VOTERS CHOICE, version 1.3

[Kip Humphrey]

VOTERS CHOICE, version 1.3 (version changes highlighted in BOLD)

Give voters choice in how they vote:

1. Hand counted paper ballots (handle absentee and provisional ballots using the same processes and procedures)

OR

2. Vote digitally, by machine (any type)
a. A paper receipt accompanies all digital voting, is confirmed by the voter, retained by the precinct, and used to provide a total precinct vote total (to determine the total number of precinct voters) and to compare to digital data records under dispute. This acts to limit the total number of data records in the state's master vote open-sourced database.
b. The state maintains county-level denormalized master vote databases (that are counted) with public read-only access via the Internet, phone system, and local kiosks. Election equipment vendors are contracted to populate the county-level master vote databases under an accuracy-based performance contract. Equipment vendors are reduced to commodity providers, a sure appeal to career election officials.
c. Digital voters are offered a random ballot identifier, encrypted by a voter-supplied PIN, used to look up and verify the accuracy of the voter's digital ballot (the voter's data record that is counted)
d. Each vote data-record contains a voter's complete vote selection for the election and includes precinct identification, a voter-supplied PIN encrypted ballot identifier, a .jpg of the voter's paper record, individual fields for each race within which voters' vote selections are recorded, and an encrypted checksum of the data record itself to protect against data tampering.
e. From election day +1, for 7 days, voters have the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their vote and contest any discrepancy
f. If a voter disputes the accuracy of that voter's data record, first the data record is compared to the .jpg image of the paper record. If the .jpg does not demonstrate a voter's claim (should answer 99% of discrepancy claims), the paper receipt is pulled (using the voter-supplied ballot identifier and PIN) and compared to the voter's digital data record, with the paper receipt taking precedence.
g. The public has read-only access to the master vote database enabling anyone to tabulate the votes
h. Upon vote certification, the SoS will publish accuracy results of the various voting methods employed during the election in the state. The accuracy results reported out by the SoS reflect the % of confirmed and proved discrepancies and corrections found and reported by voters to election officials during the 87-day vote review period, and a 10% mandatory random audit of votes cast. Accuracy results of the previous election are prominently and publicly posted for voter review in precincts during current elections. 2006 fictitious example:

2004 Voting Method Rate of Accuracy
Paper Ballots: 99.1% accuracy Undervotes reported: 1.5% Overvotes reported: .7%
OptiScan machines: 98.3% accuracy Undervotes reported: 2.3% Overvotes reported: 1.6%
DRE touch screens: 93.6% accuracy Undervotes reported: 2.6% Overvotes reported: 0%

Needless to say, if digital voting methods produce high inaccuracy numbers, they will fast disappear over time. Such is the self-correcting nature of VOTERS CHOICE.

i. In the event of a recount (where the margin of reported and audited errors exceed 1/2 the differential between candidate's vote totals by precinct), a hand recount is conducted counting paper records in those precincts and counties showing such accuracy differentials, the voter review period is reopened for the duration of the recount, and the SoS will issue a public appeal to voters to check and verify the accuracy of their votes.

This system eliminates the attraction to digitally manipulate the vote, provides complete transparency (no hidden ballots, no secret counting), and offers protection to concerned/vulnerable voters who have the option of complete vote anonymity by voting via VVPB.

State election officials escape the controversy, manage paper ballots (VVPB, absentee, provisional) in one consistent manner, can offer voters a variety of voting machines (allowing custom input devices for various differing handicaps), and reduce their responsibility to maintaining and securing one simple master denormalized vote database.

Security issues aside, this system ostensibly enables Internet voting (handled like other digital voting contracts - i.e., populate master vote database accurately) since input methods become largely irrelevant.

Election officials are free year-to-year to select any variety of input devices (cheapest, most entertaining, etc.).

Fraud cannot hide in this system because the ballots that are counted are visible and voter-verifiable, and the tabulation of votes is public, accessible, and verifiable. ANY inaccuracy falls on the voting equipment/service providers with loss of contracts becoming their economic incentive for accuracy. Election officials maintain a hand counted paper ballot system (accommodating VVPB, absentee, and provisional ballots) and a simple denormalized database system that stores digital vote data records in denormalized form and tabulates votes. All else can be safely contracted to voting service providers who are subject to minimum service delivery performance requirements (% of reported and verified inaccuracies per 1000 voters) by which their businesses will succeed or fail. Voters have choice as to how they vote, paper or machines, can verify the accuracy of their votes, have recourse to dispute and correct any inaccuracies in their digital ballots, and have read-only mirrored access to independently tabulate votes.

VOTERS CHOICE is self-correcting - Voters, acting in their own self-interest will tend to vote by means they perceive to be the most accurate, reliable, and convenient. Armed with accuracy results as reported out to the public, voters will tend to opt for the voting method that is the most reliable and accurate. Such a performance-based system will show swings in voting method usage based on accuracy results. The more accurate electronic voting becomes, the more votes will be cast electronically and the less votes cast using paper ballots. Conversely, inaccurate electronic voting will cause a swing to paper ballots. Voters trap errors, voters determine the favored voting method. Electronic voting system providers will live or die by the accuracy of their own systems.

DETAILS TO FLESH OUT:
* Hand counted paper ballot system design
* Recording hand counted paper ballots in the master vote databases
* Posting & reporting mechanism for precincts' count of voters
* Open-sourced master vote database system design and configuration
* Database system security design
* System auditing processes and procedures
* Independent voting system supervision and monitoring processes for political parties and citizens
* Vendor voting service contract provisions and requirements
* % of acceptable vote processing accuracy (99.5%? 99%? 98.5%?)


Please notice that while VOTERS CHOICE offers hand counted paper ballots or electronic voting (dual or multi-choice), it is not a fully parallel voting system. This is important given the self-correcting feature of VOTERS CHOICE. That said, I point out that ALL counties maintain multiple voting systems due to absentee and provisional balloting. VOTERS CHOICE does not change this; nor does it add to election officialdom workloads or responsibilities. It does add to the volume of paper ballots but that volume is variable into the future, determined in large measure by the accuracy of digital voting - the more accurate digital voting becomes, the fewer paper ballots will exist to hand count. The reverse is also true however. If anything, VOTERS CHOICE reduces election department workloads by turning voting method and recount decisions into largely mechanical exercises based on accuracy of performance. The impetuous to provide accurate voting falls on the shoulders of election service providers when they are tied to performance-based contracts.

Should certain counties reject hand counted paper ballots due to ballot complexity or sheer population density, those counties must process all votes as digital. If, for example, paper ballots are scanned for tabulating purposes, those ballots are subject to the processes and procedures outlined for all other digital voting. Those counties will then have to justify and defend to their electorate their decision to eliminate hand counted paper ballots as a choice for that county's voters. Such moves carry political liability should such a county produce higher comparative vote inaccuracies. Once again, VOTERS CHOICE puts the voter in charge instead of election officials or election services vendors.


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