an opinion that extols the virtues of stare decisis, the dissent complains that our “treatment of the waiver question rests entirely on the dubious decision in Patterson,” post, at 12. The Court in Patterson did not consider the result dubious, nor does the Court today.