"First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan" by Gary Schroen.
excerpt from a review posted on Amazon -
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His particular bête noire is the Defense Department, which he excoriates as ponderous and timid. JAWBREAKER's men raged at the delays in the arrival of Special Operations forces, and when U.S. bombing finally began on Oct. 7, a disgusted Schroen warned Hank that the first forays "could best be described as modest." Schroen reports that the Pentagon got repeatedly rebuked back in Washington for its sluggish pace, including what seems to have been a cabinet-level spanking for Rumsfeld on Oct. 15. But he also takes swipes at clueless stateside officials from his own agency, snarling over a secure phone that one CIA scold "might like the job out here" instead.
Schroen is also still fuming at the policymakers who flung his team into harm's way before the Bush administration was willing "to fight a winning war in Afghanistan." In particular, he holds a grudge against the State Department, Pentagon and NSC officials who hesitated to aid the Northern Alliance before Sept. 11 and continued dithering afterward. According to Schroen, they worried that providing the concentrated, northern-front bombardment necessary to help the alliance defeat the Taliban would also let its Tajik leaders take over Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, and start settling scores with the country's more numerous ethnic Pashtuns. The alliance's leaders felt the mistrust keenly, and so did their JAWBREAKER patron. Schroen came to bitterly resent the "strong anti-Tajik lobby within the ranks of senior U.S. policymakers," including Gen. Tommy Franks of the Joint Chiefs and a State Department official whose name Schroen does not provide but whose resumé is spelled out with venomous precision. Ultimately, events on the ground made U.S. policymakers' decisions for them; as the war cabinet debated, one alliance general told his CIA liaison, "I am going into Kabul regardless of what your NSC decides."
Schroen's hard feelings were probably exacerbated by at least two spectacular episodes in which "friendly fire" almost killed some of his men. On Oct. 10, he got an urgent call from a military officer back home supervising the flights of remotely piloted Predator drones -- the high-tech tool that, in the fall of 2000, had spotted a "man in white" widely thought to be bin Laden before being grounded until after Sept. 11 as Bush administration policymakers argued about whether to delay reconnaissance-only missions until armed planes were readied. The mission manager now reported that a Predator was currently looking in real time at two non-Afghan men in Western garb on a newly built airfield on the Shomali Plains. "One of the men is very tall and thin and may be bin Laden himself," the voice on the line reported, asking permission to launch an anti-tank missile at them. "You're not going to believe this," Schroen told a comrade after checking the coordinates, "but I think the Predator is looking at Chris and Ed, and this guy thinks Ed is bin Laden. They want to hit them with a Hellfire." The other CIA man yelped, "My God, they're going to kill Chris and Ed!" Later, an equally confused B-52 bomber crew dropped a 2,000-pound bomb not on the coordinates of a Taliban troop position but on those of the CIA team nearby; one of Schroen's men was blown to the floor of a mud building, bruised, scared and scraped -- along with the Afghan leader he was briefing, future president Hamid Karzai.
The author is relatively laconic about battlefield blunders, but he is far less forgiving about what he sees as a massive strategic error: the Bush administration's shift of its focus to Iraq at the expense of the country he helped liberate from the Taliban. The only way to get bin Laden's head on that pike, Schroen warns, is to win full cooperation from Pakistan's balky military, beef up the CIA presence in the region, bring back the indispensable Special Operations units that had been pulled out "as early as March 2002" to prepare for the Iraq invasion, and launch a relentless, coordinated manhunt on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani frontier. This is deeply informed advice, ignored at American civilians' peril.
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I picked up a copy of this book but so far haven't had time to read it. Thought it might be of interest to folks though. Schroen was on talk shows about his book when it was released, and iirc he also supported what Kerry said about Tora Bora. There's probably a bunch of blog posts from around that time that report and discuss Schroen's comments.