The meeting between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas was too little, too late. It was too late because Olmert waited for a year before inviting the Palestinian leader to a work meeting. And it was too little because in the year that has passed, the political standing of both figures has been seriously weakened.
The Palestinian Authority is being torn apart in an internal struggle and is on the verge of civil war, while Olmert has lost public support and is worried about potentially destabilizing his coalition. Under such conditions, despite the importance of the meeting, the two leaders will have a hard time turning it into a real political process.
Olmert depicted the meeting with Abbas as a first step in implementing the political initiative he raised four weeks ago in his Sde Boker speech. The prime minister made an offer to Abbas at the time to begin a political process that would include "the evacuation of many territories and communities established therein," the establishment of a Palestinian state with territorial contiguity in the West Bank, and the release of many prisoners. Since that speech, serious international pressure has been exerted on Olmert and Abbas to forgo their preconditions and agree to talk. Israel must show it is standing with Abbas and Fatah in their confrontation with Hamas.
Ahead of the meeting, Abbas conceded his demand that prisoners be released, and Olmert conceded his demands for a new Palestinian government and the release of abducted soldier Gilad Shalit. The prime minister also took a political risk in his decision to show restraint in the face of continuing Qassam fire from Gaza, despite pressure from Defense Minister Amir Peretz and other ministers to resume Israel Defense Forces activities there. Olmert's policy of restraint enabled the meeting to take place, an eventuality that was in doubt until the last moment.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/805014.html