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GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, you know, I went to several Senators, including I think a couple who later ran for office, and, for the Presidency. I said, "Don't believe him." (laughs) "He's made up his mind to go to war. Don't give him a blank check."Al Franken: Mm Hm. GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: But they gave him a blank check. I said it on CNN, "You can't give him a blank check." And I said it in the testimony that you have to make sure that there's a resolution. It's got to be a broad resolution so we can go to the United Nations, but it doesn't and shouldn't be a blank check.http://securingamerica.com/node/932=============== September 16, 2002: Clark said Congress shouldn't give a "blank check," to Use Force Against Iraq. On September 16, 2002, Clark said, regarding Iraq and possible Congressional authorization to use force, "Don't give a blank check. Don't just say, you are authorized to use force. Say what the objectives are. Say what the limitations are, say what the constraints and restraints are. What is it that we, the United States of America, hope to accomplish in this operation?"
WOODRUFF: How much difference does it make, the wording of these resolution or resolutions that Congress would pass in terms of what the president is able to do after? CLARK: I think it does make a difference because I think that Congress, the American people's representatives, can specify what it is they hope that the country will stand for and what it will do. So I think the -- what people say is, don't give a blank check. Don't just say, you are authorized to use force. Say what the objectives are. Say what the limitations are, say what the constraints and restraints are. What is it that we, the United States of America, hope to accomplish in this operation. And I think that the support will be stronger and it will be more reliable and more consistent if we are able to put the specifics into the resolution. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0209/16/ip.00.html
Clark opposed the Bush Administration's ill-advised war in Iraq, often citing its inability to involve allies and properly plan for post-war reconstruction:
On August 2, 2002, Clark said, regarding a possible invasion of Iraq, "We seem to have skipped some steps in the logic of the debate. And, as the American people are brought into this, they're asking these questions."
August 29, 2002--Clark said there is "War Fever Out There Right Now in Some Quarters of the Leadership Elements in this Country...Where is That Coming From?"
On August 29, 2002, Clark said regarding a proposed invasion of Iraq, "Well, taking it to the United Nations doesn't put America's foreign policy into the hands of the French. What you have to do as the United States is you have to get other nations to commit and come in with you, and so you've got to provide the evidence, and the convincing of the French and the French public, and the leadership elite. Look, there's a war fever out there right now in some quarters of some of the leadership elements in this country, apparently, because I keep hearing this sense of urgency and so forth. Where is that coming from? The vice president said that today he doesn't know when they're going to get nuclear weapons. They've been trying to get nuclear weapons for -- for 20 years.So if there's some smoking gun, if there's some really key piece of information that hasn't been shared publicly, maybe they can share it with the French."
On August 29, 2002, Clark said, regarding a possible invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, "I think -- but I think that underneath, what you're going to have is you're going to have more boiling in the street. You're going to have deeper anger and you're going to feed the recruitment efforts of Al Qaeda. And this is the key point, I think, that we're at here. The question is what's the greater threat? Three thousand dead in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon underscore the fact that the threat we're facing primarily is Al Qaeda. We have to work the Iraq problem around dealing with Al Qaeda. And the key thing about dealing with Al Qaeda is, we can't win that war alone."
On August 29, 2002, Clark said, regarding a possible invasion of Iraq, "My perspective would be I'd like to see us slow down the rush to go after Saddam Hussein unless there's some clear convincing evidence that we haven't had shared with the public that he's right on the verge of getting nuclear weapons.
On August 30, 2002, Clark said, regarding a possible invasion of Iraq, "Going after Iraq right now is at best a diversion, and at worst it risks the possibility of strengthening Al Qaeda and undercutting our coalition at a critical time. So at the strategic level, I think we have to keep our eye on the ball and focus on the number one strategic priority. There are a lot of other concerns as well, but that's the main one."
On August 30, 2002, Clark said, regarding a possible invasion of Iraq, "It seems that way to me. It seems that this would supercharge the opinion, not necessarily of the elites in the Arab world, who may bow to the inevitability of the United States and its power, but the radical groups in the Middle East, who are looking for reasons and gaining more recruits every time the United States makes a unilateral move by force. They will gain strength from something like this. We can well end up in Iraq with thousands of military forces tied down, and a worse problem in coping with a war on terror here in the United States or Europe, or elsewhere around the world." On September 23, 2002, Clark said, regarding Iraq and possible Congressional authorization for the use of force, "When you're talking about American men and women going and facing the risk we've been talking about this afternoon... you want to be sure that you're using force and expending American blood and lives in treasure as the ultimate last resort. Not because of a sense of impatience with the arcane ways of international institutions." http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-09-26clark.html
On October 5, 2002, Clark said, regarding debate on Congressional authorization for war against Iraq, "The way the debate has emerged, it's appeared as though to the American people, at least to many that talk to me, as though the administration jumped to the conclusion that it wanted war first and then the diplomacy has followed." On January 23, 2003, Clark said, regarding the case the United States had made for war against Iraq to the United Nations, "There are problems with the case that the U.S. is making, because the U.S. hasn't presented publicly the clear, overwhelming sense of urgency to galvanize the world community to immediate military action now." http://www.clark04.com/faq/iraq.html
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