Daze of reckoning in Gaza

[bemildred]

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This is fascinating reading material, not only for the Palestinian leadership that kept the report secret until it was leaked, and not only for Palestinian citizens. It paints a terrifying picture of military and political helplessness, internal disputes, family loyalties, a lack of talent and ability to administer military and political forces, a huge waste of money (Mohammed Dahlan received $25 million to build a trained military force, which collapsed in one moment), an absence of coordination between headquarters and the forces in the field, many cases of fear along with some demonstrations of courage, and personal and party hatred between members of Fatah themselves, not to mention toward Hamas.

But beyond the importance of the report as courageous Palestinian accounting, its most significant revelation is that PA President Mahmoud Abbas not only assumed that Hamas was about to take control of Gaza, he also knew it. He had before him all the analyses, the information and the developments that preceded the Hamas takeover. Nonetheless, Abbas did not manage to do anything to prevent the takeover, nothing that might have prevented the present situation in Gaza. According to the report, the failure was not only functional, but also a case of "ideological neglect," because since 1994, the year when the PA was established, the authority in general, and Fatah in particular, had not formulated national principles relating to the proper approach of the PA toward movements based on religious platforms, such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

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It also seems that Israel twice missed a historic opportunity to cooperate with Hamas - in practical, even if not in political terms. The first instance was when it boycotted the Hamas government when it was established democratically after the 2006 elections, and the second when the national unity government between Fatah and Hamas was formed.

This report may be the most relevant document for answering the practical question today of whether to conduct negotiations with Hamas, or to continue the two-pronged policy involving ongoing fruitless political talks with Abbas and waging a war without goals against Hamas. Israel and the PA must keep in mind the warning of the authors of this report: If the structure of the Palestinian security forces does not change, if structural and ideological conclusions are not implemented, and if there is no single strategic policy, the Palestinian government is liable to collapse in the West Bank as well.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/961725.html