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I have spoken to roughly 500 Iowa Causus goers in the last month, and as they were able to connect the dots on Deans stances in separate issues, many who were leaning towards Dean began to lean away.
Both of the candidates who stated that they wanted to repeal the all of the Bush tax cuts were slaughtered by the two candidtes who said they wanted to keep the Democratic Party's addition to the Bush tax cuts which was larger cuts to the middle class than Bush wanted to give.
Adding to this fact is that many people who supported Dean because of his stance on National, Universal Health were able to put this togetther with Deans staten=ments and overwhelming comittment to fiscal responsability based on fiscal conservatism, rather than progressive fiscal responsibility. Deans position that he would not consider beginning a universal health program until the budget was balanced lost Dean a large number of people between the ages of fofty and 65, who supported Dean because they have been thinking of retiring early, or downshifting in their jobs, and the only thing preventing this is their need to keep their job related health benefits.
Tie this in with Deans changing stance, and his unwillingness to clarify this stance on whether Medicare and Social Security will be on or off the table for cuts under a Dean Administration also served him very poorly among those who are about to retire, or already retured on a fixed income. Dick Gephardt did not help himself by pointing out Deans actual record of statements in the past on Medicare and Social Security, but served both Kerry and Edwards rather well. As Governor, when cuts were necessary for him to balance the budget, Vermont State programs that were the equivalent of Medicvare and Social Security were the first programs to feel the heft of Deans budget axe. And those who have been artound tend to placemore credence in what a erson has actually done regarding programs that they benefit from, than the candidates talk during a campaign. Especially when that candidates campaign talk is rather far removedd from the actual decisions they made while in office.
Deans stance on the war did not do him any good wither, as Dean was not, as the other candidates pointed out, and the media reminded the Iowa voter of, against either war with Saddam Hussein, or unilateral action. The fact that Dean tried to alter the facts on his stance before March of 2003, regarding his statemtns prior to Bush invading also was more closely scrutinized by the Iowa media as the caucus got closer. This does not reflect a right wing media conspiracy against Dean, just the media doing what it always does to candidates. This is to reveal all of the candidates statements from the start to the finish of their campaign in that particular state. Deans statements about his own stance on the war would have been better serverd if he admitted to his earlier support of the possibility of unilateral action, and the two conditions under which he staed he would consider unilateral action.
Dean did state that he would find unilateral action acceptable if the U.N. did not enforce its own resolutions regarding Iraq that resulted from the Gulf War, and if Saddam Hussein did not disarm himself and acitvely co-operate with U.N. inspectors. After the war started, Dean distanced himself from those prior statements, making his claim to have been the only candidate to have opposed the war from the beginning seem less than plausible. They also gave more and more Iowa Democrats the impression that Dean thought they were too stupid to look back at his record of statements on Iraq, and his record as Governor regarding domestic affairs, and how it is disconnected from his campign for the presidency.
In the same breath, speaking of evolving as a candidate, and refusal to acknowledge that he haschanged at all are such opposing statements that in the end, Dean began to appear to be more opportunistic, and less honest than either Kerry or Edwards, regardless of his anger, which is largely seen as a political ploy, rather than an honest position.
By the time a state is winding up its race for any nomination, the most important factor that the undecided are looking for in a candidate are issues of character, trsutworthiness, and above all a consitant political record.
At the end, in Iowa, Dean and his campaign were seen as lacking in these elements. Watching and listening to C-Span, one heard many, many phone calls in which tentative Dean supporters decided against him for precisely for the consitions noted above.
Dean himself is already speaking of not needing a win in New Hampshire in order to remain viable. Given that while Kerry was beginning to move up from 14 point in Iowa on the 10th of January, to 25 points on the day of the caucus, while Dean started dropping from 28 points on the 10th of January, to the low 20's on the day of the caucus, which were also reflected in similar changes in the polls in New Hampshire, with Dean dropping from 36 points on the 10th of January, to 28 point on the day of the Iowa Caucus seems to indicate that the events in Iowa are being reflected in New Hampshire.
The condition in New Hampshire are begining to resleble those in Iowa as well, with Kerry pickig up major newpsper endorsements in Iowa, just before the caucuses, and recieving major newspaper endorsements in New Hampshire. Dean has endorsement from Washington based democrats from New Hampshire, while Kerry has the major local endorsements, again the same circumstances that occured in Iowa.
Kerry has a very well organized campaign in New Hampsire, but Kerry has chosen for focus first on the even that was going to occur first, which was Iowa, his New Hampshire organization prepared, but waiting until Iowa was finished before gearing up for full action.
Even a win in New Hampshire will not be as much of a feat for either Dean or Kerry, as this state is within their own turf, and first or second place will be equally effective for either candidate. It was being able to have a campign and platform that resonated outside of ones own home ground that is of greater consideration. A win in New Hampshire for Clark or now possibly Edwards, with enough bounce which will be consideres a major accomplishment.
Also, most political science professors and other professional observers of the political arena, both Democratic leaning and Republican leaning, indicate that Dean is simply the weakest of the major Democratic candidates regarding overall electability, as well as ability to beat Bush in the General election. This is fact. While during December and early January, a few polls showed Dean as being able to be close competition for Bush, most polls showed that Dean was the candidate with the widest spread in the General election against Bush, and again, this impression of Dean as compared to Kerry also was spoken of in the last ten days of the campaign. Many of those who leaned towards Dean or in fact, had up until that point had decided that they were going to support Dean, earlier in the campaign also gave this reason for deciding to select another candidate over Dean.
Dean had overwhelmingly spent more time in Iowa than any of the other candidates. Eighteen months longer than the other candidates who have only spent six months there, and for the most part the others did not gear up their camapigns in Iowa until the last month. But for the first eighteen months, all Iowa voters got to hear was Deans opinion of himself.
During the last few weeks, they got to not only hear other candidates opinions of Dean, which of course would be slanted, but they got to hear about Dean record as Governor, and records of his earlier campaign statementy outside of Iowa.
The difference between Deans opinion of himself and the reality behind his record are the likely largest reasons for the events and way the Iowa Caucuses turned out. This is not to say that what Dean did in Vermont were events that did not occur, just that they were not as impressive as Dean made them out to be, and that perhaps Dean was not as responsible for the positive changes in Vermont as he claimed.
For New Hampshire to be something that will improve Deans viability, Dean is going to have to win New Hampshire big, with as large a difference between him and other candidates as there was between himself and the candidates who did etter than him in Iowa.
Kucinich supporters in New Hampshire are likely to do for Edwards what the did for him in Iowa, and while this did not sizably improve Edwards percentages in Iowa (It looks like Edwards still would have gotten over thirty percent in Iowa regardless of Kucinich's requests for those who supported him to go to Edwards if Kucinich did not have a viable campaign in Iowa). And it is highly unlikely that those who supported Gephardt in Iowa are going to support Dean in New Hampshire, now that Gephardt has pulled out. They are most likely to split between Clark and Kerry, and Edwards.
Yet Dean will not be able to play the longshot in New Hampshire, as he is currently frontrunner there, but no longer by the thirty points he held over Kerry between September and early January. Kerry is still the longshot in New Hampshire, and New Hampshire voters, like Iowa voters, are voters who tend to completely reverse themselves on the initial frontrunner in their states, with similar statistics for candidate switches existing in both states. On average in both states, 75 percent of those who support the frontrunning candidate in the months prior to a nomination vote tend to change from the frontrunner to another candidate in the last week, regardless of what the results were in the first state to hold its nomination election.
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