Anyone have the raw number of machines

[Robert Oak]

that have actually "malfunctioned"?

I think it would be interesting to run some statistics on the
machines themselves.

Computer errors should be reasonably systematic (i.e. have a pattern)
especially if there is a common software bug which all of them
are running.

I think it would be interesting to do a statistical analysis
of all of the "malfunctions" versus manufacturer type as well
as central tabulator method and see if there is any magic
correlation between this "malfunction" and heavily democratic precincts or battleground states.

[lapfog_1]

1. There are so many places to hack the vote

probably the worst place is at the actual polling machines.

All that is needed is for the actual vote to be close (say less
than 5 to 10 percent for the real winner) AND for there to be no
paper trail (or other manual recount trail).

After that, the rest is easy.

For God's sake, they use WINDOWS machines in a lot of places to
do the tabulations (even of the paper and punch card ballots)!

[UL_Approved]

2. The paperless machines are themselves Windows based

They use a variant of Windows CE for the touchscreen terminals. If it were me, an embedded system with a whole turnkey operating system would be used. Microcontrollers are manufactured with 10 Base-T NICs and various other networking components. For collection and auditing, Linux or UNIX would be the choice. If you utilize strong cryptography, election results could be tallied in real-time and compared against exit polls in real time. Kind of an interesting concept, huh?

[lapfog_1]

5. Windows CE is a joke

but it's still easier to hack the vote at the tabulation
machines instead of the polling machines.

I think one possible future idea is to have a voter created paper
ballot. That is, the ballot is created on a website. Voters
download the ballot, make their selections, print the custom
ballot with their specific voter ID printed on it. On election
day the voters take their ballots to the polling station, check
in with the clerk (have their names cross referenced with voter
registration and have their IDs checked). Then each ballot
are marked with their encoded IDs - each page of the ballots!
Those then go to TWO tabulation machines, from two different
manufacturers, and counted. Also, every Nth ballot is pulled
from the tabulation pile and manually checked by voting officials
to include observers from both (or all) parties. If, and only if,
all the results (two tabulations and extrapolation of hand checked
ballots) match closely (within a variance of less than 1 error in
100,000), the vote is then certified.

Everyone can have confidence... the voters can have the confidence
that they selected the candidates and issues they intended. No
one can overvote or undervote, and the tabulations can be verified.

For those without PCs, printers and internet, local libraries can
be used (and colleges, etc) to prepare printed ballots. The only
drawback is that the voters selections are now recorded and identified
to who chose what... but I think that is preferable to what we
have now.

Oh, BTW, this would be a much cheaper solution than anything being
used today.

[Robert Oak]

3. I'm asking for raw info

Which machines "malfunctioned", how many per the total in the precinct,
nationwide, what precincts, what were the resulting errors for those machines and of that type of machine, what is the distribution, nationwide?

You can run a statistical analysis on the errors caught, since they should be basically the same per brand and type of machine and look at the same machines in other precincts and see if there are similar errors.

If it's a software bug, you should see a correlation with all of the machines nationwide.

If it's a GEMS tally machine, you can also see a correlation.

We've seen an error correlation with optical scanners in Florida,
but I'm saying you can also run some statistics nationwide on optical
scanners and see if there is a similar error.

If there is no correlation, but only error with a particular machine in particular battleground states and precincts, it enforces
the anomalies of the vote

[sandnsea]

4. or the opposite

What I find interesting is why some machines vote differently than others. For example, the DRE eslates in Texas are one that could accidentally record a vote for Bush after the voter pushed a straight Dem ticket. But I didn't find that peculiarity reported in any of the other places that used eslate. The same is true for most of these "glitches". Why would they be programmed so completely differently from place to place?

[shelley806]

6. Go to Voter's Unite!! They have exactly what you want...

Machine malfunctions are listed separately.

http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp?sort=da...

[NewYorkerfromMass]

7. Interesting question. nt