The corporate media and Congress have finally focused on a story that casts doubt on the official version of 9/11. The MSM is telling you that the reason the CIA erased the videotapes of the CIA interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, a key al-Qaeda figure, was to protect the identity of the CIA interrogators. The second reason offered, which you may have heard,is Richard Posner's account that Zubaydah confessed to naming five prominent Saudi and Pakistani leaders, including the head of Saudi intelligence and the top General in the Pakistani Air Force, who knew about the 9/11 attacks in advance. Four of these five died shortly thereafter, except the Saudi Intel Chief, Sheikh al-Turki, who was later welcomed by the Bush Administration as the Saudi Ambassador to Washington.
Now, here's the third reason: Abu Zubaydah was a key Al-Qaeda figure in the CIA's Chechnya operation, which involved several of the 9/11 hijackers. He was in a position to know about the relationship of the 9/11 Hamburg cell with the CIA.
Abu Zubyadah was involved in training several of the 9/11 hijackers. Before he was captured and tortured during interrogation, he knew a great amount about that operation and the role of the CIA in organizing al-Qaeda in its secret war against the Russians in Chechnya, and the relationship between US inteligence and al-Qaeda is both much more recent and closer than is officially acknowledged.
A few weeks ago, Paul Thompson and I had a lengthly exchange here at DU. Paul, chief author of
, concludes that Luai Sakka, a prominent al-Qaeda logistics and training expert, was in fact a CIA double-agent who handled several of the principal 9/11 hijackers during their training in the late 1990s. At that time, the Agency was still running al-Qaeda as part of its operations against the Russians in Chechnya.
In the course of this Chechnya operation, Sakka worked with Abu Zubaydah. They also worked together in a series of bomb plots in Jordan (the so-called Millenium Plot), for which the two were convicted in absentia by a Jordanian court, according to The Times of London. See,
The Chechens needed trained fighters. Sakka was telephoned by Ibn al-Khattab, the late militia leader controlling the foreign fighters against the Russians. Khattab requested that Sakka’s trainees should be sent on to Afghanistan for military training because “conditions are tough”.
This brought Sakka into contact with Abu Zubaydah, a high-ranking Al-Qaeda member, who ran a large terrorist training camp near the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sakka was later to be sentenced in ab-sentia for involvement in the foiled Jordanian millennium bomb attacks in 2000 along with Zubaydah.
One of Sakka’s chief roles was to organise passports and visas for the volunteers to make their way to Afghanistan through Pakistan. His ability to keep providing high-quality forged papers made Turkey a main hub for Al-Qaeda movements, his lawyer says. The young men came to Turkey pretending to be on holiday and Sakka’s false papers allowed them to “disappear” overseas.
Turkish intelligence were aware of unusual militant Islamic activity in the Yalova mountains, where Sakka had set up his camps. But they posed no threat to Turkey at the time.
But a bigger plot was developing. In late 1999, Karahan says,a group of four young Saudi students went to Turkey to prepare for fighting in Chechnya. “They wanted to be good Muslims and join the jihad during their holidays,” he said.
They had begun a path that was to end with the September 11 attacks on America in 2001. They were: Ahmed and Hamza al-Ghamdi who hijacked the plane that crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center; their companion Saeed al-Ghamdi whose plane crashed in a Pennsylvanian field; and Nawaf al-Hazmi who died in the Pentagon crash.
They undertook Sakka’s physical training programme in the mountains and later were joined by two of the other would-be hijackers: Majed Moqed, who also perished in the Pentagon crash, and Satam al-Suqami, who was in the first plane that hit the north tower.
Moqed and Suqami had been hand-picked by Al-Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia specifically for the twin towers operation, Sakka says, and were en route to Afghanistan. Sakka persuaded the other four to go to Afghanistan after plans to travel to Chechnya were aborted because of problems crossing the border. “Sakka he liked the four men and recommended them,” said Karahan.
Before leaving, all six received intensive training together, forming a cell led by Suqami, which was similar to the Hamburg group run by Mohammed Atta, another ringleader in the 9/11 attacks.
Here's the exchange I had with Paul a few weeks ago in which we discussed Atta, the Hamburg cell, and their conection with Sakka:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=125x185400paulthompson (1000+ posts)
Sun Nov-25-07 02:27 AM
Original message
London Times: Al-Qaeda Kingpin: I Trained 9/11 Hijackers
Source: London Times
Since being convicted as an Al-Qaeda bomb plotter last year, (Luai) Sakka has decided to reveal his alleged role in some of the key plots of recent years, providing a potential insight into the unanswered questions surrounding them. His story is also one of a globetrotting terrorist in an organisation that is truly multinational.
But a bigger plot was developing. In late 1999, (Sakka's lawyer) Karahan says, a group of four young Saudi students went to Turkey to prepare for fighting in Chechnya. “They wanted to be good Muslims and join the jihad during their holidays,” he said.
They had begun a path that was to end with the September 11 attacks on America in 2001. They were: Ahmed and Hamza al-Ghamdi who hijacked the plane that crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center; their companion Saeed al-Ghamdi whose plane crashed in a Pennsylvanian field; and Nawaf al-Hazmi who died in the Pentagon crash.
They undertook Sakka’s physical training programme in the mountains and later were joined by two of the other would-be hijackers: Majed Moqed, who also perished in the Pentagon crash, and Satam al-Suqami, who was in the first plane that hit the north tower.
Read more:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2936761.ece ________________________________________
While this article is interesting, what's REALLY interesting is that Luai Sakra/Sakka may well have been an informant for the CIA and Syrian intelligence before 9/11, and appears to have at least told Syrian intelligence about the 9/11 attacks one day before they happened. In 2004, Der Speigel reported, "Western investigators accept Sakra’s claims, by and large, since they coincide with known facts. On September 10, 2001, he tipped off the Syrian secret service... that terrorist attacks were about to occur in the United States. The evidently well-informed al-Qaeda insider even named buildings as targets, and airplanes as weapons. The Syrians passed on this information to the CIA—but only after the attacks."
However, in former CIA Director George Tenet's book published earlier this year, Tenet mentioned that on September 10, 2001, "a source we were jointly running with a Middle Eastern country went to see his foreign handler and basically told him that something big was about to go down. The handler dismissed him." Tenet claims the warning was "frightening but without specificity." This perfectly fits with descriptions of Sakra (except that Sakra claims the warning was more specific than Tenet does). If so, and if Sakra's claims are correct, this would mean that Sakra was training some of the 9/11 hijackers around the same time he started working as a CIA informant! It makes one wonder exactly what the CIA knew about the 9/11 attacks before they occurred.
I've done a lot of research on Sakra and in fact I'm quoted in the London Times piece. You can see my timeline entries on him here:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&complete_911_timeline_possible_moles_or_informants=complete_911_timeline_luai_sakra#alate99sakrayalova Hopefully this will just be the first of several articles about Sakra that go into some other things about him, such as his links to intelligence agencies. While Sakra has some pretty amazing claims, the known facts about him are pretty amazing as well.
The 9/11 Timeline:
http://www.complete911timeline.org/ Don't miss the new 9/11 documentary, 9/11: Press for Truth
http://www.911pressfortruth.com/ leveymg (1000+ posts)
Sun Nov-25-07 03:01 AM
Response to Original message
6. Significant overlap between the Sakra trainees and the 01/00 Kuala Lumpur conference?
Edited on Sun Nov-25-07 03:22 AM by leveymg
We know that al-Hazmi and al-Midhar accompanied bin Attash to Bangkok from the January 2000 al Qaeda planning summit, and from there the primary pair of Flt. 77 hijackers travelled on to LAX, where they entered the U.S. on 01/15/2000. That entry was noted at CIA-Counter Terrorism Center (CTC), but an immediate notification cable to the FBI was withheld "per the order of the (CTC) Assistant Director", and apparently not sent.
What other attendees at Kuala Lumpur were also named as Sakra's trainees? Where was Sakra in early January 2000? Can we look upon the Kuala Lumpur meeting as an extension of the Sakra trainings? Were bin Attash and Sakra the operational leaders of a group that was originally intending to join the CIA/Turkish/Saudi-directed war in Chechnya? If so, this may present further evidence that the core of the 9/11 attack cell, along with most of the muscle, was penetrated by at least one CIA double-agent, and may have originated as a CIA-trained operational cell.
Background: the 9/11 and USS Cole attacks were planned at that Kuala Lumpur meeting, and it was monitored by CIA and "a half-dozen allied agencies", George Tenet testified to the Joint Congressional Committee in 2002.
What are your thoughts on that, Paul?
You write:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&complete_911_timeline_possible_moles_or_informants=complete_911_timeline_luai_sakra#alate99sakrayalova According to Sakra’s lawyer, in late 1999, 9/11 hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi, Hamza Alghamdi, Saeed Alghamdi, and Nawaf Alhazmi undertook Sakra’s training program. They had been planning to go to fight in Chechnya, but Sakra recommended them to Zubaida and they went to Zubaida’s training camp in Afghanistan instead. Hijackers Majed Moqed and Satam Al Suqami also later trained with Sakra in Turkey. Sakra alleges Moqed and Al Suqami were hand-picked by al-Qaeda leaders for the 9/11 plot. Sakra claims that at one point the entire group were arrested by police in Yalova, Turkey, after their presence raised suspicions. They were interrogated for a day but released because no evidence of wrongdoing could be shown. In early 2006, Sakra made the claim that he had helped some of the 9/11 hijackers near Bursa, but he did not give specifics. While Sakra’s account cannot be corroborated, it does fit with details given in the 9/11 Commission’s final report. According to that report, after 9/11, captured al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash claimed that a number of militants trying to go to Chechnya in 1999 were unable to get there and stayed at al-Qaeda guesthouses in Turkey instead, where they were to wait to make another attempt to enter Chechnya in the summer of 2000, but they ended up going to Afghanistan instead. Bin Attash mentions nine hijackers who may have been trying to get to Chechnya in this fashion, including all the ones mentioned by Sakra. <9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 233> The 9/11 Commission report also mentions that most of the “muscle” hijackers trained at the al Faruq camp, except for Al Suqami and Moqed, who trained at the Khaldan camp. <9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 234>
Mark
Alert | Add to my Journal
Printer Friendly | Permalink | Edit | Reply | Top
paulthompson (1000+ posts)
Sun Nov-25-07 03:42 AM
Response to Reply #6
12. I dunno
Sakra claims that he didn't get contacted by the CIA until 2000, which would be after the Malaysia summit. But then he went to live in Germany for a year and says that he had contact with Mohamed Atta and others while in Germany there. I would be surprised if Sakra didn't at least know of the Hamburg cell members, since he lived in Germany until a couple of months before 9/11. For a long time it was claimed that the Hamburg cell Atta was a part of was cut off from all other al-Qaeda cells, but more and more is coming out to show that is not true. It had strong ties to other cells in Germany and other European countries, such as Italy. So it's hard to see how Sakra could not have had some links to that cell while it is claimed he was an informant for the CIA. And a number of the Hamburg cell members were Syrian or had ties to Syria, and Sakra is part Syrian and had deep links to cells in that country.
Furthermore, another myth is that most of the 9/11 hijackers were blank slates, meaning they were chosen because they had clean records and so they could come into the US without causing any suspicion. But that's not true either. Look for instance at this entry about three of the hijackers that Sakra claims he trained:
Spring 2001: US Customs Investigate Three Hijackers Before 9/11
In the wake of the foiled al-Qaeda plot to blow up hotels in Jordan during the millennium celebrations, Jordan gives tips to the US that launch a Customs investigation into one of the plotters, Raed Hijazi, and his US connections. “Customs agents for months traced money flowing from several Boston banks to banks overseas, where officials believe the funds were intended for bin Laden’s network.” In September and October 2000, Jordanian officials gave US investigators evidence of financial transactions connecting Raed Hijazi, Nabil al-Marabh, and future 9/11 hijacker Hamza Alghamdi (see September 2000; October 2000). By spring 2001, Custom agents further connect al-Marabh and Hijazi to financial deals with future 9/11 hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi and Satam Al Suqami. The Washington Post will later note, “These various connections not only suggest that investigators are probing ties between bin Laden and the hijackers, but also that federal authorities knew about some of those associations long before the bombings.” (Washington Post, 9/21/2001) It appears that the money flowed from al-Marabh to Alghamdi and Al Suqami. (Cox News Service, 10/16/2001; ABC News, 1/31/2002) While accounts of these connections to Alghamdi and Al Suqami will be widely reported in the media in the months after 9/11, a Customs Service spokesman will say he can neither confirm nor deny the existence of the inquiry. (New York Times, 9/18/2001) It appears that the two hijackers are not put on any kind of watch list and are not stopped when they arrive in the US on April 23, 2001, and May 2, 2001, respectively (see April 23-June 29, 2001). British newspapers will later note that Alghamdi was one of several hijackers who should have been “instantly ‘red-flagged’ by British intelligence” but in fact is not when he passes through Britain sometime in early 2001 (see January-June 2001). The 9/11 Commission Final Report will fail to mention the Customs investigation and will give no hint that these hijackers’ names were known in the US before 9/11.
And here's a snippet from another entry:
In at least some cases, it appears that US intelligence did quickly access existing files on the hijackers. The Washington Post reports, “In the hours after Tuesday’s bombings, investigators searched their files on Al Suqami and Alghamdi, noted the pair’s ties to al-Marabh and launched a hunt for him.” A top Customs official claims that by checking flight manifests and comparing them with other information such as watch lists, he is able to determine the names of all 19 hijackers by 11:00 a.m.(see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (Washington Post, 9/21/2001)
So it certainly seems possible to me that these guys Sakra claims he trained were known to US intelligence long before 9/11. But this fact has been covered up ever since. There were a few reports about it shortly after 9/11 in the New York Times and the Washington Post and such, and then it was completely forgotten by the likes of the 9/11 Commission, which time and time again forgot about things that were reported in major newspapers.
The 9/11 Timeline:
http://www.complete911timeline.org/ Don't miss the new 9/11 documentary, 9/11: Press for Truth
http://www.911pressfortruth.com/ Alert
Printer Friendly | Permalink | Reply | Top
leveymg (1000+ posts)
Sun Nov-25-07 04:14 AM
Response to Reply #12
16. Ramzi bin al Shihb, Atta's Hamburg roommate, was also at Kuala Lumpur
Edited on Sun Nov-25-07 04:36 AM by leveymg
Ramzi was denied US visas on multiple occasions, and served as a financial conduit for the Hamburg cell between Atta, the flight 77 hijackers, and (I recall) Moussaoui, who stayed over at the same condo overlooking the golf course in Kuala Lumpur before he entered the US in 2001. During the early January meeting, Ramzi twice flew back and forth from Malaysia. Any investigator looking at Ramzi (or Sakra) would have easily located the others. If Sakra met with Atta in Germany in 2000-01, he likely would have also had contact with Ramzi. I believe it's quite significant that Ramzi and KSM both went to ground shortly before 9/11 and both managed to remain at large in Pakistan for over a year before being arrested in Karachi.
What is your source for "a number of the Hamburg cell members were Syrian"? Hadn't seen that before, and what do you think is the significance, beyond Sakra being "part Syrian"? What were Sakra's ties to Syrian intelligence? I agree, it makes sense that Tenet was referring to Sakra, and to Syrian intelligence. Was Syrian intelligence handling the Hamburg cell? Were the Syrians acting as a cut-out for the CIA in dealings with Atta and the others in Germany? When do you think Atta was first recruited?
You wrote about the Syrian connection:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?entity=syria author Ronald Kessler will write in a 2004 book, “Often, the CIA used operatives from Arab intelligence services like those of Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and other countries to infiltrate bin Laden’s organization.” A longtime CIA officer says, “Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians penetrated the bin Laden organization for us. It’s B.S. that we didn’t.” Kessler further explains that such operations remain one of the CIA’s best-kept secrets and often occur even with intelligence agencies the CIA is sometimes otherwise at odds with. Kessler says, “In return for help, the CIA provided them with money, equipment, and intelligence on their adversaries. Over the years, the Jordanians, for example, relied on the CIA to alert them to plots against the king. Over time, the Jordanians became so good at the intelligence game that they were better at detecting plots than the CIA.” (Kessler, 2004, pp. 143) Jack Cloonan, an FBI expert on al-Qaeda, will later say, “There were agents run into the camps. But most of them were not very well placed,” and lacked access to the inner circles. One example of such an asset may be Khalil Deek, who worked closely with al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see 1998-December 11, 1999) and was reportedly a mole for Jordanian intelligence (see Shortly After December 11, 1999). In the months before 9/11, Jordan will warn the US that al-Qaeda is planning a major attack inside the US using aircraft (see Late Summer 2001), and Egypt will warn the CIA that al-Qaeda has 20 operatives on a mission in the US, some of them training to fly (see Late July 2001).
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Syria, Jack Cloonan, Jordan General Intelligence Department, Khalil Deek, Egypt
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
October 27, 2001: Zammar Arrested, Detained by US in Syria Suspected al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Haydar Zammar travels from Germany to Morocco. Not long after, perhaps in December, he is arrested by Moroccan police with US assistance. Although he is a German citizen and under investigation by Germany, German intelligence remain unaware of his arrest, and only learn about it from the newspapers in June 2002. He is sent to Syria, where there are formal charges against him. Zammar reportedly now claims he recruited Mohamed Atta and others into the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell. (Washington Post, 6/19/2002) It is widely suspected that the US arranged for Zammar to be sent to Syria so that he could be more thoroughly interrogated using torture. The Germans are angry that the US has been submitting questions for Zammar and learning answers from Syria, but have not informed Germany of what they have learned (Daily Telegraph, 6/20/2002; Christian Science Monitor, 7/26/2002)
Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Syria, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Germany
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
Early 2002-January 2003: Syrian Government Helps US with Al-Qaeda Intelligence until US Cuts Off Relationship Because of Iraq War Priority By early 2002, Syria emerges as one of the CIA’s most effective intelligence sources on al-Qaeda. Syria is one of seven countries on a State Department list of sponsors of terrorism. It has been on that list since 1979, mostly because of its support for Hezbollah combating Israel. But Syria is also an opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda has many connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, especially its Syrian branch. According to journalist Seymour Hersh in New Yorker magazine, “The Syrians had compiled hundreds of files on al-Qaeda, including dossiers on the men who participated—and others who wanted to participate—in the September 11th attacks. Syria also penetrated al-Qaeda cells throughout the Middle East and in Arab exile communities throughout Europe.” It appears Syrian intelligence may even have penetrated the Hamburg cell tied to the 9/11 plot, as hijacker Mohamed Atta and other cell members, such as Mohammed Haydar Zammar, occasionally worked at a German firm called Tatex Trading, which was infiltrated by Syrian intelligence (see September 10, 2002-June 2003). For a time, the Syrians give much of what they know to the CIA and FBI. A former State Department official says, “Up through January of 2003, the cooperation was top-notch. Then we were going to do Iraq, and some people in the administration got heavy-handed. They wanted Syria to get involved in operational stuff having nothing to do with al-Qaeda and everything to do with Iraq. It was something Washington wanted from the Syrians, and they didn’t want to do it.” Hersh reports, “The collapse of the liaison relationship has left many CIA operatives especially frustrated. ‘The guys are unbelievably pissed that we’re blowing this away,’ a former high-level intelligence official told me. ‘There was a great channel… The Syrians were a lot more willing to help us, but they’— Rumsfeld and his colleagues—“want to go in (Syria after the Iraq war).’” New Yorker, 7/18/2003
Mark
Alert | Add to my Journal
Printer Friendly | Permalink | Edit | Reply | Top
paulthompson (1000+ posts)
Mon Nov-26-07 05:47 AM
Response to Reply #16
32. Syria
It's widely known that Darkazanli, Zammar, and other key members of the Hamburg cell were/are Syrian. Around 1982, the Syrian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and killed about 10,000 people. Not surprisingly, this generated a backlash and a lot of the survivors turned to violence. The Times article talks about how Sakra saw this massacre at the age of nine and was radicalized at that point. So there's a strong bond between Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members due to their common experience of this massacre and other crackdowns. It appears that Mohamed Atta also joined the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood while doing university work in Syria. So that's an important linkage. A lot of al-Qaeda guys in the 9/11 plot were not just al-Qaeda but also tied to radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, esp. the particularly violent and radical Syrian branch. KSM, for instance.
The Syrian government has taken a no holds barred approach against the Muslim Brotherhood (in contrast to most other countries where the MB is usually more moderate and tolerated to some extent). So it's no surprise that the Syrians have kept track of radical MB figures overseas, figuring they could always cause trouble to Syria later. It's also no surprise then that they were tracking Darkazanli and Zammar in particular, since both of those guys made a lot of waves early on. Both were being investigated by a variety of intelligence agencies by the mid-1990s. Thus, we see this:
September 10, 2002-June 2003: Germans Begin, Then Cancel, Investigation into Company with Ties to Hamburg Cell and Syrian Intelligence
On September 10, 2002, German police raid the Tatex Trading company, a small textile business located just outside of Hamburg. According to Newsweek, German authorities has been “keeping a close watch on the company… for years.” Germans begin preparing a case against the company and the US prepares to freeze the company’s assets. But by June 2003, the investigation is closed and no action is taken by the US or Germany. Newsweek will claim that “Some US and German officials suggest that both countries decided not to proceed with legal action against Tatex to avoid antagonizing the government of Syria.” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 9/7/2003; Newsweek, 1/18/2004) The New Yorker will claim “Tatex was infiltrated by Syrian intelligence in the eighties; one of its shareholders was Mohammed Majed Said, who ran the Syrian intelligence directorate from 1987 to 1994.” (New Yorker, 7/18/2003) Some believe the Syrians infiltrated the company to spy on extremist Syrian exiles in Hamburg, while others believe Syrians were using the company as a front to illegally acquire high-tech equipment from the West. It is claimed that the investigation into Tatex is dropped because Syria has been cooperative with Germany and the US in other areas. (Newsweek, 1/18/2004) Abdul-Matin Tatari, the Syrian in charge of Tatex, admits that his company had employed Mohammed Haydar Zammar and Mamoun Darkazanli, both of whom have been tied to the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. Further, the Chicago Tribune claims, “Investigators also say Mohamed Atta himself worked for a time at Tatex, something Tatari vehemently denies. But Tatari admits that one of his sons signed Atta’s petition to establish an Islamic ‘study group’ at Hamburg’s Technical University that served as a rendezvous for the hijackers and their supporters.” Tatari’s son took trips with Mounir El Motassadeq, who also has been tied to the Hamburg cell. Tatari, Zammar, Darkazanli, and Atta all are believed to be members of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, a secret society banned in Egypt. (Chicago Tribune, 11/1/2002)
So it seems Syrian intelligence were keeping a very close eye on the Hamburg cell through this front company. Probably the number of Syrians living in Hamburg was pretty small and most of the people working at the Syrian company were Syrian, so getting Zammar, Darkazanli, and Atta to work there would have allowed Syrian intelligence to keep a very close eye on them indeed. Probably Sakra was recruited as an informant for Syria precisely to keep an even closer eye on the Hamburg cell. And the CIA was very interested in the likes of Zammar and Darkazanli too. For instance, it's come out that the CIA repeatedly tried to get Darkazanli to "turn" before 9/11. If Tenet is correct that Sakra was an informant being jointly run by the CIA and the Syrians, then it's likely the CIA was getting all kinds of info about the Hamburg cell by some point in 2000. That would have opened up all kinds of leads. It's hard to see for instance how they could have missed Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Hamburg if they somehow failed to notice he attended the Malaysia meeting. He not only attended that meeting, but also used his credit card while there, so they could have easily traced him back to it months later even if they didn't recognize the photos and video of him there. It's been reported for instance that the US rejected bin al-Shibh's visa applications to come to the US because they knew he was involved in the Cole bombing, so they probably did do just that later in 2000 if they weren't onto him already. And I just found out that German intelligence warned Spanish intelligence in July 2001 that bin al-Shibh was coming to Spain that month, so obviously bin al-Shibh was being investigated even though details of when and how much remain mired in secrecy.
Unless there was some mindbogglingly incompetent and sloppy spycraft going on, it's hard to see how the Hamburg cell wasn't completely penetrated by the Syrians, the CIA, and the Germans, at least. Egyptian intelligence may have been looking at them too. Contrary to popular belief, the Hamburg cell was not made up of a bunch of new recruits with completely clean records who attracted little to no attention before 9/11. Darkazanli and Zammar in particular were lit up like Christmas trees, attracting all kinds of intelligence attention (Darkazanli thru financial ties to many key al-Qaeda figures, and Zammar because he ran a travel agency of sorts to move al-Qaeda people around). For instance, the US may have started investigating Darkazanli as early as 1993. Whether or not Able Danger identified Atta per se, it hasn't been disputed that Able Danger identified Hamburg as one of about six al-Qaeda hotbeds of activity around the world, because that's exactly what it was.
The more I look at what the US (and other governments) knew about the 9/11 plotters before 9/11, the more incredible the claim seems that the 9/11 plot could not be stopped. And that's just based on what we know. What we don't know is probably even more damning. For instance, the German government conveniently "lost" the records charting what they know about who and when in regards to the Hamburg cell.
The 9/11 Timeline:
http://www.complete911timeline.org/ Don't miss the new 9/11 documentary, 9/11: Press for Truth
http://www.911pressfortruth.com/ 
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
DEAD BECAUSE OF A LIE
