Kidnap of soldiers in July was Hezbollah's fifth attempt

[bemildred]

Two months before the July 12 raid in which Hezbollah abducted two Israel Defense Forces soldiers and killed three others, Israel had learned of another plan by the group to carry out an attack against an IDF patrol at the same location.

Sources said Hezbollah refrained from carrying out the attack due to the deployment of large IDF forces in the area. At the same time, Israel contacted American and French diplomats, and warned them that if Hezbollah would attempt to kidnap IDF soldiers again, Israel's response would include a large-scale military operation.

It is unclear whether Israel's warning of a massive response to another attempt to kidnap soldiers reached Hezbollah, nor is it clear whether the group chose to disregard the warning.

---

The abduction of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, which sparked the war in the north, was the fifth attempt by Hezbollah to kidnap IDF soldiers. Since the October 2000 attack in which three IDF soldiers were killed during a kidnap attempt, this was the only time Hezbollah succeeded in capturing IDF soldiers and holding them as hostages.

Haaretz

[The Magistrate]

1. An Interesting Article, Sir

Disregarded warnings, or failure to observe developments accurately, are pretty common coin.

[Lithos]

2. I agree with an inaccurate read...

Nasrullah admitted as much already. I think Olmert was too much of an unknown to him; hard to play effective poker with someone who you just sat down at the table with.

L-

[msmcghee]

3. Your poker analogy is misleading.

Poker is a game where all players agree to abide by the same rules. At this table one party was there to cheat.

The "innacrurate read" you refer to is just Nasralla's overestimation of his own abilities. He didn't expect Olmert to draw the line so distinctly this time.

[The Magistrate]

5. It Seemed A Fairly Good One To Me, Ma'am

For Nasrallah's point of view, there are two basic possibilities: either he thought the Israeli response would be colossal, or he thought the Israeli response would be restrained. Both reactions, he could safely enough presume, would enhance his prestige, and so the action could only benefit him. His statements after the fact that he did not think the Israelis would react on the scale they did are meaningless as indications of his actual decision process, though they do suggest the popularity of Hezbollah, and conviction of its "victory," are not quite as they are often presented, in Lebanese society.

From Olmert's point of view, he had little choice but to react by a sizeable show of force: his actions in Gaza set something of a precedent by which reaction to a new and similar provocation would have to be judged, and anything less would have been read as weakness by political foes and friends alike.

[msmcghee]

6. I agree with your assessment.

But I still think the poker analogy does not apply so well. I chose a different aspect of poker - that it is a peaceful game played by parties who agree beforehand on some set of rules to be impartially applied during the game - than you and Lithos.

I'm not saying you are wrong - in that there is deadly serious gamesmanship involved - which also happens in poker games. (In fact I used the word "misleading" in my post to characterize Lithos' post, which I believe is incorrect, reading it back now.)

I should have explained my point further and I accept your criticism.

[bemildred]

4. Yes Sir.

That was my main interest. The view seems to be foggy in all directions. Something it is always good to keep in mind.

[Igel]

7. Wasn't there recent video footage released showing that

the kidnappees in 2000 were alive for a while after they were kidnapped? Something about a documentary on Lebanese tv that showed new footage from Hizb.