The Handover: Too Little, Too Soon

[wtmusic]

The handover of political authority from U.S. Administrator L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority to interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi should have been a major step of great significance for coalition forces.

Unfortunately, it won’t.

For more then a year, the CPA has moved slowly and ineffectively in returning power to the Iraqi people. There has been no sense of urgency in restoring government functions and making provisions for the Iraqi people to have a livelihood. Programs to establish police and other security forces had long-term objectives, but no short-term execution.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/06/28/opinion/main626355.shtml

[ewagner]

1. Overlooking the obvious

The greatest failure after the invasion was the inability to find in-country personnel to take over the functions of government immediately. Unlike Haiti, where there was a clear "opposition government" ready to step in and take control there was no such entity in Iraq. Pentagon planners had mistakenly believed that Chalabi and others like him would be greeted as returning heroes and easily step into positions of legitimate authority. As with so many other issues in Iraq, the Pentagon was dead wrong.

There is no Iraqi George Washington. The failure to identify or even groom such a person around whom the Iraqi people could unite was and remains the biggest failure of the CPA.

[yowzayowzayowza]

2. "Dead wrong"

Was the Pentagon dead wrong or more specifically (and importantly) the Office of Special Plans dead wrong?

[ewagner]

3. Good Point

Although I suppose you could say the Pentagon was wrong to the extent that Rummy bought the OSP bullshit hook, line, and sinker.