What's left to vote on?

[Behind the Aegis]

On Monday, a visitor arrived in Damascus: Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), the former Palestinian prime minister and one of the "architects" of Oslo. He came to see Bashar Assad carrying a letter from Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen).

What the letter said exactly is not known, but from Assad's reaction, as published by the Syrian news agency, one can surmise that it included a request for assistance. Not money, but political assistance. "We are in favor of the unity of the Palestinian people," was Assad's public response. On the face of it, this was just an empty slogan. But in fact, it was a hint that is very pregnant with meaning and directed at Hamas, especially at the movement's leadership, which is a "guest" in Damascus. Because Abbas asked Syria to persuade - or, if possible, to pressure - the head of Hamas' political bureau, Khaled Meshal, to agree to adopt the so-called "prisoners' document" as the diplomatic platform of Ismail Haniyeh's government.

When Abu Ala was asked to travel to Damascus, the initial public reply of Meshal, who is essentially the head of external Hamas, was already known. A few days earlier, in an interview with the Qatari newspaper Al-Watan, Meshal insisted that he was opposed to a referendum on the prisoners' document and that the Palestinian government was an elected government, and thus there was no need to survey public opinion again. "There was no referendum on the Oslo Accords," he pointed out. But between Meshal's statements and Abu Ala's trip, something else happened: Ehud Olmert met with Hosni Mubarak.

Granted, the Arabic press, which was not pleased about the meeting, published an upsetting photo in which the Israeli prime minister is seen placing his hand on the Egyptian president's shoulder - a familiar gesture of authority. But actually, the one who ran the meeting was Mubarak, who laid out for Olmert all the dangers and deep fears felt by Jordan over the possibility of unilateral moves by Israel, and Egypt's concern over a possible outbreak of civil war in the Gaza Strip, as a result of which Egyptian police are liable to be injured. If that were to happen, Mubarak would face tough internal pressure and would be forced to choose between two paths of action: withdrawing Egyptian forces, which would bring the Philadelphi Route agreement to an end, or intervening and using force against those attacking the Egyptians. Mubarak is not keen on either possibility, and thus he had to do something right away.


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