http://www.itl.nist.gov/lab/specpubs/500-158.htmNotational Institute of Science and Technology
1988
INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
6.1 The Continuing Problem Of Confidence In Results
Consultants' evaluations of a vote-tallying program, quoted in the New York Times article on July 29, 1985 <6>, as well as testimony on November 25, 1986 before a committee of the Texas legislature (section 2.8.3 above), have demonstrated that technically trained individuals continue to find significant vulnerabilities in vote-tallying software and hardware. Results of computerized elections continue to be challenged, and regardless of the outcomes of these challenges, it has been clearly shown that audit trails that document election results, as well as general practices to assure accuracy, integrity, and security, can be considerably improved.
Technically qualified consultants employed in some election challenges have stated that "it would be possible" to alter computer programs used in those situations. While proof of actual manipulation appears to be lacking, documentation conclusively demonstrating otherwise is insufficient, due to the manner in which the challenged elections, and others, have been conducted.
In the 1975 vote-tallying report, it was stated that:
The assurance that steps are being taken by election officials to prevent unauthorized computer program alteration or other computer-related manipulations remains, nationwide, a problem for the maintenance of public confidence in the election process. <91>
Thus, the 1975 statement remains pertinent.
Given the continuing problem, it is important, first, to identify the agencies responsible for correcting the deficiencies, and second, to provide recommendations that will assist these agencies in rectifying the situation.
6.2 Responsibility And Requirements For The Effective Management Of Elections
6.2.1 Government Responsibility
As discussed in section 3.9.1, responsibility for the conduct of elections in the United States rests with local governmental agencies assigned this function under State law (or under local law, under a grant of authority by State law). It was stated in that section that major elections are carried out by about 2870 county-level government agencies, and by some 7630 other local governmental agencies. In some 1005 of the total 3140 counties and county-equivalents, vote-tallying is completely computerized. It is partly computerized in an additional 192 counties.
Typically, the local offices operate with oversight by the chief State elections official, but the degree of oversight varies from State to State. The local offices of election administration require the necessary resources and expertise to efficiently and effectively carry out their responsibility. That responsibility includes procurement of supporting equipment and services, including vote-tallying systems. An effective procurement must include specifications (technical descriptions of products to be procured) so that accuracy, integrity, and security will be promoted.