Page 8/172 about Cheneys August 26th, 2002 claim that Iraq was pursuing nuclear program.
According to a DIA report, the intelligence community continued to assess that it would take five to seven years from the commencement of a revived nuclear program for the Iraqi government to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This same report repeated the assessment that a nuclear weapon could be constructed much faster
if adequate fissile material was acquired from a foreign source, though an earlier CIA assessment noted that
“we have not detected a dedicated Iraqi effort to obtain fissile material abroad.Thus the need to invent the “yellow cake” story.page16-17/172 Conclusion to Statements given by Cheney and others regarding Nuclear Weapons.
Conclusions(U) Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community.
Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while others disagreed
or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that reconstitution was not
underway, and the Department of Energy, which argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program.
39 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002.
15
Postwar Findings
(U)
Postwar findings revealed that Iraq ended its nuclear weapons program in 1991, and that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively declined after that date.The Iraq Survey Group (ISO) found
no evidence that Saddam Hussein ever attempted to restart a nuclear weapons program, although the Group did find that he took steps to retain the intellectual capital generated during the program. That intellectual capital decayed between 1991 and 2003, however, and the ISO found
no evidence that the relevant scientists were involved in renewed weapons work.(U) Postwar findings confirmed that the high-strength aluminum tubes sought by Iraq had been intended for a conventional rocket program, and found
no evidence that other dual-use technologies (magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools) were intended for
use in a nuclear weapons program. Various ongoing activities at former nuclear sites were apparently
unrelated to any weapons program, and construction observed at the al-Tahadi highvoltage and electromagnetic facility also had no apparent connection to any nuclear weapons
program.(U)
Postwar surveys found no evidence that Iraq sought uranium from any foreign sources after 1991. http://emptywheel.firedoglake.com/2008/06/05/phase-ii-report-working-thread/