December, 2001: Iraq Analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

[welshTerrier2]

here's an item that shows the invasion of Iraq and taking out Saddam was very much in the "pipeline" (pun intended!!) long before all the evidence that "was fixed around the policy" was "prepared" ... one thing I'll say for the Joint Chiefs' analysis, those guys really understood the debacle that was soon to occur in Iraq ...

bush, cheney and rumsfeld should be brought up on treason charges for ignoring their insightful guidance ...

source: http://www.iraqtimeline.com/2001.html

December, 2001: The Joint Chiefs, unimpressed with the plan, orders a counterproposal to be developed that won't include the INC. Generals and admirals take the lead in criticizing the plan, spearheaded by Marine General Anthony Zinni. Zinni maintains that all the plans he saw during his years at CENTCOM involved the participation of at least two corps -- at least six combat divisions, totalling around 150,000 troops, as well as heavy air support. In a 2000 essay, Zinni, who is preparing to retire, wrote that to "drive a stake" through the heart of Saddam, "You must have the political will -- and that means the will of the administration, the Congress, and the American people. All must be united in a desire for action. Instead, however, we try to get results on the cheap. There are congressmen today who want to fund the Iraqi Liberation Act, and let some silk-suited, Rolex-wearing guys in London gin up an expedition. We'll equip a thousand fighters and arm them with $97 million worth of AK-47s and insert them into Iraq. And what will we have? A Bay of Goats, most likely."

One of the officials involved in the planning says that he, too, has doubts about the efficacy of an INC-based armed insurrection, even one backed by US Special Forces and airpower: "If you go to war and don't address the root political problem, why bother? All we're going to get is another tyrant in five years. If this is the war to end all jihads, it's got to have a broad-based political agenda behind it." One of Zinni's close aides says, "Our question was, 'What about the day after?' How do you deal with the long-term security aspects of Iraq? For example, do you take the Republican Guard and disarm it? Or is it preferable to turn it from having a capability to protect Saddam to a capability to protect Iraq? You've got Kurds in the north, Arab Shia in the south, and the Baath Party in the middle, with great internal tribal divisions. There's potential for civil war. Layer on external opposition and you've got a potential for great instability. I'm a military planner and plan for the worst case. As bad as this guy is, a stable Iraq is better than instability."

A former senior Defense Department official says, "The issue is not how nice it would be to get rid of Saddam. Everybody in the Middle East would be delighted to see him go. The problem is feasibility." (Seymour Hersh)