None of al-Haideri’s claims were true. Today’s
Rolling Stone reveals that the administration’s use of al-Haideri’s lies to justify the Iraq war were “the product of a clandestine operation … that had been set up and funded by the CIA and the Pentagon for the express purpose of selling a war.”
At the center of this operation was John Rendon and The Rendon Group, “a controversial, secretive firm that has been criticized as ineffective and too expensive,” more than $56 million since the 9/11 attacks. (Taxpayers are paying him $311.26/hour.)
The Rendon Group personally set up the Iraqi National Congress and helped install Ahmad Chalabi as leader, whose main goal — “pressure the United States to attack Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein” — Rendon helped facilitate. Pentagon documents show that Rendon has the highest level of government clearance (above Top Secret), which helped it with its INC work — “a worldwide media blitz designed to turn Hussein…into the greatest threat to world peace.”
While the White House continues to insist it did not manipulate intelligence before the Iraq war, it sure seems that it hired John Rendon and his group to do just that.
Numerous links available at the
ThinkProgress post:
http://thinkprogress.org/2005/11/17/rendon-groupI had just finished reading the above when I checked at
TPM and noticed that Mark Schmitt had an extensive post in the
TPMCafe and one excerpt seemed to fit well with the above report from
ThinkProgress:<clip>
I think that the way we're looking at these questions is a little quaint. We're asking very traditional questions: Was information withheld? Was there deceit about the information? Those are the familiar Watergate/Iran-contra questions.
But they overlook the Ideology of Information that the administration created.
By this I mean the whole practice of evaluating all information going into the war not for its truth value, but for whether it promoted or hindered the administration's goal of being free to go to war. The President could have been given every bit of intelligence information available, and he and/or Cheney would have reached the same decision because they would have discarded, discounted, or disregarded most of it.
Information that was Useful to that goal was put in one box, Not Useful put in another.
Entire categories of information were assigned to the Not Useful box because their source was deemed an opponent of U.S. military action, or assumed to have some other motive.
All information from the UN inspectors went into the Not Useful box because they were deemed war opponents, or because it was believed that giving any credence to the inspectors would lead back into the mid-1990s cycle of inspections and evasions of inspections. Any information from the CIA was considered Not Useful because they were deemed to have overlooked Saddam's arsenal in the 1990s.
The fact that Saddam did everything the inspectors and the U.S. asked, even to the point of destroying the missiles whose specifications exceeded an agreement, was Not Useful or irrelevant because Saddam's motive was to avoid war. (Of course it was!) <clip>
It is important to call attention to the Ideology of Information promoted during that period because it is very much alive. It is inherent in the Plame leak and to this day in the criticisms of Wilson -- the argument that he was the one who revealed information in his op-ed. It is inherent in the Bush and Cheney speeches: criticism and second thoughts, reminders of alternative information are all deemed simply Not Useful.
It's something much deeper and sicker than just withholding or manipulating information. Much more at the link to
Ideology of Information:
http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2005/11/17/173326/24And, we know how invaluable the services of Judith Miller, almost all of the major broadcast and print media corporations were to the distribution of the propaganda.
Peace.