Clark's line of command was directly to Bill Clinton during Kosovo, as he was the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO during the war, not a commander of simply the U.S. Army.
Anyone knows that it was in Clark's capacity as NATO Chief that he was fighting that War (thereby answerable to the heads of state of NATO countries)....not as a 4 Star General (which is responsive to the Pentagon Chiefs).
Plus, note that it is the Republicans who defended Wes Clark when he was "retired" early.
Wes Clark has no "problem" with the military. He had a problem with two Military personnel (Sec. Cohen and Gen. Shelton....both whom resented the fact that as NATO Allied Commander, Clark called the shots in the NATO Kosovo intervention and that he reported to them as a 4 star General, but Reported directly to Bill Clinton as NATO Supreme Allied Commander).
Wes Clark was retired early, something which was done behind his and Bill Clinton's back by Cohen and Shelton because he did what was right. Their problem is that he had insisted that high altitude bombing, their plan, wouldn't get the job done that was needed beyond killing more civilians than were required. He called for low flying Apache helicopters and boots on the ground (as his motto was "If it ain't worth dying for, it ain't worth fighting for). Cohen and Shelton didn't want to do this because they were afraid of U.S. Casualties, and after Somalia, didn't want to "chance" anything of that and therefore were for dropping bombs from high up. It is, however, a known fact that what got Molosovic to retreat was Clark's threat of boots on the ground and The apaches....not the gradual bombing plan. The civilian casualty numbers for Kosovo hover around 500. It could have been a lessor number had it not been for Shelton and Cohen.
Clark was right and did too good a job, and so as far as Cohen and Shelton were concerned....he had to go!
Here's news articles from the era as my back up.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A51403-2000May1¬Found=true ("The Unappreciated General" --5/2/00)
http://www.texasforclark.com/departure3.htm (Reprint of WAPO's Dana Priest article 8/4/99 - "Clark's Exit Was Leaked Deliberately")
http://www.texasforclark.com/departure.htm (Reprint of "Washington's Long Knives" 8/03/99)
http://www.texasforclark.com/departure4.htm (Why Wesley Clark Got the Ax at NATO - 8/6/99)
http://www.slate.com/id/2089014/ (The Shelton Smear)
More....
http://www.texasforclark.com/departure3.htm -
But in terms of the military, the other Generals have no problems with him.
Retired General Walter Kross, a former four-star Air Force general under whom Clark served on the staff of the Joint Chiefs in the mid-1990s. For two years Kross worked with Clark from 6:00 in the morning until 9:00 at night six days a week, and sometimes on Sundays. He disagrees strongly with Shelton and Cohen about Clark's abilities and character. When I asked him why Clark was disliked by some military officers, Kross replied,
"He's not the army general officer from central casting. He's the extra-ordinary senior officer who can do extra-ordinary work on the entire range of challenges senior officers have to face—including Kosovo and the Dayton Accords, on which he worked himself into exhaustion. No army officer from central casting can do that work, but Wes did. "
He added, "Some senior officers misinterpret drive, energy, and enthusiasm for overambition...he is outside the mold and that makes some other officers uncomfortable."
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16795CLARK WAS NOT CLINTON'S GENERAL. Falsely Accused
by Spencer Ackerman
Unlike most officers who served in Vietnam, Clark came home from the jungles convinced of the importance of defending U.S. values with force. As he writes in his memoir, Waging Modern War, "One of life's greatest gifts, I've found, is the opportunity to fight for what's right." He adds, "There is so much more to be done." Throughout the '90s, he bridled at U.S. inaction, particularly in Rwanda, where rampaging Hutu militiamen murdered 800,000 Tutsi in 100 days. The response from Washington was worse than nothing: Secretary of State Warren Christopher urged a "full, orderly withdrawal" of U.N. peacekeepers, lest the United States be called upon to relieve the rump force, a prospect the Pentagon adamantly opposed. Clark, then Shalikashvili's policy director, was ashamed. He later observed to author Samantha Power, "The Pentagon is always going to be the last to want to intervene." In Waging Modern War, Clark implies that the military dishonored itself "when we stood by as nearly a million Africans were hacked to death."
A year later, Clark risked his career to confront the uniformed reluctance to use force in defense of human rights. As Shalikashvili's envoy in the Balkans, he directly crossed Admiral Leighton Smith, the four-star commander of Mediterranean nato forces. Nato began bombing Bosnian Serb positions in late August 1995 in order to force an end to a genocidal campaign controlled by Serbian dictator Milosevic. Although nato demanded a full Serb withdrawal from the besieged city of Sarajevo, Smith urged that a brief bombing pause in early September be extended indefinitely, since, as he explained to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, he thought the United States had no business intervening. But Clark, then still a three-star, insisted in a heated telephone call that the bombing should continue as planned. As Holbrooke writes in To End A War, "I could tell from the noises emanating from Clark's cell phone that he was being scolded by a very angry, very senior American naval commander." Smith--who quickly alerted his superiors to Clark's insolence--had the inclinations of nato policymakers on his side; after all, heads of state had neglected Bosnia as long as was politically tolerable. But Clark was right, and he won: The bombing resumed and caused the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from Sarajevo within two weeks of Clark's clash with Smith. That November, the warring parties met at Dayton to negotiate a peace accord. Shalikashvili soon afterward awarded Clark his fourth star--despite ferocious resistance from the Army, which would have preferred his retirement.
But it was as nato commander that Clark took his biggest gamble--against practically the entire Pentagon--and triumphed. By early 1999, Milosevic's army was murdering Albanian civilians in the Serbian province of Kosovo, despite a U.N. Security Council resolution and nato threats to bomb. Negotiations at Rambouillet, France, had failed. With nato's credibility on the line and Kosovar lives in jeopardy, Clark prepared to transform diplomacy backed by the threat of force into diplomacy backed by its use. But Clark's plans were vastly different from those favored by his Pentagon colleagues, who advocated the Powell Doctrine's dictate of overwhelming force in pursuit of a specific goal. Instead, Clark merged military and diplomatic action into a hybrid--as the bombing intensified, so did nato's demands, moving from a return to negotiations to halting the ensuing ethnic cleansing to a final settlement of Kosovo's political status. It was an incremental war with incremental objectives, brazenly flouting the Powell Doctrine.
Clark's Pentagon superiors were appalled. During both the buildup and the campaign itself, the military--and, subsequently, the White House--hobbled the nato commander. In December 1998, Clark requested that the U.S. Army prepare for an impending war. Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, who had fought nearly all of Clark's high-profile promotions, bluntly responded, "But we don't want to fight there." The next month, the service chiefs met and decided to undercut the war effort by emphasizing the possibility of bloody conflict--a prospect they knew would frighten Clinton. As a senior military official explained to The Washington Post, "I don't think anybody felt like there had been a compelling argument made that all of this was in our national interest." Although the chiefs argued that sanctions alone might bring Milosevic to heel, they would not even credibly threaten the use of force needed for their success: In March, on the eve of the war, the Pentagon ordered the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt out of the Adriatic, sending a message of vacillation during Clark's preparations.
But, if the Pentagon acted to stall the campaign, at least its position on the war was clear. The same could not be said of the Clinton White House. In March, nato opened its offensive against Milosevic. But the night the bombing began, Clinton issued a critical statement: "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war." This position reflected the advice of Defense Secretary Cohen and Joint Chiefs Chairman Shelton, but it confounded Clark. The war was predicated on nato's ability to gradually increase the pressure on Milosevic, but, without at least the plausible threat of an invasion, nato leverage was crippled. Clark confided to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, "I can't guarantee
with air power alone." Behind the scenes, he began to lobby for a 175,000-troop invasion of Kosovo, and, as the bombing dragged on through April, the White House realized that ruling out ground troops had hamstrung the campaign. Yet Clark could not even get the White House to decide when to decide if an invasion would go forward. In mid-May, national security adviser Sandy Berger asked him, "How long can we defer a decision, Wes?" When Clark responded that operational planning had to begin on June 1, Berger asked, "Can you push that date back a couple of weeks, to, let's say, 15 June?" By that time--thanks to intensified bombing, increased nato and Russian diplomacy, and word of a prospective invasion--Milosevic had capitulated.
But not even victory stopped the Clinton administration's intransigence. After Milosevic began to withdraw from Kosovo in early June, Russian troops began moving from their Bosnian positions toward the strategically important Pristina airfield. Clark worried that the Russians would occupy a portion of Kosovo independently of nato and allow Serb atrocities to continue, as they had in Bosnia. He arranged with Washington to quickly take the airfield under the pretext of coordinating communication and information flow with the arriving Russians. But, after Moscow assured Washington that its troops would not enter Kosovo on their own, Shelton told Clark to stand down. Hours later, however, Russian soldiers began to land in Pristina in violation of their pledge. Clark felt his hand had been forced and ordered three-star British General Michael Jackson to have his troops block Pristina's runways. But Jackson thought the move might spark a firefight with the Russians and refused, famously telling the nato commander, "Sir, I'm not starting World War III for you." Instead, Jackson suggested taking the roads near the field. Clark's command to seize the airfield has been recently cited as evidence of his overaggressiveness (hardly a Clintonian trait). But, although Jackson's quote was memorable, in essence the British general's plan differed with Clark's by only a few stretches of road. And it worked. In the end, nato took the roads, and there was no confrontation. Of course, had the Clinton administration followed Clark's advice to take the airfields in the first place, the incident might well have been avoided altogether.
Clark's tactical and strategic wisdom went unappreciated inside the Beltway. He was rewarded for his win in Kosovo by a terse call from Shelton the following month informing him that his nato assignment would end early. (According to Waging Modern War, Shelton would not even show Clark the courtesy of extending the phone call a few minutes to work out a face-saving exit.) Clinton privately told Clark, "I had nothing to do with it." Indeed, Clinton had very little to do with practically everything about Clark--including Clark's victory--while generals who shared the president's disinterest in the mission stymied a successful commander. Yet Clark has never disparaged Clinton's efforts to take full credit for winning the war--most recently, during the former president's triumphant trip to Kosovo last week. How un-Clintonian.
Spencer Ackerman is an associate editor at The New Republic.
New Republic 10/6/03 https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=20031006&s=ackerman100603
General Colin Powell on CNN - 9/28/03: "I've known Wes Clark for 20 years. He's one of the most gifted soldiers that I have ever had work for me. And beyond that, I really feel it's appropriate for me to recuse myself from any further comment now that he is a political candidate."
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0309/28/le.00.htmlMajor General George Pickett on the whispers...."No big surprise, since he graduated first in his class from West Point , which puts him in the super-smart set with Robert E. Lee, Douglas MacArthur and Maxwell Taylor."
'All this book leanin' is unbecoming for an officer. The yankees got all the smart ones, and look where it got them."
http://www.command-post.org/oped/2_archives/008539.html 4 Star General McCaffrey:
"(He-Clark) is probably the most intelligent officer I ever served with," McCaffrey said. "(He has) great integrity, sound judgment and great kindness in dealing with people. He is a public servant of exceptional character and skill."
Admiral John Dalton, Former Secretary of the Navy, in a 2004 OP Ed--
"Wesley Clark is uniquely qualified to lead the nation - Today, America faces two fundamental challenges at home and abroad: keeping our country safe in a dangerous world, and restoring fiscal responsibility and prosperity for the working families of our nation. We must choose a President with experience and depth both for the domestic economy and the international arena. "
Maj. General Robert Scales responding to Shelton's insinuation while being interviewed by Fox News' Britt Hume: "Well, first of all, they are whispered. You know, Brit, Wes Clark led a 19-nation coalition, he fought a war and he won it. If you are a general in war and you have to command such a disparate organization, there are times when you have got to be hard and you've got to be decisive. I mean no one complains about Jack Welch (search) running the best…being the best CEO in the country and he was tough. But I've known Wes for 40 years; he's also a passionate, committed, empathetic individual."
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,97689,00.html General Schwarkopf on CNBC News questioned about the whisper campaign....
BORGER: All right, General, I'm going to switch gears on you just for one last question, because we've been watching all of the Democrats react to the news of Saddam Hussein's capture. You made a little bit of news on our show on November 6th when you said of General Wesley Clark that he was not going to get your vote, that was for certain, because General Hugh Shelton had said that he was not a man of character and integrity. And you said, quote, "If that's the case, he's not the right man for president as far as I'm concerned." Have you changed your mind?
SCHWARZKOPF: Well, again, 'if that's the case' was a very, very important statement. You know, I don't know to this date--there's never been any attempt to explore with Hugh Shelton what he meant by that.
....I don't know what lack of character caused Hugh Shelton to say that, I don't know what lack of integrity caused Hugh Shelton to say that, and I'd like to hear more about it. And basically I just don't think that that's been addressed that much. And obviously to a lot of people that's not an issue at all."
http://ann.forclark.com/story/2004/1/8/191653/0022 The fizzling whisper campaign was brought to a halt when General Shelton was called on the carpet by Hague prosecutors who were trying Milosovic. Milosovic repeated what Gen. Shelton had whispered about General Clark, after Clark testified against Milosovic. Unfortunately for General Gossip, he had to call his unfortunate comments assailing Wes Clark's character "just politics".
http://wesleyclark.h1.ru/presidence4.htm#LA%20Meetup%20... Read these for further insight:
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_I... http://www.buzzflash.com/interviews/03/10/int03221.html MAJ. GEN. ROBERT SCALES: SCALES: I've known Wes for 40 years; he's also a passionate, committed, empathetic individual. So, soldiers in wartime have to lead soldiers into battle and the lives of men and women are at stake. And sometimes that requires a degree of flintiness that you don't need in other professions.
HUME: What about those who suggest that his character reflects a kind of unbridled ambition that puts his career above all things, fair?
SCALES: No. No. Unfair. Again, like I say I've known him all my adult life. He is an individual who is committed to a higher calling. I mean he's got three holes in him and a Silver Star from Vietnam. He has a…the word patriot only partially describes his commitment to public service. And for as long as I've known him, he's always looked, you know, beyond himself and he's been committed to serving the nation. And I think what you are seeing happen here recently is an example of that.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,97689,00.html Lt. Gen. James Hollingsworth, one of our Army's most distinguished war heroes, says: "Clark took a burst of AK fire, but didn't stop fighting. He stayed on the field 'til his mission was accomplished and his boys were safe. He was awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart. And he earned 'em."
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_I... General Barry McCaffrey :"(He) is probably the most intelligent officer I ever served with," McCaffrey said. "(He has) great integrity, sound judgment and great kindness in dealing with people. He is a public servant of exceptional character and skill."
McCaffrey told the Washington Post: "This is no insult to army culture ... but he was way too bright, way too articulate, way too good looking and perceived to be way too wired to fit in with our culture."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uselections2004/story/0,13918... "I have watched him at close range for 35 years, in which I have looked at the allegation, and I found it totally unsupported," said retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who taught with Clark at West Point in the 1970s. "That's not to say he isn't ambitious and quick. He is probably among the top five most talented I've met in my life. I think he is a national treasure who has a lot to offer the country."
McCaffrey acknowledges that Clark was not the most popular four-star general among the Army leadership. "This is no insult to Army culture, a culture I love and admire," McCaffrey said, "but he was way too bright, way too articulate, way too good-looking and perceived to be way too wired to fit in with our culture. He was not one of the good old boys."
http://www.projo.com/extra/2003/candidates/content/proj... Defense Secretary William Perry: who as deputy defense secretary first encountered Clark in 1994 when he was a three-star on the Joint Staff. "I was enormously impressed by him," said Perry, a legendary Pentagon technologist who served as defense secretary under Clinton.
Perry was so impressed, in fact, that with Clark facing retirement unless a four-star job could be found for him, Perry overrode the Army and insisted that Clark be appointed commander of the U.S. Southern Command, one of the military's powerful regional commanders in chief, or CINCs. "I was never sorry for that appointment," Perry said.
http://www.projo.com/extra/2003/candidates/content/proj... Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs overrode the Army once again and made sure Clark became Supreme Allied Commander Europe, traditionally the most powerful CINC, with command of all U.S. and NATO forces on the continent.
http://www.projo.com/extra/2003/candidates/content/proj... Col. Douglas Macgregor: There is this aspect of his character: He is loyal to people he knows are capable and competent," Macgregor said. "As for his peers, it's a function of jealousy and envy, and it's a case of misunderstanding. Gen. Clark is an intense person, he's passionate, and certainly the military is suspicious of people who are intense and passionate. He is a complex man who does not lend himself to simplistic formulations. But he is very competent, and devoted to the country."
http://www.projo.com/extra/2003/candidates/content/proj... Col. David Hackworth: I'm impressed. He is insightful, he has his act together, he understands what makes national security tick – and he thinks on his feet somewhere around Mach 3. No big surprise, since he graduated first in his class from West Point, which puts him in the supersmart set with Robert E. Lee, Douglas MacArthur and Maxwell Taylor.
Clark was so brilliant, he was whisked off to Oxford as a Rhodes scholar and didn't get his boots into the Vietnam mud until well after his 1966 West Point class came close to achieving the academy record for the most Purple Hearts in any one war. When he finally got there, he took over a 1st Infantry Division rifle company and was badly wounded.
He doesn't suffer fools easily and wouldn't have allowed the dilettantes who convinced Dubya to do Iraq to even cut the White House lawn. So he should prepare for a fair amount of dart-throwing from detractors he's ripped into during the past three decades.
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_I... Andrew Young: "I asked a whole lot of my friends who were generals and colonels and majors, who served over General Clark and under General Clark and every last one of them said to me that this is a good man, and if he were leading our nation they would be proud. son of the South capable of making a dangerous world a safer place for everybody. A man we are going to make the next president of the United States."
http://socialize.morningstar.com/NewSocialize/asp/FullC... 
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