http://firedoglake.blogspot.com/I spent my spare time this weekend reading through Paul Pillar's Foreign Affairs article, and I have to say, it was worth every moment that I spent on it and them some. Pillar's assessment of the mistakes leading up to the Iraq War and the Administration's subsequent missteps in post-war planning and operations -- including to today -- are essential reading for those of us who have been trying to make sense of the mess we see in the headlines.
''The Bush administration's use of intelligence on Iraq did not just blur this distinction; it turned the entire model upside down. The administration used intelligence not to inform decision-making, but to justify a decision already made. It went to war without requesting -- and evidently without being influenced by -- any strategic-level intelligence assessments on any aspect of Iraq. (The military made extensive use of intelligence in its war planning, although much of it was of a more tactical nature.) Congress, not the administration, asked for the now-infamous October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, although few members of Congress actually read it. (According to several congressional aides responsible for safeguarding the classified material, no more than six senators and only a handful of House members got beyond the five-page executive summary.) As the national intelligence officer for the Middle East, I was in charge of coordinating all of the intelligence community's assessments regarding Iraq; the first request I received from any administration policymaker for any such assessment was not until a year into the war. ''
I highlight this specific passage because it is a theme that we have seen time and again with the Bush Administration. From Paul O'Neill to Richard Clark to Lawrence Wilkerson and now to Pillar: the Administration had a desired outcome -- war with Saddam Hussein -- and was willing to bend whatever rules, information, and planning that was necessary to achieve that outcome. Ends justifies the means.
There has been a substantial amount of discussion in the last week regarding this Administration's lack of support for candor -- and the President and his staff's repudiation of criticism, even from within their circle of supporters. (The most recent article on the subject was raised by none other than GOP mouthpiece Bob Novak, highlighted here last night.) Without some mechanism for internal criticism, some check and balance on the inside of the process wherein important decisions are made, how is it that mistaken decisions are to be refined or poor judgments to be called for what they are?