It speaks of two different options - the "bad bank" one and the government insuring assets.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/business/economy/02value.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hpThe article does include a nice example and explanation of the value of the a specific bond. I think the most important thing is to find an equitable way to value the loans so the program is not a welfare program for stockholders and bank CEOs. In this example, it is intuitive that the value given by the bank - 97% - is not true. If the average bad asset is really worth 3% less than anticipated - the banks could easily write it down and might not even need government assistance. Banks have ALWAYS had some losing assets. Yet, the banks are likely correct that the sales that do occur are fire sales - so 38% is likely too low. Where the value is assigned under any plan is likely more important in terms of fairness that the choice of plan.
Under the "bad" bank approach, the valuation is the price the "bad" bank acquires a bond for.
Under the plan Kerry prefers (based on the sketchy description), the valuation affects the percent of the company's value the government would get - as it would be based on the relative amount the bank assets were considered to be worth and the amount the government put in. Here if the bank's bonds, after being written down by the bank, were aggregated to be $2 million and the government put in $1 million, the government would effectively own a third of the bank - but if the unknowable "true" value of the bank's bonds was really $1 million - the government should get a half. So, the same problem exists.
One lever that should help is that if the bank's over estimated the assets, they would get very little government money to make them whole and they would not really be back in a healthy state. This is an incentive to make an honest evaluation. In the bad bank scenario, there is no down side for the banks to pushing for high estimates - once sold at a pretty penny to the government, they are no longer their problem, but ours. They
might though become the speculators who buy the assets a few years down the road from the "bad" bank for a low price and then gain as they recover value - partially due to the government working on the mortgage problem as well. (Take this with a grain of salt - it is not from the article or from what Kerry said - it is my attempt to understanding what people smarter than me and with education and experience in Finance (of which I have none) - have not come to clear consensus agreement on.)
Kerry's comments on MTP do not say he would not support the alternative. It is constructive that he and the experts advising him are addressing the dynamics of the alternative plans. It would seem, from his comments, that if the "bad" bank plan is adopted, he would look to finding a way to do the best in assuring that we don't pay too much and that once the assets are aquired, they aren't sold too cheaply. (It sounds like he thinks the latter (and maybe the former ?) happened in the RTC - so this is Kerry using what he learned.)