Reports suggest troop presence hinders Iraq hand over; Sadr key player

[ProSense]

July 10, 2006
Daily Life

In Iraq's Mayhem, Town Finds Calm Through Its Tribal Links

By SABRINA TAVERNISE and QAIS MIZHER

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But in a surprising twist, the region's tribes, particularly powerful in neighborhood life here, have weighed in forcefully, using their authority, often in a nonviolent way, to force the Islamists to back off.

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The reaction of the tribes was hardly a foregone conclusion. In the American-led effort in Iraq, they were an afterthought. Few were courted, and they were all but left out of the political process, which began here in earnest in early 2005.

Followers of Mr. Sadr dominate the 42-member provincial council. The governor is a former Mahdi Army commander. The police chief is a former Badr member.

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"Tribes hold the key to this province," he said. "If we try to employ our own version of law in this country, we are not going to win."

The tribes have helped the occupying forces at times. They successfully mediated in 2004, when the Mahdi militia fought the British in an uprising across Iraq's south inspired by Mr. Sadr.

At that time "the tribes went to the Sadr office and said, 'Take your guys off the streets,' " said Mr. Ferguson, the British political adviser. In Dhi Qar Province, west of Amara, tribal leaders recently interceded in a similar fashion, he said.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/10/world/middleeast/10amara.html

Moqtada al-Sadr must be treated as key to security in Iraq

Cleric's main challenge is to keep his mehdi army from participating in sectarian violence

By International Crisis Group (ICG)

Wednesday, July 12, 2006

REPORT INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Editor's note: The following text comprises the executive summary and recommendations of the latest ICG report, entitled "Iraq's Muqtada al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabilizer?" To view the full report, visit www.crisisgroup.org

With stepped-up US-led raids against Moqtada al-Sadr's militia, the Mehdi Army, and media allegations of the militia's responsibility for widespread and particularly horrendous sectarian killings in Baghdad on July 9, the Shiite leader and his movement have become more central than ever.

The war in Iraq radically reshuffled the country's political deck, bringing to the fore new actors and social forces, none more surprising and enigmatic, and few as critical to Iraq's stability, as Sadr and the Sadrist movement he embodies.

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His movement is profoundly Shiite but his nationalistic discourse, resistance to the occupation, hostility toward other Shiite actors (the clerical establishment in Najaf and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)) and opposition to federalism have earned him respect from some Sunni Arabs.

His rejection of an autonomous southern, predominantly Shiite, state and his reluctance to compromise with the Kurds on the status of Kirkuk, together with the strength of his armed militia, the Mehdi Army, have put him at the center of issues critical to the future of the political process: negotiations over the Constitution, agreement over the status of Kurdistan, the eventual dismantling and disarming of militias and the timing of coalition forces' withdrawal.

Moreover, Sadr has begun to acquire regional standing, having displayed surprising diplomatic skill during an early 2006 tour of neighboring countries.

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http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=73873

Iraqi forces are handed power as withdrawal begins

By Kim Sengupta
14 July 2006

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But what was being commemorated was significant, more so for Iraq than Britain. Three years, three months, three weeks and four days after the US-led invasion, an Iraqi government was getting back the control of security for one of its 18 provinces, at - British officials insist - Iraq's request.

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The governor of Muthanna, Mohammed Ali Abbas al-Hassai, said: "This means they mean it when they say there will be an end to the occupation."

British and US officials hope the Muthanna withdrawal will be the precursor to an exit strategy on a much larger scale. They claim it will be followed by Maysan province, which is also under British control, Dhiqar, where the Italians are based, then the three Kurdish provinces in the north which have seen relatively little violence.

Major-General John Cooper, the commander of British forces in Iraq, said he believed there were "four or five" provinces where conditions were reaching the point where they could be handed back to the Iraqi government, but he declined either to name them or indicate a timescale.

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http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/story.jsp?story=698674

[ProSense]

1. Even in Iraq, All Politics Is Local

July 13, 2006
Op-Ed Contributor

Even in Iraq, All Politics Is Local

By RORY STEWART

Kabul, Afghanistan

A GREAT many of the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq arise from a single problem: the American-led coalitions’ lack of trust in local politicians. Repeatedly the Western powers, irritated by a lack of progress, have overruled local leaders, rejected compromises and tried to force through their own strategies. But the Westerners’ capacity is limited: they have little understanding of Afghan or Iraqi politics and rely too heavily on troops and money to solve what are fundamentally political and religious problems.

The coalitions cannot achieve political change in the absence of strong local support. And when they try to do so, they undermine their local allies. Iraqi and Afghan national and regional leaders have a far better understanding of the limits and possibilities of the local political scenes; they are more flexible and creative in finding compromises; and unlike the coalition officials, they are elected. They must be given real power and authority. This may seem an obvious prescription — but in fact the coalitions are not allowing it to happen.

I walked for several weeks across northern Afghanistan shortly after the coalition invasion, and I was struck by the strength and vibrancy of local politics. For four days I walked through blackened villages of ethnic Hazaras that had been torched by Taliban fighters in a last bid to impose central control. Yet within a few weeks of the Taliban retreat in these remote areas — some a 10-day walk from the nearest road in the winter snow — political councils had re-emerged to balance the demands of the community and the realities of local power.

There was a different political system in almost every village: one was controlled by a feudal chief who could recite a genealogy stretching back 15 generations; another by a mullah who had been backed by Iranian money during the Afghan civil war. In western Afghanistan, a former guerrilla leader named Ismail Khan was turning Herat into the most secure and prosperous city in the country.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/13/opinion/13stewart.html