Democratic Underground Latest Greatest Lobby Journals Search Options Help Login
Google

WHO GOT WATERBOARDED AND WHY: What Tortured Detainees Had In Common

Printer-friendly format Printer-friendly format
Printer-friendly format Email this thread to a friend
Printer-friendly format Bookmark this thread
This topic is archived.
Home » Discuss » Archives » General Discussion (1/22-2007 thru 12/14/2010) Donate to DU
 
leveymg Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Dec-14-07 02:16 PM
Original message
WHO GOT WATERBOARDED AND WHY: What Tortured Detainees Had In Common
Edited on Fri Dec-14-07 02:51 PM by leveymg
The ongoing controversy over the destruction of CIA torture tapes raises several more unanswered questions. The answers call into question the very basis of the Bush Administrations so-called Global War on Terrorism.

Why did the CIA erase the tapes of the waterboarding of two of three particular high-value detainees? Why wasn't the waterboarding of a third, Khalid Sheihk Mohammed, videotaped?

Why were these three waterboarded but not 9 others who were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques? Why were these 12 tortured out of the nearly 100 prisoners the CIA acknowledges it has held in secret custody around the world? What characteristics or experiences do those who received the worst torture have in common? Answer: An al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, January 5-8, 2000, and how the CIA dealt with it.

What is it about the water board that made it reserved for only this special few? Was the most extreme physical torture merely to extract information from those who had resisted other measures, or was there another reason why water boarding was applied to three particular individuals Abu Zubaydah, Hambali, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed? Again, the common thread goes back to Kuala Lumpur. See, http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.ph...

***

NBC News yesterday identified three al-Qaeda figures who Bush Administration sources admit were water boarded, a form of torture involving partial-drowning. A fourth detainee is also identified as having been threatened with water boarding, but broke down to CIA interrogators before being immersed. That report states: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20752717 /

Among those subjected to the enhanced techniques are operatives responsible for the attacks on the East Africa embassies in 1998, the USS Cole in 2000, and the September 11 attacks. The interrogations took place at secret U.S. prisons in eastern Europe and north Africa.

The three subjected to water boarding were viewed as al-Qaida operatives with real-time information on terrorist planning:

Abu Zubaydah, al Qaedas so-called dean of students at Afghan training camps who provided travel arrangements and accommodations to recent camp graduates;
Khalid Sheik Mohammed, mastermind of 9-11; and the man who killed Daniel Pearl; and
Hambali, the Indonesian terrorist responsible for the Bali bombings in December 2002 that killed more than 200, including five Americans.

SNIP

A fourth high ranking al-Qaida member, Ramzi bin al Shibhorganizer of the Hamburg cell that was the core of the 9-11 attacksagreed to talk with just the threat of water-boarding, said the officials.



WHY WERE THEY CHOSEN?

According to NBC:

Two of the threeKSM and Hambaliwere chosen for water boarding because they were resistant to other interrogation methodsone, Zubaydah, because he initially told the CIA of an impending attack, then refused to discuss it, according to two officials.


Thats as much as government officials will say, and the major media has thus far reported. But, who are these four, what did they have in common, and what might this tell us about their selection.

Kalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM)(aka, Mukhta The Brain)
KSM is by far the most notorious figure known to the public of this group. He is credited with being the mastermind of the 9/11 attack, and was the central organizer of the Planes Operation that resulted in the deaths of some 3,000 people at the WTC, the Pentagon, and a crash site in Pennsylvania. KSM was water boarded repeatedly in a secret CIA detention before being transferred to Guantanamo Bay with 14 other high value detainees.
KSM dispatched four of seven al-Qaeda operatives who met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia during January 5-8, 2000. That group mapped out the details of what would be the 9/11 attack and the bombing of the USS Cole. In attendance at that planning summit were the following individuals:

Ramzi bin al Shibh (Mohamed Attas roommate in Hamburg, captured 05/2003 Karachi, threatened with waterboarding, moved to Guatanamo Bay in 09/2006)

Hambali (local host, Jemaah Islamiya Operations Chief, captured Thailand, waterboarded in Thailand, moved to Guatanamo Bay in 09/2006)

Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar (the two principal Flt. 77 hijackers, observed by CIA as they traveled to Thailand on way to US on 01/15/2000, deceased 09/11/2001)

Muhammad Salih bin Attash (aka,Khallad, key al-Qaeda trainer, accompanied Hazmi and Midhar to Thailand after they left Kuala Lumpur, captured 08/2003 in Pakistan, tortured in CIA Dark Prison, Afghanistan, moved to Guantanamo Bay in 09/2006)

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (The second al-Qaeda figure whose interrogation tape Hayden claims the Agency destroyed in 2005 is Abd al-Rahom al-Nashiri, allegedly al-Qaedas planning chief for the Persian Gulf. Named as key plotter in USS Cole attack, captured in UAE in November, 2002, waterboarded, moved to Guatanamo Bay in 09/2006)

Fahad Al-Quso (originally assigned to video the 10/2000 attack on the USS Cole, shortly thereafter Quso admits under questioning by the FBI his ties to bin Attash and details about the Kuala Lumpur summit. The FBI unit investigating the Cole requests information possessed by the CIA about that attack, but Agency withholds key information that would have tied the Cole plotters to the 9/11 attack cell, see, http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a10... . Quso is tortured by the CIA, moved to Guatanamo in 09/2006).

In addition, Abu Zubaydah, the second individual whose CIA torture tapes are said to have been erased, is alleged to have been al-Qaedas chief recruiter and the field commander of the attack on the USS Cole that was planned in Kuala Lumpur. Zubayadah was the first major AQ figure captured in Pakistan in 03/2002, and was waterboarded.

As we see, above, all four of those waterboarded (or threatened) and both of those whose CIA interrogation tapes are said to have been erased, either planned, attended, or trained al-Qaeda operatives present at the Kuala Lumpur planning meeting. What might be significant to the CIA about that particular event? Paul Thompsons 9/11 Timeline gives us a plethora of reasons why the CIA would give particular attention to those who attended: http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a01...

January 4-6, 2000: CIA Prevents FBI from Learning about Hijackers US Visa; Other CIA Agents Are Deliberately Misled about This

The CIA has been tracking Khalid Almihdhar as he travels to Malaysia for the al-Qaeda summit that starts on January 5, 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000). The CIA has just received a photocopy of his passport that shows he has a valid visa to travel to the US (see January 2-5, 2000). But they deliberately prevent the FBI from learning about this visa. On January 4, a CIA cable containing the photocopy is sent from the CIAs Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, office to Alec Station, the CIAs bin Laden unit. An FBI agent named Doug Miller assigned to the unit sees the cable and drafts a memo requesting the required permission from the CIA to advise the rest of the FBI that one participant in the Malaysia summit would likely be traveling soon to the US.

Miller further writes that Almihdhars visa indicates he will be traveling to New York City and that he has been connected to the 1998 embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998 and October 4, 2001) and the monitored al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Late 1998-Early 2002). He also writes that photos of Almihdhar have been obtained and will be sent as well. However, a headquarters desk officer tells him that a deputy unit chief, Tom Wilshire, does not want it sent yet, and that, This is not a matter for the FBI.

Several hours later, this desk officer writes a cable that is distributed only within the CIA. It is sent the next day and claims that Almihdhars visa documents were shared with the FBI. This officer will later admit she didnt personally share the information with the FBI either, and the 9/11 Commission will not be able to find anyone in the CIA who did share it with the FBI.

A week later, Miller follows up by sending his rejected memo to Wilshire. Miller asks, Is this a no go or should I remake it in some way? He never gets an answer and drops the matter.

The Justice Departments Office of Inspector General will later call the failure to pass the information to the FBI a significant failure but will be unable to determine why the information was not passed on.

In 2002, CIA Director George Tenet will allude to e-mails he claims prove the information about the visa is passed to the FBI around this time. However, the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry and 9/11 Commission fail to find any evidence of these e-mails. The FBI claims it never received any such e-mails.

Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Tom Wilshire, Alec Station, Doug Miller, Khalid Almihdhar
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar

January 5, 2000: CIA Warns Other Intelligence Agencies that Almihdhar Has Visa to US, but Lies about FBI Knowledge of This

The CIA had just learned that hijacker Khalid Almihdhar not only is travelling to an al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia, but also has a visa to travel to the US (see January 2-5, 2000). Alec Station, the CIAs bin Laden unit, sends a cable to a number of friendly intelligence agencies around the world, saying, We need to continue the effort to identify these travelers and their activities to determine if there is any true threat posed. The cable also says that Almihdhars travel documents have been given to the FBI. But in fact the FBI does not know about the visa, and Alec Station is clearly aware that the FBI does not know (see January 4-6, 2000). <9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 6 ; WRIGHT, 2006, PP. 311>

The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the weight of available evidence does not support that the FBI was told about the visa. <9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 6 >

Entity Tags: 9/11 Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar, Alec Station, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
January 5, 2000: Malaysian Intelligence Only Videotapes First Day of Al-Qaeda Summit, 9/11 Hijackers Videotaped with Hambali

Acting on the behalf of the CIA, Malaysian intelligence videotapes the attendees of an al-Qaeda summit. Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will later claim that the attendees were videotaped by a Malaysian surveillance team on January 5, 2000.

But this is only the first of four days of meetings, all held at the same location (see January 5-8, 2000), and the attendees are secretly photographed on the other days (see January 6-9, 2000). The Los Angeles Times will similarly note that Malaysian intelligence made a single surveillance videotape that shows men arriving at the meeting, according to a US intelligence official. The tape, he said, has no sound and viewed as very significant at the time.

The contents of the videotape remain murky, but one account claims Ramzi bin al-Shibh was one of the attendees videotaped at the summit. Further, a US Treasury press release in 2003 will state that was videotaped in a January 2000 meeting in Malaysia with two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers of AA Flight 77 - Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi.

US intelligence officials consider the summit so important that CIA Director George Tenet, FBI Director Robert Mueller, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, and other high-ranking officials are given daily briefings about it while it is taking place (see January 6-9, 2000). So it is unclear why only the first day would be videotaped and why such video would not be considered more important. Malaysia will give the CIA a copy of the tape about one month after the summit ends (see February 2000). By 1999, the FBI had connected Hambali to the 1995 Bojinka plot and also obtained a photo of him (see May 23, 1999). Yet the CIA will not share this video footage with the FBI nor will they warn Malaysian intelligence about Hambalis Bojinka plot connection (see Shortly After January 8, 2000).

Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Khalid Almihdhar, Malaysian Secret Service, Hambali
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Hambali, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Remote Surveillance, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
January 5-8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Discusses 9/11 and Cole Plots; CIA Has Malaysians Monitor It



Attendees of the Malaysian summit. Top row, from left: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Middle row, from left: Khallad bin Attash, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Hambali. Bottom row, from left: Yazid Sufaat, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Fahad Al-Quso. About a dozen of bin Ladens trusted followers hold a secret, top-level al-Qaeda summit in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed.

At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the summit and then passes the information on to the US (see January 6-9, 2000). Attendees of the summit are said to include:

Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar.

The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence at this summit. The CIA already knows many details about these two by the time the summit begins (see January 2-4, 2000), and tracked Almihdhar as he traveled to it (see January 2-5, 2000).

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), a top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known KSM is an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January 1995 (see January 6, 1995), and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only realized the summit was important in the summer of 2001, but the presence of KSM should have proved the its importance. Although the possible presence of KSM at this summit is highly disputed by US officials, one counterterrorism expert will testify before the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of KSMs interrogations since his capture, and that KSM has admitted leading this summit and told the attendees about a planes as weapons plot targeting the US (see July 9, 2003). Many other media reports identify him there as well. For instance, according to Newsweek, Mohammeds presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatchedand had photographs of the attacks mastermind doing the plotting.

An Indonesian militant known as Hambali, or Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin. He was heavily involved in the Bojinka plot, an early version of the 9/11 plot (see January 6, 1995 and June 1994). The FBI was aware of who he was and his connections to the Bojinka plot at least by 1999 and identified a photograph of him by that time (see May 23, 1999). He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003). Malaysian officials recognize Hambali from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident. But the US does not tell them of his Bojinka connections so they will not know to arrest him after the summit is over (see Shortly After January 8, 2000).

Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian man who owned the condominium where the summit was held. A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaats presence at this summit is later missed in September 2000 (see September-October 2000). Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. Malaysian officials also recognize Sufaat from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident (see Shortly After January 8, 2000).
Fahad Al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative. Al-Quso will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000 (see Late October-Late November 2000), but the FBI will not given a chance to fully interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003.

Tawfiq bin Attash. Better known by his alias Khallad. Bin Attash, a trusted member of bin Ladens inner circle, was in charge of bin Ladens bodyguards, and served as bin Ladens personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole bombing. He is also thought to be a mastermind of that attack. Attash is reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to get a US visa. <9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004, PP. 8> US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995. A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attashs presence at this summit will later be missed in January 2001 (see January 4, 2001). Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go (see Summer 1999). He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003 (see April 29, 2003).

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. (Note: in the sources al-Nashiri is referred to by two of his aliases: Muhammad Omar al-Harazi and Al Safani). Al-Nashiri is one of al-Qaedas top field commanders and operates out of Malaysia while 9/11 is being prepared. He was involved in an arms smuggling plot (see 1997) and the East African embassy bombings (see August 22-25 1998), in which his cousin was martyred (see August 7, 1998). He also organized the attack against the USS The Sullivans (see January 3, 2000), and will be involved in the attacks against the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the Limburg (see October 6, 2002). He will be arrested in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. An al-Qaeda operative had identified a photo of al-Nashiri for the FBI in late 1998 (see August 22-25 1998). <9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 152-3>

Ramzi bin al-Shibh. Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His presence at the summit may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin Attash, and had video footage of him. German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. Ulrich Kersten, director of Germanys federal anticrime agency, the Bundeskriminalamt, will later say, There are indications that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was in Kuala Lumpur for the meeting. Another account noting he was photographed at the summit further notes that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks of January 2000. Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. One account says he is recognized at the time of the summit, which makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibhs presence at this summit will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000). So presumably better surveillance or follow-up from this summit could have prevented that attack as well.

Ahmad Hikmat Shakir. An al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, he may have attended this summit, according to some documents, but his presence is uncertain. After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after the US says they dont want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001).
Salem Alhazmi, 9/11 hijacker and brother of Nawaf Alhazmi. He is possibly at the summit, although very few accounts mention it. US intelligence intercepts from before the summit indicate that he at least had plans to attend.

Abu Bara al Taizi. A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent. He is reportedly meant to be one of the 9/11 hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny for Yemenis. <9/11 COMMISSION, 6/16/2004, PP. 8>

Mohamed al-Khatani. A Saudi, he allegedly will confess to attending the summit while being held in the US Guantanamo prison (see July 2002). He apparently will unsuccessfully attempt to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see August 4, 2001). However, al-Khatani will later recant his testimony and say he lied to avoid torture (see October 26, 2006).

Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also said to have been at the summit. Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. However, according to the Wall Street Journal, bin Attash and al-Quso are suspected of being Islamic Jihad members at one point, so this may just be a reference to them.
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Fahad al-Quso, Al-Qaeda, Abu Bara al Taizi, Islamic Jihad, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Khalid Almihdhar, Hambali, Malaysian Secret Service, Ulrich Kersten, Yazid Sufaat, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Salem Alhazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash, Mohamed al-Khatani, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Warning Signs, Millennium Bomb Plots, 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Hambali, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

January 5-6, 2000: CIA Liason with FBI Who Just Learned About Almihdhars US Visa Twice Fails to Tell FBI about It

On the night of January 5, 2000, a CIA officer known as James who has been assigned to the FBIs Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) to deal with problems in communicating between the CIA and the FBI briefs an FBI agent who works in the FBIs bin Laden unit (which is part of the SIOC at that time) about a number of cables he has received regarding the al-Qaeda summit that is just starting in Malaysia and one of the people attending it, hijacker Khalid Almihdhar.

The CIA agent writes an e-mail to several other CIA agents and details exactly what he briefed this person on. Although the CIA should inform the FBI of a terrorist like Almihdhar having a US visa, he does not mention discussing the visa with the FBI agent, even though he has just seen several CIA cables talking about it. The FBI agent will later say he does not know why James chooses to brief him, as he is not a designated contact point for the CIA. Overnight, another CIA cable comes in to him providing new details about Almihdhar and the Malaysia summit.

The next morning, the CIA agent briefs a different FBI agent in the SIOC about these new developments. Again, records indicate he fails to mention anything about Almihdhars US visa. This FBI agent will also say he does not know why he was briefed on the matter, as he is not a designated contact point for the CIA. James then sends an e-mail to other CIA agents describing exactly what he told both of the FBI agents. One section of his e-mail reads, Thus far, a lot of suspicious activity has been observed but nothing that would indicate evidence of an impending attack or criminal enterprise. that as soon as something concrete is developed leading us to the criminal arena or to known FBI cases, we will immediately bring FBI into the loop. Like yesterday, stated that this was a fine approach and thanked me for keeping him in the loop. Due to the briefings James gives, another CIA officer assigned to the FBI will not bother to brief the FBI on Almihdhar (see January 6, 2000). After 9/11, James will refuse to talk to the Justice Departments Office of Inspector General, but will tell the CIAs inspector general that he has no recollection of these events.

Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA officer known as James
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

(January 5-8, 2000): CIA Fails to Act on Triangle of Calls Linking Malaysia Summit, Cole Bombers House, and 9/11 Hijackers Hotel

A series of calls by al-Qaeda operatives, some of whom are under surveillance by the CIA and the Malaysian Special Branch at this time, links three sites involved in the bombing of the USS Cole. Even though the CIA is aware of the calls, it will later say it is unable to find the hijackers in Bangkok, the location of one of the call sites. The calls made by the operatives are between the following three locations:

A payphone in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, near an apartment where about a dozen al-Qaeda operatives are holding a summit (see January 5-8, 2000);
The Washington Hotel in Bangkok, Thailand. Al-Qaeda operatives Ibrahim al-Thawar and Fahad al-Quso are staying at the hotel around this time and will go on to be involved in the Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000). They are later joined in the hotel by summit attendees Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Khallad bin Attash;
Al-Qusos house in Yemen. The calls from the payphone to this location are made by bin Attash.

Although bin Attash and possibly others call the Washington Hotel while they are under surveillance, the CIA will be unable to locate them there during the week they spend in Bangkok, from January 8-15 (see January 8-15, 2000). Author Lawrence Wright will comment, Although the CIA later denied that it knew anything about the phone, the number was recorded in the Malaysians surveillance log, which was given to the agency. <9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 156-160, 181-2; NEW YORKER, 7/10/2006 > The FBI team investigating the Cole bombing will later learn some of this information before 9/11 and ask the CIA for details. However, the CIA will fail to disclose what it knows about the Malaysia summit or that it looks for the hijackers and associates in Thailand after January 8 (see July 2001).

Entity Tags: Tawfiq bin Attash, Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency, Fahad al-Quso, Khalid Almihdhar, Ibrahim al-Thawar
Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
January 6, 2000: CIA Informs FBI Leaders about Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit but Fails to Mention One Attendee Has US Visa

FBI Director Louis Freeh and other top FBI officials are briefed about the ongoing al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) as part of their regular daily update.

They are told the CIA is in the lead and that the CIA promises to let the FBI know if an FBI angle to the case develops. But they also are not told that the CIA just found out one of the participants, Khalid Almihdhar, has a US visa. <9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004> One FBI official familiar with the case will later complain, purposely hid from the FBI, purposely refused to tell the bureau. The thing was, they didnt want John ONeill and the FBI running over their case. And thats why September 11 happened. They have blood on their hands. Jack Cloonan, an FBI agent in the I-49 squad that focused on al-Qaeda, later says: If that information disseminated, would it have had an impact on the events of 9/11? Im telling you that it would have.

Entity Tags: Louis J. Freeh, Jack Cloonan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, John ONeill
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar

January 6, 2000: CIA Officer Detailed to FBI Fails to Brief FBI on Almihdhars US Visa, Is Told FBI Already Has Almihdhar Information

An FBI agent asks a CIA officer detailed to the FBI for an update on hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, but the CIA officer does not provide the information. When he tells another CIA officer, known as James, that he has been asked for the information, James sends him a series of e-mails saying he has already briefed the FBI on the latest news about Almihdhar (see January 5-6, 2000). However, the briefings James gave the FBI failed to include the fact that Almihdhar has a US visa, even though James knew of the visa and should have communicated it to the FBI.

Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA officer known as James
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

January 6, 2000: Two Malaysia Summit Attendees Travel to Singapore and Thailand, But Agents Monitoring Them Fail to Get Their Names

Two of the operatives attending al-Qaedas Malaysia summit make short trips to neighboring countries, returning to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, within 24 hours. The two operatives are Nawaf Alhazmi and Khallad bin Attash and the two countries they visit are Thailand and Singapore, but it is not definitively known which operative goes to which country. <9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 4 >

However, an associate of bin Attashs, Fahad al-Quso, arrives in Thailand on this day. In addition, Alhazmi will later be said to have visited Singapore.

Presumably, therefore, it is bin Attash that travels to Thailand, whereas Alhazmi goes to Singapore. The 9/11 Commission will later say of these two trips, After the fact, efforts were made to track them. US officials in Kuala Lumpur wondered if one of these Arabs was the still mysterious Nawaf. Both returned to Kuala Lumpur within the next 24 hours, though the authorities did not know it at the time. <9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004, PP. 4 >

Khalid Almihdhar is also said to visit Singapore, and both he and Alhazmi are said to travel to Indonesia around this time as well, but the circumstances of these additional trips, if they are actually made, are not known. Almihdhars passport was copied by intelligence services on the way to Malaysia (see January 2-5, 2000) and a similar operation to obtain Alhazmis passport details failed (see January 2-4, 2000). These two trips represent opportunities to obtain Alhazmi and bin Attashs passport details, but this is apparently not done, even though the two are under surveillance at this point (see January 5-8, 2000).

Entity Tags: CIA Kuala Lumpur station, Nawaf Alhazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

January 6-9, 2000: Malaysia Provides CIA with Information on Al-Qaeda Summit and Attendees

Hazel Evergreen Park, located on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, is the condominium complex where the terror summit was held. At the CIAs request, the Malaysian Secret Service is monitoring an important al-Qaeda summit (see January 5-8, 2000) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and begins passing what it knows to the CIA even before the summit is over. Media accounts are consistent that the operatives at the summit are photographed, and even videotaped on the first day (see January 5, 2000), but (it is claimed) there is no wiretapping or other recording of their conversations.

However, Malaysian officials are not informed what to look for, and focus more on monitoring the local Malaysian and Indonesian hosts who serve as drivers than the visitors attending the summit. One account says that in general, As the terrorists left the , the Malaysian police clicked away with their cameras. There was enough material for a whole photo series. The terrorists strolled around town like regular tourists. They casually searched out an Internet cafe and spent many hours in front of the computers, always surreptitiously watched by an observation team. Authorities find out what hotel Khalid Almihdhar is staying at and he and his associates are photographed there , as well as coming and going from the condominium where the meeting is held.

On January 7, Khalid Almihdhar and others go shopping, giving Malaysian security ample opportunity to collect information about them. They spend hours at Internet cafes, and after they leave, Malaysian intelligence searches the hard drives of the computers they used. On January 8, the CIA will be told that an unnamed new person has just joined Almihdhar and the others, and that additional photographs have been taken.

By January 9, all the data and photos the Malaysians have collected are in the hands of the CIA, except for the video footage, which apparently is sent to US intelligence one month later (see February 2000). However, no photos or video and few details from any of this surveillance have been publicly released. It is known that there are photos of:
Khallad bin Attash with Almihdhar.
Fahad al-Quso next to Almihdhar.
Some photos are of Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
Hambali is in some photos, and is immediately recognized by Malaysian intelligence (see Shortly After January 8, 2000).
Yazid Sufaat also is in some photos, and also is recognized by Malaysian intelligence.

Entity Tags: Hambali, Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, Malaysian Secret Service, Yazid Sufaat, Tawfiq bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Fahad al-Quso, Counterterrorist Center
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar

January 6-9, 2000: Top CIA and Clinton Cabinet Officials Repeatedly Briefed about Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia

On January 6, 2000, the CIA office in Malaysia begins passing details from the Malaysian governments surveillance of the al-Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to the CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC) (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 6-9, 2000). Cofer Black, head of the CTC, orders that he be continually informed about the meeting. CIA Director Tenet is frequently informed as well. They are given continual updates until the meeting ends on January 8. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, FBI Director Louis Freeh, and other top officials are briefed, but apparently President Clinton is not.

However, it appears that the CIA deliberately and repeatedly fails to tell the FBI that one attendee, hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, has an active visa to visit the US (see January 5, 2000, January 6, 2000, and January 5-6, 2000). No evidence has been presented suggesting anyone else outside the CIA was told this crucial fact either. The Malaysian summit ended on January 8. According to the 9/11 Commission, On January 14, the head of the CIAs al-Qaeda unit again updated his bosses, telling them that officials were continuing to track the suspicious individuals who had now dispersed to various countries. <9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 237>

Officially, the CIA will later claim to have lost hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar as they left the meeting (see January 8, 2000), however, Almihdhar will later report back to al-Qaeda that he thought he was followed to the US (see Mid-July 2000). It has never been reported if any of the other attendees were monitored after leaving the meeting or not.

Entity Tags: Sandy Berger, Nawaf Alhazmi, William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton, Khalid Almihdhar, Counterterrorist Center, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black, Louis J. Freeh
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Before 9/11, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

(After January 6, 2000): CIA Fails to Check FBI Has Been Notified of Almihdhars US Visa, Although this Is Routine Practice

Although the CIA passes information to the FBI about the attendance of hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi at al-Qaedas Malaysia summit, it repeatedly fails to mention that Almihdhar has a US visa (see January 6, 2000, January 4-6, 2000, January 5-6, 2000). It also fails to check that the FBI has received this information. The CIAs inspector general will say it found no indication that anyone in checked to ensure FBI receipt of the information, which, a few Station officers said, should have been routine practice.

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorist Center, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit

January 8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit Ends; CIA Still Fails to Add Attendees to Watch List

The al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) ends and the participants leave. Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar fly to Bangkok, Thailand, with al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash (see January 8, 2000). Other attendees depart to other locales. There have been no media reports that any of the others were followed by intelligence agents.

Before the summit started the CIA knew one attendee was named Khalid Almihdhar and that another had the first name Nawaf. At the end of the summit the CIA appears to have learned little more, and still does not know Nawafs last name is Alhazmi. Around this time, on January 7 and 10, the CIA searches for their names in their databases but get no hits. Yet they dont ask for a search of the much larger NSA databases, which had vital information on them (see Early 1999). CIA headquarters asks the NSA to put Almihdhar on their watch list so they can pass on more information about him (see Mid-January 2000). However, neither Alhazmi nor Almihdhar are placed on the State Departments watch list, which would actually prevent them from coming to the US. <9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004>

The CIA still fails to tell the FBI that Almihdhar has a valid US visa, and in fact seems to go out of their way not to tell the FBI about it (see January 4-6, 2000, January 6, 2000, January 5, 2000, and January 5-6, 2000).

Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda, Nawaf Alhazmi, Tawfiq bin Attash
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar
Page 11 of 42 (4158 events)

Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
L. Coyote Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Dec-14-07 02:24 PM
Response to Original message
1. "three al-Qaeda figures who Bush Administration sources admit were water boarded"
Edited on Fri Dec-14-07 02:26 PM by L. Coyote
tells us how much they know they cannot cover up, and nothing more about the actual numbers.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
EFerrari Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Dec-14-07 02:25 PM
Response to Original message
2. James Elroy couldn't make this shit up. n/t
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
Pewlett Hackard Donating Member (59 posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Dec-14-07 03:42 PM
Response to Original message
3. most disturbing post on DU I've read
The problem in 2000 was the CIA was mainly concerned with protecting its "turf" from the FBI? What a tragic waste of gov't resources. That's a long read but def. recommended.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
Peace Patriot Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Dec-14-07 05:13 PM
Response to Reply #3
6. Nope, I don't buy it, Pewlett Hackard. They did it once too often--
denying the FBI information on the US visa--and much too deliberately--for me to buy the explanation that it was a "turf war." Besides, what does the CIA have to do with the "turf" of US visas, the "turf" HERE--who gets into our country? That's not their purview. If they have info, they give it to the FBI, because they can't track it back--they are (or were) legally prohibited from it. They were violating protocol. And the most likely explanation for them doing that, so repeatedly and consistently on this US visa--when a previous attack had already occurred on our soil (the first WTC bombing), and on a US ship--is that someone in the CIA was protecting the 9/11 plot. As with so many Bush Junta activities, that are attributed to incompetence, inefficiency and stupidity--"incompetence," "inefficiency" and "stupidity" that so often serve the interests of major war profiteers and other global corporate predators--I think we would be wiser to look for the outlines and operatives of the Bush Junta plots against us--against our intelligence agencies (with Daddy Bush operatives within, and with their outings and purges under Bush Jr.), against our military (hijacking our military for a corporate resource war, driving it into the ground), against all of our agencies (FEMA, the EPA, the Justice Dept.), against our Constitution (shredding it), and against the American people (rigged voting machines, stolen elections, looting our treasury, and leaving us naked before the global robber barons, who are free to fleece us, poison us, and remove our jobs to third world countries).

The "problem" in 2000 was NOT that the "CIA was mainly concerned with protecting its 'turf.'" The "problem" was Stolen Election One, and subsequent events, which the PNACers had been preparing, long in advance. When "innocent" explanations are touted, for events that turn Bushites into billionaires, beware!
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
leveymg Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 07:59 AM
Response to Reply #6
9. Not an inter-agency struggle for "turf" - an overcompartmentalized CIA operation
Edited on Sat Dec-15-07 08:36 AM by leveymg
that violated the Agency's charter by becoming an illegal, warrantless operation run within the United States by the CIA.

There are other reasons the CIA and FBI weren't talking to each other, both distrusted the Clinton White House, and neither was filing FISA warrant applications as the law required. Look at Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Wen Ho Lee.

The fact is, however, that 9/11 happened under Bush's watch after he refused Tenet and Black's pleas to roll-up the AQ attack cells. We still don't know why Bush refused. Draw your own conclusions about that.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
tinrobot Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Dec-14-07 03:46 PM
Response to Original message
4. It's part of a drip campaign (pun intended)
Edited on Fri Dec-14-07 03:46 PM by tinrobot
You let out the names of the most notorious people who were waterboarded. People who were directly responsible for the deaths of thousands. If any of these people were convicted in the US, they would most likely get the death penalty, so waterboarding seems tame by comparison.

Once Americans accept that these notorious people can be waterboarded, they won't object so much to the next (less notorious) group, and so on...

Don't get me wrong -- I'm not saying I agree with waterboarding for any reason, I'm just pointing out the tactics.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
leveymg Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 08:03 AM
Response to Reply #4
10. Most of this stuff has been public since 2002. eom
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
Peace Patriot Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Dec-14-07 04:48 PM
Response to Original message
5. I want to comment on the FBI Freeh section above...
Here it is...

---------------

FBI Director Louis Freeh and other top FBI officials are briefed about the ongoing al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) as part of their regular daily update.

They are told the CIA is in the lead and that the CIA promises to let the FBI know if an FBI angle to the case develops. But they also are not told that the CIA just found out one of the participants, Khalid Almihdhar, has a US visa. <9/11 COMMISSION, 1/26/2004> One FBI official familiar with the case will later complain, purposely hid from the FBI, purposely refused to tell the bureau. The thing was, they didnt want John ONeill and the FBI running over their case. And thats why September 11 happened. They have blood on their hands. Jack Cloonan, an FBI agent in the I-49 squad that focused on al-Qaeda, later says: If that information disseminated, would it have had an impact on the events of 9/11? Im telling you that it would have.

Entity Tags: Louis J. Freeh, Jack Cloonan, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, John ONeill
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar

later --------------

There are a couple of "dots" that may need connecting, and that I have been concerned about. Here they are, more or less chronological order:


Spring 2001: Cheney's secret meeting with energy corporations to carve up the map of Iraqi oil fields.

May 1, 2001: Cheney meets with Gary Condit, CA congressman who sits on the House Intelligence Committee, at noon, during the time period in which one of Condit's mistresses, Chandra Levy, was apparently lured from her apartment, to her death. (Newsweek and other war profiteering corporate news monopoly disinformation outlets never ask Cheney or his aides about this meeting. Newsweek publishes Cheney's account of the meeting 3 months later, after FBI/DC police announcements change Levy's disappearance hours from mid-morning to early afternoon, coinciding with the Cheney/Condit meeting. Short meeting, routine political business, 2 aides present--according to Cheney aides speaking to Newsweek, apropos of nothing. This no questions asked of Cheney about the meeting with Condit always bothered me.)

Summer 2001: Investigation of the FBI by the House Intelligence Committee, on-going over the summer. Freeh head of FBI at the time. I never knew what this investigation was about, but it was in the news a lot that summer--what news there was that wasn't drowned out by the Condit/Levy scandal. I recall something about FBI "efficiency," and I now suspect a Bushite purge of some sort--eliminating true-bluers like John O'Neill, identifying manipulable agents, etc.. (Was Condit a Bushite agent of this purge?)

August 2001: FBI agent Colleen Rowley tries to get a FISA warrant to get into Z. Moussoui's computer, and is turned down by her superiors--a rare denial.

Late summer 2001: FBI agent John O'Neill (terrorism expert, onto the Al Qaeda money trail in Yemen) is driven out of the FBI, using the phony excuse that he negligently left his briefcase in a roomful of agents. O'Neill takes a private security job at the World Trade Center a week before 9/11, and dies in the attack.

Post 9/11: The FBI finally gets into Moussoui's computer, and one of the things they find there is the password to, and the name of, Nicholas Berg's email account. According to Berg's father (speaking to reporters after Nicholas is beheaded in Iraq), Nicholas told him that FBI agents had questioned him about this, that he had told them that he met Moussoui by accident, on a bus, Moussoui had asked to borrow his computer to access his email, and Nicholas had permitted this. The FBI agents went away, apparently satisfied with this explanation, and Nicholas Berg was later permitted to enter Iraq, during the war, on two occasions, to "look for business" for his telecom company.

May 2002: A year after her disappearance, Chandra Levy's remains are found in Rock Creek Park, not far off the path where many police cadets had searched for her, the previous summer--but in the "post 9/11 world," this discovery was somewhat drowned in the "news."

March 2003: Invasion of Iraq. 100,000 thousand innocent people slaughtered by the U.S. in the initial bombing alone, according to the British doctors' report. Torture begun at Abu Ghraib.

May 2004: Nicholas Berg is arrested in Iraq, by the U.S., and held for 10 days at Abu Ghraib. His parents write letters to Donald Rumfeld begging for him to intervene and release their son. Nicholas is then released, onto the street--with the DoD claiming they offered him safe passage via Jordan, and he refused it. The next thing we know, supposedly Al Qaeda grabs him, and beheads him in the famous videotape, which gets released around the same time as the torture at Abu Ghraib is exposed, with Berg's beheading used as a cause celebre by Freepers to stoke up hatred of the "enemy" and downplay sympathy for tortured Iraqis.

----------------

I don't think I have overcolored these events. My descriptions are pretty much based on what is known (news reports, etc.). It seems a long leap from Chandra Levy's kidnapping and death, to Nicholas Berg's beheading. But the thread that connects them (besides Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld and their criminal war plans) is the FBI.

Was the House Intelligent Committee's investigation of the FBI in summer '01 an attempt to purge the "good guys" from the FBI? Was Condit (a "Blue Dog" Democrat, and darling of the Bush White House) their operative on the Intelligence Committee? And, was his mistress offed as a favor to him? (There is evidence that she wanted him to leave his wife, and marry her. She was a young Bureau of Prisons intern in DC.) (There are many strange things about FBI behavior during that investigation, pointing to either incompetence, or internal or external interference with the investigation.)

Why was there no followup by the FBI on Nicholas Berg's strange story of meeting Z. Moussoui in a bus? And, given this red flag on terrorism, why was Nicholas Berg permitted to travel to and within Iraq, during a war? (One strange aspect of the Berg/Moussoui encounter is that Berg was a conservative Jew, and Moussoui an immigrant and rather loony Arab. Would Berg have trusted such a person--a total stranger--with his computer?)

Why was Colleen Rowley's FISA request denied by her superiors in the FBI in DC?

Who was behind ousting terrorism expert John O'Neill from the FBI? Who offered him, or got him, the job at the WTC? And, do we have even a minimal understanding of what was going down with that?

Who was behind the arrest and detention of Nicholas Berg in Iraq? (His parents were convinced that it was a U.S. arrest/detention, but who? I believe the DoD put out a cover story that it was Iraqi police, because I remember reading some Iraqi police chief denying that they had anything to do with Berg's arrest. Who held him? Why? Was he "given" to Al Qaeda? Was he beheaded by U.S. operatives, staged (& taped) like it was Al Q? And WHAT was Nicholas Berg DOING in Iraq? And what was his email account doing in Moussoui's computer?)

Just a few of the questions raised by these seemingly disparate events. The kind of questions that keep bugging you. I hope there are answers somewhere, and that the American people are one day fully informed of the horrors that our government has been guilty of.

I have little doubt that the waterboarding and other torturing and murders of prisoners by the Bush Junta was to cover up Bush Junta crimes. I simply don't believe that anything they did, or anything they do, is to "keep us safe." They have absolutely no concern for the safety and well-being of other people. Their motives in everything are greed, and coverup. The people they use for their purposes may have varying motives, and also different breaking points for how much they will do, and how far they will go, before they see the light about Bush Junta motives. I sense that a lot of people in our intelligence community are reaching that point--the breaking point--with this regime. I pray that more of them will do the right thing, and be safe doing so.

Also, we owe an eternal debt of gratitude to researchers like Levymg, who preserve and collate information, and help "connect the dots." The Bush Junta may have the American people blockaded, nationally, as to our sovereign power under the Constitution to direct OUR PUBLIC SERVANTS in government to act in our interest, but they won't win, in the end. There are too many of us who revere the truth and who still believe in democracy and the rule of law.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
mod mom Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Dec-14-07 10:48 PM
Response to Reply #5
8. Impressive how you folks can put these pieces together and keep namesstraight.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
Sugar Smack Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 08:16 AM
Response to Reply #8
11. I agree. I'm definitely bookmarking this.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
leveymg Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 08:34 AM
Response to Reply #5
13. The problem with secret agencies is that they're easy to manipulate by those
who's interests aren't the same as the nation's. U.S. intelligence has long been permissive of the illegal operations of privatized intelligence networks. Cheney's Energy Task Force follows in a long line of cloak and dagger carried out by oil companies, banks and law firms going back to Oliver Nelson Cromwell's Panama Canal theft.

Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
paulthompson Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Dec-14-07 10:01 PM
Response to Original message
7. Al-Nashiri
Hi Mark, thanks for getting this info out there. One thing, though. ABC News has a different list of waterboarded detainees, also containing three names. But their list is Zubaida, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, and KSM. So the difference is Hambali vs. al-Nashiri. But it just so happens that both those guys attended the Malaysia summit. Zubaida and al-Nashiri also are the two guys that had their CIA interroations videotaped and then those tapes got destroyed.

In all likelihood, it was probably all four of them that got waterboarded, and then some. Plus, if you weren't a "big name" like KSM or Hambali, odds were you got renditioned to countries like Syria or Egypt for a time, where waterboarding was just one of many very nasty torture techniques used.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
leveymg Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 08:54 AM
Response to Reply #7
14. Thanks Paul. There are other, more minor, variations in lists that
Edited on Sat Dec-15-07 08:55 AM by leveymg
I've seen. I agree - there were probably at least four (five, including Ramzi bin al Shibh) who got dipped. The important part is that they line up perfectly with Kuala Lumpur. Why torture just this group? What exactly was CIA trying to find out from this particular group, or make them forget?

Here's a thought - what we know as Al-Qaida is essentially this handful of guys. If CIA admits to 100 renditions, why didn't CIA hold onto the rest and torture them, as well, if they were important enough for the U.S. to kidnap to begin with? Maybe, the renditions was mostly just a quid pro quo to foreign itelligence agencies for cooperation with Bushco's foreign policy initiatives and other favors done.

I had expected the number of CIA renditions and "enhanced interrogations" to be larger. Much larger.

This raises some fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of the GWOT.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
madokie Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 08:32 AM
Response to Original message
12. whats driving these three crazy have to do with it. As waterboarding will do
so as to render them as unreliable sources when and if they do get to tell their stories, that is. Its what they haven't told us they, CIA, know about them, their relationship to them etc that they don't want us to ever know so they render these targets incapable of getting their message out by scrambling their brains by destroying their sanity. Yes we are dealing with dangerously deranged people in our whitehouse today.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
leveymg Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 08:57 AM
Response to Reply #12
15. Yes, yes, and Yes.
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
G_j Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 09:15 AM
Response to Original message
16. K&R!
thanks!!!
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
DemReadingDU Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 03:40 PM
Response to Original message
17. afternoon kick
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
countryjake Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Dec-15-07 09:31 PM
Response to Original message
18. kick
Printer Friendly | Permalink |  | Top
 
DU AdBot (1000+ posts) Click to send private message to this author Click to view 
this author's profile Click to add 
this author to your buddy list Click to add 
this author to your Ignore list Sat Nov 01st 2014, 12:32 AM
Response to Original message
Advertisements [?]
 Top

Home » Discuss » Archives » General Discussion (1/22-2007 thru 12/14/2010) Donate to DU

Powered by DCForum+ Version 1.1 Copyright 1997-2002 DCScripts.com
Software has been extensively modified by the DU administrators


Important Notices: By participating on this discussion board, visitors agree to abide by the rules outlined on our Rules page. Messages posted on the Democratic Underground Discussion Forums are the opinions of the individuals who post them, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Democratic Underground, LLC.

Home  |  Discussion Forums  |  Journals |  Store  |  Donate

About DU  |  Contact Us  |  Privacy Policy

Got a message for Democratic Underground? Click here to send us a message.

© 2001 - 2011 Democratic Underground, LLC